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ABSTRACT
This report presents the U.S. Cyber Command with a cross-case study based on the examination
of China’s, Russia’s, Iran’s, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s history, geography,
politics, economy, religion, and philosophy in order to understand how each differing strategic
culture guides the state’s motivations and behaviors. This includes each country’s employment
of non-state actors and proxies, legal framework, and military-civilian relations. The strategic
culture lens provides a deeper understanding of each state’s cyberwarfare strategies. By
examining how current factors are shaping the most likely future trajectory and what the most
dangerous trajectory could look like, we provide lessons that the U.S. can draw upon for its own
strategic formulations.
The team conducted literature and internet reviews to identify the influencing factors for each
country’s strategic cultures and current cyber capabilities. Additionally, the team conducted inperson and phone interviews with field experts to assist in the understanding of the issues,
concepts, and processes to formulate the most relevant product for the client. Interviewees
included Erica Borghard, Jenny Jun, Jack Snyder, JD Work, Jason Healey, Sean Kanuck, Adam
Segal and Nadiya Kostyuk.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This project examines how strategic culture influences the way Russia, China, Iran, and North
Korea conceptualize, understand, and act within cyberspace to better inform future U.S.
decision-making, policy creation, and national actions within cyberspace. This report is
presented in the form of a cross-case study that attempts to answer two overarching research
questions:
1. Strategic culture: How does strategic culture frame each state’s understanding of the cyber
domain and, therefore how does this understanding inform the capabilities they currently
possess, intend to develop, and how they plan to use them?
2. Future trajectories: What does the most likely trajectory for each country look like? What
does the most dangerous trajectory look like?
The strategic culture lens -understood as the embodiment of how history, geography, politics,
economy, religion and philosophy shape a nation’s identity and create a consistently structured
national security response- is used to enable a broader and deeper understanding of each state’s
cyberwarfare strategy. Each case study provides a set of lessons that the U.S. can draw upon for
its own cyber strategy as well as potential areas for future research.

CHINA
Chinese strategic culture is usually described by either the Confucian-Mencian paradigm or the
Parabellum paradigm. However, it can be argued that cyberspace presents a new vehicle
capable of supporting the employment of both. Consequently, an important analysis of Chinese
strategic culture accounts for the use of cyberspace through a continued avoidance of violence
in lieu of predominantly offensive operations. Espionage, intellectual property theft, and
information dominance are all methods employed through cyber means to ensure the
preservation of the state, protection of its national borders, and the prevention of perceived
disruptive influences from potential adversaries seeking to prevent China’s rise.
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Although China’s national strategy and objectives persist, a noticeable shift has been observed
in the intensity and frequency of its cyberspace activities. However, China is likely to continue to
use its interpretation of international law to legitimize both its domestic and international
actions in the cyber domain. The establishment of the “Information Silk Road” as part of the
OBOR initiative is likely to remain a major focus in growing China’s economy and regional
influence through cyberspace because it enables both information dominance domestically and
deterrence of international interference associated with disputes in the South China Sea,
Taiwan, and Tibet. Another economic consideration should also be taken into account is that
China remains a large holder of U.S. debt, and this is likely to strongly influence Chinese
decision-making when considering the impact of cyber operations that could negatively
influence or potentially damage U.S. critical economic infrastructure.
On the other hand, misperception of signals from Beijing based on how China seeks to engage
in cyberspace can lead to dangerous global impacts. A situation where the PLA views U.S.
actions to be a violation of its cyber sovereignty maintains a propensity to be perceived as an
offensive action and trigger a preemptive response from China. Consequently, this may lead to
an escalatory crisis scenario that maintains the propensity of spreading to other domains. If
escalation occurs through cyberspace, a U.S. response may not be able to achieve the desired
magnitude of its intended effectiveness against specific digital targets as a result of tight
controls across China’s internet. Accordingly, these factors may compel the U.S. or other nations
to consider kinetic avenues of approach toward their desired targets in some capacity.
Whether U.S. actions are deemed to be offensive or defense in nature, a violation of Chinese
sovereignty (physical or asymmetric geographies), or as an active attempt to delegitimize the
state government, will have profound impacts on China’s deployment of its cyberspace
capabilities. Consequently, the U.S. must seek to understand what China’s ‘nine-dash line’ is in
cyberspace, and how it can best formulate a strategy that will prevent an escalatory response as
a result of misunderstood signals in all domains of warfare.
An important point of emphasis in the formulation of U.S. cyber strategy with China should also
include a thorough analysis of how the Chinese government is likely to understand, interpret,
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and implement future cyberspace agreements, as well as not just China’s short-term strategic
objectives, but also their long-term global ambitions twenty to thirty years from now.
Lastly, the consolidation efforts of President Xi Jinping this past year may be signaling a new
development in how China seeks to use cyberspace to its advantage in the future. For example,
the Confucian “mandate of heaven” can be conceptualized as a potential representation for how
President Xi’s legitimacy has been built upon his intent to restore China’s world standing, and
how a newly consolidated cyber force represents another means to achieve this national
objective.

RUSSIA
The Russian approach to cyberspace is based on a Hobbesian zero-sum interpretation of the
international arena in which a failure to vanquish spells defeat. Russia’s conduct within the cyber
domain has been informed by state affairs and political developments and makes a particular
emphasis on offense. Deep operations theory has considerable visibility and applicability in
Russia’s approach to cyber warfare and appears most demonstrably in its offensive posture in
the realms of Command and Control (C2), Psychological Operations (PsyOps), or Action on
Objective. Deep operations theory is also evident in Russia’s Information Security Doctrine of
2008, which marshals all sectors of Russian society to exercise efforts in furtherance of Russian
national information security objectives. Another point of consideration is that progression to
greater state control of the Internet appears to proceed in a piecemeal manner, where
legislation has been passed addressing specific facets of information security instead of a
nationwide firewall.
Conventional intelligence has shown greater Russian willingness to use force in the cyberspace
domain. This includes using Ukraine as a testing ground for more of its advanced cyber
weaponry and tactics. These have been employed in support of kinetic operations, as well as in
pure cyber missions. Given past Russian success in cementing frozen conflicts, its need for
cognizance in its actual capacity, and the risk of over stretch, further belligerence will likely occur
in the Near Abroad. We can expect Russia will be active in group operations across domains,
until they see their adversaries parried.
5

What appears to be the worst-case future trajectory is that Russia will exhibit even less reticence
to engage in aggressive behavior. As a result of, minimal and shrinking economic and diplomatic
common interest, and links with the West. This evaluation is seconded by the possibility that the
DNC breach is a sign of Russian disregard for the consequences of its actions. If this were to be
the case, then it would be more than reasonable to anticipate the most dangerous scenario to
be a Russian doubling-down in the face of confrontation. In addition, with every capability that
Russia has perpetrated on the West, there was a precedent in its near abroad. Whether through
pure information operations in Estonia, hybrid operations in Georgia and Crimea, or infiltration
of critical infrastructure systems in Eastern Ukraine. There are parallels in information
operations to influence elections, the possibility of clash in flashpoints featuring the Russian
Armed Forces, as well as the discovered presence of Russian malware in U.S. SCADA systems.
Russian action is trying to maximize its push for hegemony in what it deems its traditional
spheres by any means necessary, just short of war. As for implications for the US, countering
deception in the information space will require i) an understanding of the means and disguises
through which Russians will obfuscate their actions in the domestic space; and ii) hardening soft
targets, such as social media and defense against guerrilla cyber operations through proxy TOR
servers.
Moreover, it will be necessary to adapt to the Russian understanding of deterrence, which is a
reiteration of active measures. However, understanding and remembering Russia’s desire for a
strategic stability that aligns with great power balance, and one that reinforces the Russian
perception of a multipolar world, is key. As the strategic stakes increase with symbolic and
strategic importance, we see the lengths Russia will go to. Without communicated direct
response or show to force from the West, Russia will feel emboldened to proceed with impunity.
In response to Russian influence operations during the 2016 election, notable steps were taken
with respect to diplomatic and judicial retaliation. It is time that these are joined militarily.
Atlantic Resolve is just one of many steps taken in the kinetic realm. A potent next step would
be to join this with an OCO that imposes cost on Russia and makes them cognizant of not only
the lengths to which the U.S. will proceed offensively, but what risk they pose to themselves.
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IRAN
Today, significant features in the strategic culture of the Islamic Republic of Iran are: a strong
national cultural identity, dominant leaders, and powerful military organizations as important
players in strategic development as well as important receptors for strategic targeting. Both the
strong national cultural identity, which is rooted in regional hegemonic ambitions, and the
dominance of the theocratic ruling regime lead to a culture in which a powerful military arsenal
is a must. Similarly, the powerful national identity and military culture lead to confrontation and
rivalries with regional foes, which themselves become part of the strategic culture of Iran. These
features are woven together such that they produce a comprehensive strategic culture that
dictates Iran’s foreign policy and military activities in general, and its cyber warfare activities in
particular.
The history of Iran as a major civilization and hegemonic regional power has manifested in
Iranian cyberattacks, many of which have targeted its regional adversaries, such as neighboring
Arab Gulf countries and Israel. In addition, its presumed role as leader of the “Axis of Resistance”
(to Israel) has channeled its aggressive cyber operations against U.S. and Western allies in the
region. As a guardian of jurisprudence, and by extension a guardian of the state, the Supreme
Leader and the Ayatollahs exert major control over guiding the use of cyber as a weapon. That
is reflected in Iran’s cyber warfare activities being geared not only to preserve and protect the
regime from domestic and foreign threats but also to go on the offensive against these
adversaries.
In all likelihood, Iran will continue to develop its cyber capabilities and expand the network of
proxies to include Iraqi groups being supported by Iran. Domestically, the IRGC will continue
espionage activities against its citizens to ensure a successful oppression of any popular
protests. Regionally, Iran’s cyberwarfare will continue to focus its sabotage efforts against its
neighboring Arab countries, including targets crucial to U.S. interests in an effort to counter its
adversaries and expand its interventionist policies. Globally, it will focus its efforts on espionage
operations aiming to collect data in order to influence public opinion through propaganda.
Further, in retaliation to the recent statements made by President Trump against Iran’s
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destabilizing activity in the region, the Iranian regime may target businesses belonging to the
President’s family and relatives.
The most dangerous scenario includes much more extensive and dangerous damage targeting
U.S. domestic infrastructure and disruption of U.S. military operations. Although most of Iran’s
activities in the West have been for data mining or financial benefit, a cyber-attack on vital
infrastructure facilities, such as nuclear facilities or electric power plants, in the U.S. cannot be
completely ruled out. Furthermore, since Iran, its proxies, and allies are becoming the target of
Westerns military operations, Iran may choose to escalate further and targeting U.S. bases in
the region with a cyber-attack. The aim of the operation to disrupt the U.S. military operations
in Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Such operations are complicated and require expertise and vast
technical resources. Therefore, Iran may rely mainly on its elite cyber force, the Passive Defense
Organization.
Since it is expected that Iran would likely focus its cyber-attacks attention on the energy sector,
it becomes necessary to realize the importance of allowing additional monitoring of facilities
and internet-connected equipment to prevent any fall and failure. Coordination with the
relevant government entities, is crucial. In addition, the focus of Iran’s cyberspace activity is
directed against the West, including the United States and, therefore, requires appropriate
defensive arrangements, beginning with an up-to-date doctrine of cyberspace defense.
Moreover, and since Iran’s neighbors are a primary target of its cyber warfare, it would be
advisable to encourage the Arab States to strengthen their cyber capability in order to face the
Iranian threat.

DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Historically, the pursuit of aggressive military policies not only consolidated power, but also
overwhelmed South Korea. However, because of the existence of the U.S. military base and the
economic surpassing of South Korea, it is now a clear fact that North Korea has no rational hopes
of achieving its grand mission to unite the Korean peninsula by military might. As so, efficacy of
conventional use of force has been undermined to the maximum extent without risking
engaging in full-fledged war.
8

The continued pursuit of an aggressive set of military policies placed the North Korean elites at
a grid-lock situation against South Korea, the U.S., and the international community, which
meant they could not take any more military action without escalating the situation. In addition,
the Chinese declaration that they would not respect their past agreement to support North
Korea in time of war against the U.S. has left Kim Jung-Un with little room to maneuver in
addressing domestic power retention issues. Because exercising conventional capabilities would
escalate the situation out of control for the North Korean leadership, it was necessary that the
party and the military find a solution to enhance the efficacy of use of force in a method that
does not escalate the current status quo. Such perception and need of the ruling class has
resulted in unexpectedly sophisticated cyber capabilities to be developed, which surprised the
western cyber security experts during the SWIFT and WannaCry hacking incidents.
Beyond the obvious continuation of current activities, one of the top three most likely future
trajectories of Pyongyang elites would consider installing malware that can lay dormant in U.S.
critical infrastructure systems, but that can effectively take down the system from its buildingblock level and up when invoked. Critical infrastructure, such as the three core U.S. electricity
grids, are clear high value targets to cyber intrusion. However, because actual trigger of dormant
malware would be a clear act of war, the DPRK would most likely only plant the malware as a
fallback for the regime and, with high confidence, never pull the trigger unless Kim Jung-Un’s
life is directly threatened.
Second most likely is, with rise of the cloud computing industry, hijacking of computing
infrastructure can become a lucrative exploit for North Korean hackers. Account credential theft
can benefit the DPRK in multiple ways, including utilizing the computing resources to mine
cryptocurrencies, leverage for botnet, and mask malicious deployment. It is highly probable that
individual server operators across the world whose main expertise are not on the servers are all
potential targets for North Korean hacker groups in this regard.
Last of the three most likely future trajectories is Kim Jung-Un and the RGB’s investment toward
long term (15~30 years) cyber-content capacity building. The RGB has a long history of
experimenting their cyber capabilities on South Korea in terms of manipulating the public
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sentiment. Currently, due to what deems to be intelligence failure, former directors of National
Intelligence Service of South Korea were arrested on charges of operating a South Korean
counter action team to counter what they claim is North Korean influence.
In this respect, the Russian interference in the American election would also have been a
benchmark learning experience for RGB strategists. Considering the above along with the
longevity nature of totalitarian regime policies, it is possible to hypothesize that North Korean
strategists would seek to influence a democratic state’s public opinion by indirectly affecting
one of the five blocks in the digital media value chain. For example, the RGB can work to create
original content designed around mockery of existing elected policymakers -it would not only
significantly undermine the RGB’s target individual, but it would also act to discourage policy
makers to ‘meddle’ with North Korea.
The most dangerous future scenario would be North Korea wrongly being accused of a cyber
offensive and being cornered into a kinetic act of war resolution. Such false accusation caused
by the difficult nature of the cyber domain could systematically force the North Korean
leadership into activating the first of the aforementioned scenarios –an execution of attack on
critical infrastructure would directly lead to escalation of tension rapidly and uncontrollably for
either states. North Korean elites have structured their society in a way that leaves them with
limited response decision choices in exchange for continuation of power stability –such
dynamics can be extended to the cyber domain and should be considered as the most dangerous
trajectory possible.
Undermining Kim Jung-Un’s leadership within North Korea would also be a personal red line for
Kim Jung-Un. Although seemingly unassociated with cyber, impossible cases such as the U.S.
pressuring Kim Jung-Un via enabling free flow of information for the mass population would be
detrimental to sustainability and safety of the regime. The DPRK’s intranet is believed to be fully
compatible with the worldwide internet. Although Kim Jung-Un does not allow landlines to be
connected, he could trigger the aforementioned malware in U.S. critical infrastructure as a
retaliation for the improbable case that North Korea is enabled access to the current Western
internet and its free flow of information
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North Korea’s key decision makers have anticipated and confirmed that cyber offers high utility
in pursuing larger policy goals, and further even more aggressive cyber activities seem highly
probable. More hackers having been assigned to money raising operations rather than
intelligence collection, signals that North Korean policymakers are concentrating cyber
capabilities to counter economic sanctions from the U.S., Japan, and South Korea.
For U.S. Cyber Command, drawing a clear online red line seems imperative as the nature of the
DPRK’s cyber operations render it nearly impractical to tackle via counter cyberattack. The
DPRK will continue to be far less vulnerable to cyber-retaliation while their cyber offensive
capabilities have been tailor-made under ‘supreme teachings’ of Kim Jung-Il and Kim Jung-Un.
That, coupled with the reality that North Korean cyber operations are carried out clandestinely
in third-party nations, makes the situation seem as if fighting against a ‘ghost’: the ghost can’t
be hunted or hurt but it can hurt you.
The U.S. must be as comprehensive in their approach to cyber defense as DPRK’s cyber offensive
is. Undermining, misinforming, and disadvantaging the U.S. involves targeting not only mass
population and private companies, but also targeting specific individuals that may be
advantageous to leverage against U.S. government entities such as Cyber Command. As well as
high rank officials of private financial firms. Effectively countering such comprehensive and
combined (kinetic and cyber) offensives by DPRK will require more private-public collaboration,
as well as higher awareness from those in leadership positions.

COMMON THEMES AND GENERAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S.
Imbedded within all four state’s strategic culture is the dominating influence of an authoritative
leader, animosity towards the West, and a strong patriotic/nationalistic response to perceived
slights. Throughout the course of this project, the paramount element that manifested amongst
each is the use of the cyber domain as an equalizer in four areas.
1. All four states analyzed desire prestige or relevance on the international stage, and have
developed cyberwarfare strategies around achieving this objective;
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2. For each of the cases, the understanding of the cyber domain is coupled with the state’s
understanding of Information Warfare (IW);
3. All four cases share the desire for sustaining their regimes; and
4. For each of the cases in this report, cyber capabilities have become an extension of their
asymmetric warfare capability. Of particular importance is their use of proxies and the civil
sector for achieving this means.
Within this mindset of equalization, the control over information is an integral part of all four
state’s cyberwarfare strategies, both domestically (defense) and internationally (offense). The
cyber domain is being used to further drive animosity for the West amongst its citizens and has
enhanced all four nation’s ability to conduct military operations as a means to project power for
coercion, while still remaining just short of the threshold for military response. These states see
the cyber domain as a vail of deniability for actions that might evoke negative repercussions
against them.
Based on these common themes we recommend three areas for which U.S. Cyber Command
needs to be aware:
1. When predicting the future cyber behavior of these four states, accounting for their acute
sensitivity to regime stability is paramount. Any activity conducted by the U.S. that might
be perceived as disruptive to these regimes, has a high likelihood of being responded to via
the cyber domain. As there are already questions around whether the 2015 cyber agreement
between the U.S. and China has actually had any impact on Chinese economic cyberattacks,
the current trade war could easily push China to resume these industrial espionage
operations. Over the past ten years, Russia has ramped up its use of offensive cyberattacks
and has become embolden in its targets, as seen in the recent Democratic National
Convention (DNC) hack and election meddling. As relations between the U.S. and Russia
continue to deteriorate and the effects of newly imposed sanctions are felt by Russia, the
likelihood of them resorting to a cyber response is extremely high. If the recent comments
around the Iran nuclear deal are perceived by the Iranian regime as legitimate threats that
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will lead to newly imposed sanctions, Iran may retaliate with cyberattacks against economic
targets associated with the U.S. North Korea has been able to offset some of the financial
effects of economic sanctions imposed on them through cyber operations. Economic cyber
activity will continue and potentially expand for North Korea especially as tensions with the
U.S. rise.
2. Defending against operations conducted by these states will continue to be a challenge for
U.S. Cyber Command because of their willingness to employ the civil sector and proxies.
These non-state actors provide the adversaries with greater control and flexibility in the
domain. Proxies also adhere to their own ideals and motivations, meaning they operate
according to different rules. This should be the greatest area of concern for U.S. Cyber
Command. China seems to have started shifting focus from intellectual property theft to a
more highly precise offensive targeting of critical infrastructure. In addition to the threat
posed by Russia and China, U.S. Cyber Command must be on the lookout for Iranian and
North Korean threats to critical infrastructure as well. Since both states are relatively
insulated from a U.S. cyber response due to their lack of ICT infrastructure, they perceive
themselves as having a low level of vulnerability in this domain.
3. Preparation for continued contention over the cyber domain must take into account the
potential second and third order effects of peripheral diplomatic and military incidents
spilling over into the cyber domain. The recent kinetic action against the Assad regime by
the United States and its allies has real potential to cause cyber actors sympathetic to the
regime to retaliate against the United States, Israel, or Western interests. We cannot rule
out the possibility that Russia or Iran would use their cyber capabilities to attack the United
States in retaliation for the recent missile deployment in Syria. As spill over incidents
continue to rise, the cyber repercussions to future operations will have to be considered
before they are conducted.
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PROJECT OBJECTIVE
The complex characteristics of the cyber domain, coupled with the fast pace at which it
continues to evolve, has led to multifaceted national security challenges. 1 U.S. Cyber Command
has previously analyzed historical and conceptual cyberspace analogies in relation to how
different variables influence U.S. understanding of this domain. Conversely, this project
examines how strategic culture influences the way Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea
conceptualize, understand, and act within cyberspace to better inform future U.S. decisionmaking, policy creation, and national actions for effective competition in cyberspace.

APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
This report is presented in the form of a cross-case study. The unit of observation for each case
is the nation-state. Given the heterogeneous nature of the units under study, the cross-case
research design is the best suited for i) the intensive study of each individual case and its
underlying dimensions; but also, ii) the comparison between cases.2
This report attempts to answer two overarching research questions:
Strategic culture: How does strategic culture frame each state’s understanding of the cyber
domain and, therefore how does this understanding inform the capabilities they currently
possess, intend to develop, and how they plan to use them?
Future trajectories: What does the most likely strategic trajectory for each country look like?
What does the most dangerous strategic trajectory look like?
The strategic culture lens enables a broader and deeper understanding of each state’s
cyberwarfare strategy. Each case study provides a set of lessons that the U.S. can draw upon for

The development of cyber capabilities can enable opportunities for better communication, economic
development, and security, amongst others, but it can also lead to more vulnerabilities and threats.
2 John Gerring, “The Case Study: What It Is and What It Does,” in Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, The Oxford
Handbook of Comparative Politics, Oxford University Press (United Kingdom, 2009), pp. 90-122.
1
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its own cyber strategy. In addition, the report also presents a set of general implications moving
forward and highlights potential areas for future research.

STRATEGIC CULTURE
Throughout this report, strategic culture is understood as the embodiment of how influencing
factors shape a nation’s identity and create a consistently structured national security response.
When analyzing strategic culture, we examine the varying approaches to this concept, at what
point the tone of the debate is set, what contributes to the development of strategic concepts,
and how policymakers are influenced on strategic issues.
Strategic culture is widely referenced in writings on International Relations (IR) in an attempt to
explain the distinctive behavior of states through an examination of their individual unique
properties. Strategic culture is a limited and prioritized set of grand-strategic preferences that
are consistent across the objects of analysis and strongly persistent across time.
For Jack Snyder,
strategic culture can be defined as the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses,
and patterns of habitual behavior [cognitive behavior] that members of a national strategic
community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other with
regard to military strategy. By identifying historical and organizational factors, strategic
culture attempts to explain the origins and continuing vitality of certain attitudes and
behavior.3

The strategic culture of a state has a multitude of sources. Ranging from the national to the
organizational (in particular the military, which can be further divided into the separate
branches, all with a unique subset of strategic cultures), with the former being the underlying
influence in which the latter is formed. Strategic culture is codified in collective memory and
identity through education, training, political narratives, popular culture, and renditions of

Jack L. Snyder, “The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations,” Rand (United
States, 1977), available at: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2005/R2154.pdf (last consulted:
January 2018).
3
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historical events. Within organizational subculture, individuals are socialized into a specific
mode of thinking, thereby viewing the world through a unique strategic culture lens; this lens
subsequently creates a particular national security concept. The perseverance of these distinct
beliefs, attitudes, institutional associations, and history over time constitutes an enduring set of
factors that influence decisions in addition to policy objectives.
These preexisting strategic conceptions can strongly influence a state’s adoption of, or
resistance to, the implementation and use of new technologies. This aspect of strategic culture
is of particular importance in the context of cybersecurity. Each nation’s attitudes toward the
development and deployment of cyber capabilities is likely to be directly influenced by the
distinctive organizational subculture that controls it.
Analyzing both levels of strategic culture is imperative for understanding the motivations and
manner in which states choose to act in the cyber domain. Without a clear understanding of the
national actor, engaging in strategic assessments of other states could prove to be precarious:
states can inadvertently act in a provocative manner or unwisely misinterpret intentions.
According to Alastair I. Johnston, strategic culture is an integrated
system of symbols (argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors) which acts
to establish pervasive and long-lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the
role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these
conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely
realistic and efficacious.4

Strategic culture provides an analytic lens through which the motivations and behaviors of a
nation can be observed and evaluated. We utilize this framework by defining the independent
variables that together are assessed to constitute a state’s strategic culture. These variables
include history, geography, politics, economics, philosophy, and religion, and the relationship

4 Alastair I.

Johnston, “Thinking About Strategic Culture,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring, 1995), pp.
32-64, available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539119?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents (last consulted:
January 2018).
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between them. While the effects of these variables are unique to each particular state, they
subsequently permeate across the development of the nation’s strategic culture.
Additionally, by studying strategic culture, it becomes evident that a nation’s actions are not
fully determined by policy and are deeply rooted within influential existential factors. By
distinguishing the variables of strategic culture from other broader influences, we can better
illuminate the underlying purpose of strategic culture: to provide decision-makers with a
uniquely ordered set of strategic choices from which we can derive predictions about behavior.5
Preconceived notions over strategic decisions is where strategic culture begins to affect
behavioral choices directly. “Historical or ‘objective’ variables such as technology, polarity, or
relative material capabilities are all of secondary importance to strategic culture”. 6 We believe
that strategic culture can be a powerful and useful lens for the U.S. to understand its adversaries
and inform its own strategic choices.

METHODOLOGY
According to Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, a case study is “a detailed examination of
an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test explanations that may be generalizable to
other events.” 7 Case studies are valuable for testing hypotheses and developing theories 8
because of their:
1. Potential for achieving high conceptual validity;9
2. Strong procedures for fostering new hypotheses;
3. Value as a useful means to closely examine the hypothesized role of causal mechanisms; 10
and

5 Ibid.

Ibid.
Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, MIT Press
(United States, 2005), p. 5
8 Ibid, p. 18
9 Identify and measure the indicators that best represent the theoretical concepts the researcher intends to
measure by searching for analytically equivalent phenomena across different contexts.
10 Within a single case, we can look closely at different intervening variables and shed light on unexpected aspects
of the operation of a particular causal mechanism or help identify what conditions trigger the causal mechanism.
6
7

20

4. Capacity for addressing causal complexity.11
Special attention must be payed to the trade-off between parsimony and richness, as well as to
the tension between achieving high internal validity and good historical explanations versus
making generalizations.12 To address this, each case study will present its own set of lessons for
the U.S., in addition to the report’s general recommendations for policy and research.
To answer the question of how strategic culture influences the state’s understanding of the
cyber domain, each case study will characterize the state’s strategic culture by explaining their
understanding of the:
1. Role of force in state affairs;
2. Nature of the adversary and of the threat;
3. Efficacy of the use of force;13
4. Use of non-state actors and proxies
5. Legal framework; and
6. Military-civilian relations
To better understand where a state’s strategic culture originates, each case study delves into
the following independent variables: history, geography, politics, economy, religion, and
philosophy,14 and the relationship between them.
The second section of each case study focuses on current factors that are shaping the most likely
future trajectory and describe what each state’s most dangerous trajectory could look like. Each
case study ends by providing a set of lessons that the U.S. can draw upon for its own strategic
formulations.

This advantage is relative rather than absolute. For example, case studies can allow for equifinality (the property
of allowing or having the same effect or result from different events), but to do so they produce generalizations
that are narrower or more contingent. Case studies also require substantial process-tracing evidence to document
complex interactions.
12 George and Bennett, Op. Cit., p. 22.
13 Johnston, Op. Cit.
14 Snyder, Jack, Op. Cit.
11
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This project is based on literature and internet reviews that help identify the independent
variables of these states’ strategic cultures. Additionally, each case study relies on in-person or
phone interviews with field experts that include Jenny Jun, Jack Snyder, JD Work, Jason Healey,
Sean Kanuck, Adam Segal, and Nadiya Kostyuk. These interviews helped inform a more
comprehensive understanding of the issues, concepts, and processes concerning this project.
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CASE STUDIES
CHINA
…. The war can only be fought battle by battle,
and the enemy can only be eliminated bit by bit.…
-Mao Tse-Tung in a speech delivered
on November 18th, 195715

INTRODUCTION
China’s rise as a principal actor within cyberspace has transformed a once predominantly neutral
domain into a medium conducive to “endless competition,” one that has become intensely
dominated by an escalatory struggle between the U.S. and China.16 China’s present-day posture
and activities within cyberspace have generally been characterized through attempted acts of
international espionage, industrial and military intellectual property theft, and control of
information within its own borders.
These actions may seem overtly conclusive to other countries like the U.S. who view these
activities through a specific lens, one that has been subsequently informed by their own
strategic cultures. However, China’s history, geography, politics, economics, religion, and
philosophy have all actively informed and influenced the pursuit of state-defined strategic
objectives. Consequently, these variables have influenced the lens China applies to cyberspace
operations, a domain it utilizes as a vital component of its national security strategy.
Accordingly, this case study will explore how China understands cyberspace as an instrument of
foreign policy, the formulation of its own strategic culture, comparisons based on these strategic
culture variables, and an assessment of how China may conduct itself in the future. These factors

15 “Some

Background Notes on Mao Tse-Tung’s Philosophy of Force,” Office of Research and Analysis (United
States Information Agency, October 28, 1960), 12,
https://hv.proquest.com/pdfs/103376/103376_002_0925/103376_002_0925_From_1_to_19.pdf.
16 Yoonyoung Cho and Jongpil Chung, “Bring the State Back In: Conflict and Cooperation Among States in
Cybersecurity,” Pacific Focus 32, no. 2 (August 1, 2017): 290–91, https://doi.org/10.1111/pafo.12096.
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will help determine how China’s concept of cyberspace influences its views on the role of force
in state affairs, nature of the perceived threats, efficacy of the use of force, use of non-state
actors and proxies, legal framework, and its military-civilian relationship. Concurrently, it is
anticipated that an examination of these contributing factors will also help explain how China’s
approach informs its conduct and posture within cyberspace.

DEFINING CHINA’S STRATEGIC CULTURE
Although varying views exist on the exact characteristics of Chinese strategic culture, Alastair
Iain Johnston highlights the following predominant features from other literature: theoretical
and practical preference for strategic defense,17 preference for limited war,18 and low estimation
of the efficacy of violence,19 in addition to an observation of low variation from the time of Sun
Tzu through Mao Zedong. Johnston’s findings also present a Chinese preference for offensive
strategies that have also been suggested in additional historical literature.20
In his findings, Johnston consequently proposes the existence of two different paradigms for
Chinese strategic culture. The first is identified as the Confucian-Mencian paradigm, which
assumes conflict to be avoidable, and when force must be used, it should be defensively
employed on a minimal scale.21 The second paradigm is identified as the Parabellum Paradigm,
which “assumes that conflict is a constant feature of human affairs, that it is due largely to the
rapacious or threatening nature of the adversary, and that in this zero-sum context the
application of violence is highly efficacious for dealing with the enemy;” the Chinese concept of
“quan bian,” or absolute flexibility, is also a feature of this paradigm that links the success of
offensive violence to a strategy that facilitates the necessary environmental conditions for
success. 22

Walls, garrisons, static positional defense, and alliance building as opposed to invasion.
of force.
19 Sun Tzu’s subduing the enemy without fighting.
20 Alastair I. Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1995), 25.
21 Johnston, 249.
22 Johnston, 249.
17

18 Restrained application
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Nevertheless, it can be argued that cyberspace presents a new vehicle capable of supporting the
employment of both paradigms. Strategic defense, limited war, and restrained application of
force are valid characteristics, but the pursuit of offensive strategies and operations should not
be excluded as alternatives that support this type of Chinese strategic posture.
This case study presents an adaptation of Johnston’s description in an attempt to account for
China’s perception and subsequent actions within cyberspace. Consequently, an important
analysis of Chinese strategic culture accounts for the use of cyberspace through a continued
avoidance of violence in lieu of predominantly offensive operations. Espionage, intellectual
property theft, and information dominance are all methods employed through cyber means to
ensure the preservation of the state, protection of its national borders (both physical and
abstract), and the prevention of perceived disruptive influences from potential adversaries
seeking to prevent China’s rise. China’s unique history, geography, politics, economy, religion,
and philosophy have shaped their strategic culture, as well as the comparisons they employ in
their approach in cyberspace. Moreover, these variables of Chinese strategic culture are
distinctive, have maintained stickiness or persistence over time, contribute to a common
mindset and social practices, and are habits or ideas transmitted through socialization, as
discussed with Jack Snyder during a recent interview.23

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
H ISTORY
Chinese nationalism, deeply rooted in history and born throughout the Century of Humiliation,
is one of the strongest components of China’s strategic culture. Simply put, Chinese nationalism
not only entails the pride of being Chinese, but most importantly, the shared recollection of past
humiliations and the desire to return to greatness. 24

Jack Snyder, Discussion on Strategic Culture, In Person Interview Conducted At: Columbia University School of
International and Public Affairs (SIPA), March 5, 2018.
24 Colonel Kenneth D. Johnson, China’s Strategic Culture: A Perspective for the United States (Carlisle, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2009),
https://permanent.access.gpo.gov/websites/ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.cfm-pubID=924.htm.
23
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The Opium War between Great Britain and China, which ended with the Treaty of Nanjing, led
to the disintegration of the Chinese Empire and the loss of sovereignty as Great Britain and
France delineated zones of influence and privilege.25 Half a century later, the First Sino-Japanese
War demonstrated the shift in regional dominance in East Asia from China to Japan when China
had to recognize the independence of Korea and then ceded territory to Japan as well. 26
By 1900, the resentment took action in the form of the Boxer Uprising, 27 which in turn gave way
to the Eight Nation Alliance 28 invasion of China, where troops looted cities, murdered and
assaulted Chinese citizens. The Boxer Protocol of 1901 29 led to the Revolution of 1911 30 that
finally ended the Qing Empire. With the Republic of China still in its infancy, China suffered
another setback when the Allied Powers transferred Shandong from Germany to Japan in
1919.31
The Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, and the Second Sino-Japanese War between 1937
and 1945 threatened the very survival of the Chinese nation. However, when the CCP declared
victory and the People’s Republic of China was established in 1949, the final and one of the most
painful humiliations came with the Truman administration’s failure to recognize the Chinese
communist government.32

25 Signed in

1842, the Nanjing Treaty ended the First Opium War and ceded Hong Kong to the United Kingdom in
perpetuity, established five ports and granted most favored nation to the both the UK and France in addition to
extraterritoriality.
26 The First Sino-Japanese war was fought between the Qing Empire and the Empire of Japan between 1894 and
1895 over the Korean Peninsula as a tributary state. On the one hand, the war demonstrated the success of the
Meiji restoration and of the influence of Western-style military in the Japanese army and navy; on the other, it
revealed the high level of corruption and incompetence. It ended with the Treaty of Shimonoseki.
27 A violent anti-foreign and anti-Christian movement in response to the imperialist expansion and the spread of
western influences in China.
28 The United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, Japan, Italy, Germany, France and Austria-Hungary.
29 Signed by China, the Eight Nation Alliance, Belgium, Spain and the Netherlands, it is often regarded as one of
the Unequal Treaties and forced China to pay more than what today would be $330 million USD in reparations,
foreign troops were permitted to station in Beijing and China was forbidden to import arms.
30 Also known as the Xinhai Revolution, it consisted of many revolts and uprisings that against the Qing state,
which proved ineffective to modernize China and repel foreign aggression. A year after that, 1912 was declared
the First Year of the Republic of China.
31 The 1919 Treaty of Versailles transferred Shandong from Germany to Japan, instead of restoring it to China,
prompting the May Fourth Movement and the spread of Marxism in China, which prepared the ideological
foundation for the establishment of the Chinese Communist Party.
32 Johnson, China’s Strategic Culture [Electronic Resource], 5.
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The Chinese intervention in the Korean War reflected both the weight of the memory of these
historical defeats, the humiliation at the hands of foreign powers that accompanied them, and
the defensive to offensive nature of Chinese strategic culture. China only supported North Korea
against the U.S. when the 38th parallel was crossed and the North Korean army was pushed back
towards the Yalu River, which was viewed as a threat to Chinese reconstruction and security.33
More recently, the Chinese government’s perception of the Color Revolutions in Central Europe
and Asia have also influenced their national security approach. 34 This wariness of outside
influence has solidified a call to control information domestically and on the periphery. China
had already survived a similar scare in 1989 at Tiananmen Square, in which large scale protests
advocated for more freedom of speech and press in the country.35 As a result, China continues
to be wary of Western influences, and looks on with suspicion towards any destabilizing or
negative events that might be perceived as an attempt to reduce Chinese national security.
G EOGRAPHY
China’s

physical

territory

is

comparable to that of the U.S., but
its population of 1.2 billion people
is approximately four times larger
than the U.S. with sixty percent
concentrated across just 600 miles

Figure 1: Map of China

Johnson, 6.
C. Chen, “China’s Reaction to the Color Revolutions: Adaptive Authoritarianism in Full Swing,” Asian
Perspective 34, no. 2 (2010): 6.
35 Emilio Iasiello, “China’s Cyber Initiatives Counter International Pressure,” Journal of Strategic Security 10, no. 1
(2017): 15, https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.10.1.1548.
33

34 Titus
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of the country’s coast. 36 The vast majority of the country’s land is sparsely populated and
maintains natural features that have made it historically difficult to defend. 37 A cartographic
depiction of China can be found in Figure 1.38
China shares geographic borders with a large conglomeration of nation-state powers that may
pose potential national security threats. Land borders with Russia, North Korea, Vietnam, India,
and Pakistan, as well as contested sea claims with South Korea and Japan among others,
continue to represent a source of conflict and dispute. 39 These geographical elements have
prompted a constant fear of invasion that arguably persists even in the modern era.
Thus, a strong desire to protect its sovereign physical geography and national borders is
indicative of the influence that geography and experience have had on Chinese actions across
multiple domains. Stemming from predominately negative historical experiences with the West
in 19th century, national sovereignty evolved into a defining feature of China’s national
geographic identity. Whether its political orientation was in the form of a Republic, Nationalist
government, or Communist state, all forms have stressed a sovereign China. 40 Accordingly,
China’s perception of what constitutes its national geography, 41 remains an important feature
of its strategic culture.
China has felt compelled to defend these features of its sovereignty. For example, China’s “ninedash line” claim made in 2009 to the United Nations (UN) alleged that specific land features of
the South China Sea were a part of their national “marine entitlements under international

Andrew J. Nathan, “China’s Geography and Security Goals,” Columbia University, Asia For Educators, 2009,
http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1950_china_geosec.htm#internal.
37 A long southern coastline makes the nation susceptible to attack by sea, while its more mountainous northern
border with colder conditions has historically proven to be difficult to guard against invaders; this northern border
has been traditionally more sparsely populated with minority inhabitants retaining unpredictable loyalties,
effectively introducing lack of an effective “buffer” zone of states to block potential invaders.
38 China, 500 miles (United States: Google, ORION-ME, SK Telecom, ZENDRIN, 2018),
https://www.google.com/maps/place/China/@27.8781788,87.199404,4z/data=!4m5!3m4!1s0x31508e64e5c642c1:
0x951daa7c349f366f!8m2!3d35.86166!4d104.195397.
39 Nathan, “China’s Geography and Security Goals.”
40 Matthew Erie, “Sovereignty, Internationalism, and the Chinese In-Between,” East-West Center, International
Graduate Student Conference Series, February 19, 2004, 12.
41 Including contested geographies like the South China Sea, Tibet and Taiwan.
36
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law.”42 This nine-dash line reference illustrates how China has sought to pursue a specific type
of approach to its geography that is supported by the adoption of domestic legislation, as well
as the establishment of advantageous international laws and norms.
Another influencing element and present-day geographic association is the application of
China’s Great Wall methodology as an attempt to achieve similar strategic objectives. 43
Although the wall constituted a physical and material attempt to prevent invasions from
adversaries, it also eventually became largely symbolic as well.

44

This psychological

representation is still strongly represented today in its application to Chinese national security
and the desire of the government to prevent outside influence through knowledge. State control
has become an overtly stated strategic objective of the Chinese government in recent years.
This concept of information dominance and mastery can link back to Sun Tzu’s approach to
warfare. Specifically, the value of “foreknowledge,” and the employment of spies to gain
knowledge of an enemy’s disposition results in acquisition of the “highest intelligence,” thereby
further enabling “great results.”45
P OLITICS

42 Joel

P. Trachtman, “Integrating Lawfare and Warfare,” Boston College International and Comparative Law
Review; Newton 39, no. 2 (2016): 273.
43 Initial construction of the great wall precedes Sun Tzu and dates back to third century B.C., with some sections
of the wall being built during the “Warring States Period.”
44 The Great Wall came to represent both a physical “manifestation of Chinese strength” and psychological
“representation of the barrier maintained by the Chinese state to repel foreign influences and exert control over
its citizens.”
45 Bin Sun and Lionel Giles, Sun Tzu on the Art of War: The Oldest Military Treatise in the World (Champaign, Ill:
Project Gutenberg, 2016), 89–93,
https://ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/login?qurl=https%3a%2f%2fsearch.ebscohost.com%2flogin.aspx%3fdirect%3d
true%26db%3dnlebk%26AN%3d2011517%26site%3dehost-live%26scope%3dsite.
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The Legalist46 and Confucian47 philosophies have historically maintained a profound impact on
social and governing systems. Although not as popular in modern China, legalism has still had a
profound effect on how the government conducts itself. When faced with the threat of losing
control, the Chinese governments have been observed resorting to “some degree of legalism.” 48
The effects of this approach continue to be personified through the modern day Chinese
Communist government.
Instead of using “The Analects” from Confucius’s most famous writings, the CCP has chosen to
adopt the “imperial Confucius” methodology that stresses “obedience to the emperor,
hierarchy, and loyalty instead.49 Moreover, the Confucian concept of “harmony” has reemerged,
and is understood by China’s government as the individual fulfillment of responsibilities within
society that results in prosperity for the state as a whole.50
Confucian values also contributed to a monism of political authority that radiates from the
virtuous ruler, thus tending to promote bureaucratic centralism. This “addiction to the ideal of
unification” comes since the Warring States Period, when the main question for rival states was
not about how to live alongside one another, but rather about which state would rule the
whole.51

Yuri Pines, “Legalism in Chinese Philosophy,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta,
Spring 2017 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2017),
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/chinese-legalism/. Legalism is a philosophy that become
widely popular during the Waring States period (453-221 BCE), advocating the establishment of a “rich state and
powerful army” in order to ensure “domestic stability” during this period of inter-intra state conflicts; this school
of philosophy encouraged individuals to pursue interests in ways that would only benefit the state. Additionally,
legalism implies more than the terminology found in its naming convention. Accordingly, legalism (known as “fa”)
also refers to “methods, standards, impersonal regulations and the like,” making it more broadly applied than the
rule of law concept (known as “fa jia”).
47 Confucian philosophy is known to have been an opposing view of legalism, before predominately supplanting
the predominant legalist viewpoint. However, the ancient Confucian philosophy has been adapted to meet the
needs of China’s communist political structure.
48 Emily Mark, “Legalism,” Encyclopedia, Ancient History Encyclopedia (blog), January 31, 2016,
https://www.ancient.eu/Legalism/.
49 Simon Worrall, “Why Is Confucius Still Relevant Today? His Sound Bites Hold Up,” National Geographic,
National Geographic News, March 25, 2015, https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2015/03/150325-confuciuschina-asia-philosophy-communist-party-ngbooktalk/.
50 Worrall.
51 Christopher A. Ford, An Interview with Christopher A. Ford, interview by Mengjia Wan, November 1, 2016, 3,
http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=718.
46
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Consequently, the role of the Party today, as it relates to state control over the general
population, is an important point of emphasis particularly in relation to Maoist doctrine.
Accordingly, the Party remains actively involved with the general population, “engaging in
propaganda, discussion, persuasion, and exhortation to gauge mass reactions to policy and to
lead mass action.” 52 The importance of the population in Chinese Communist doctrine is
continually underscored as vital. Consequently, this importance constitutes the Maoist
approach to mobilization known as “the mass line,” which refers to the Party’s dependence on
the masses to achieve its desired goals; this reference is meant to highlight the importance of
“mass participation in the execution, rather than in the formulation, of policy.” 53 Furthermore,
the Party’s desire to thoroughly regulate the flow of information to its general populace remains
an evident influence in Chinese domestic politics as the CCP remains committed to ensuring
long-term survival of the regime.
E CONOMY
The historical defeats and painful humiliations at the hands of foreign powers discussed in
section 3.1.1 became the seed for the three forms of Chinese nationalism: i) Nativism;54 ii) Antitraditionalism; 55 and iii) Pragmatism. 56 Most observers would agree that pragmatism is the
dominant form of nationalism, at least since the late 1970s when the Chinese government
started reforming and modernizing the economy.57

52 Stanley

Lubman, “Mao and Mediation: Politics and Dispute Resolution in Communist China,” California Law
Review 55, no. 5 (November 1967): 1303, https://doi.org/10.2307/3479330.
53 Lubman, 1303.
54 Nativist nationalism identifies the sources of China’s weakness as foreign intervention and the consequent
subversion of Chinese virtues. It the return to Confucian tradition and self-reliance as the best strategy to
revitalize the nation.
55 Contrary to nativist nationalism, anti-traditional nationalism believes that Chinese tradition and culture are the
source of China’s weakness and advocates for the adoption of certain foreign traits and models as the road to
modernization.
56 Pragmatic nationalism believes that the source of China’s weakness is its economic backwardness. Therefore, it
should use whatever it is necessary to modernize its economy, regardless of whether that is national or foreign,
modern or traditional.
57 In 1978, the Communist Party of China let by Deng Xiaoping started the “Socialism with Chinese characteristics”
program of economic and market reforms. In the first stage, agriculture was decollectivized, entrepreneurs were
allowed to start businesses and foreign investment was allowed in the country. During the second stage,
privatization and outsourcing of state-owned industries were accompanied by the removal of price controls and
some regulations.
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Chinese nationalism is as much about the pride of being Chinese as it is about the shared
recollection of past humiliations; it is the desire to return to greatness with sustained economic
progress, which is viewed as the primary means to achieve this revival. The importance placed
on economic advancement and modernization is reflected within China’s efforts to improve its
political and security standing around the world, guarantee its access to raw materials and
technologies, as well as its placement within international markets for the export of its goods.
As it seeks to rise again to great power, China knows that its development depends on a certain
degree of world peace, which might help explain the change in China’s approach to
multilateralism since 1971.58 In this sense, China’s public commitment to its ‘peaceful rise’ can
be explained as a strategy to let the U.S. bear the burden of maintaining the status quo around
the world for a couple of decades, thereby allowing China to retool its economy and “then the
world’s balance of power [will be] forever altered.”59
As China continues to orient itself towards preemption, it remains focused on growing its
economy through industrial advancements as opposed to physical confrontation. The cultural
variable of “guanxi” governs interactions within business and introduces “moral obligations that
stem from personal relationships above all other considerations;” if relationships require gifts in
exchange for certain “favors,” guanxi likely supports this exchange.60 This relationship can be
constituted through different types of business exchanges. Transactions within guanxi can be
monetarily based, but also might be “‘hidden’ and not made obvious to the casual observer;”
this could include hosting dinners or providing invitations for potential clients.61
R ELIGION
The religious variable within Chinese culture also accounts for important contributions to its
strategic culture. A closer look at the influences of Sun Tzu’s approach to warfare reveals

58 China

entered the United Nations in 1971 and has joined all the major intergovernmental organizations within
its system, in addition to Asian regional economic, security and political organizations.
59 Lisa Margonelli, Oil on the Brain: Adventures from the Pump to the Pipeline (New York: Nan A. Talese/
Doubleday, 2007), 268.
60 Scott Stewart, “Guanxi: How Business Is Done in China,” Stratfor: Worldview, April 27, 2017,
https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/guanxi-how-business-done-china.
61 “What Is Guanxi?,” World Learner Chinese, accessed March 20, 2018,
http://www.worldlearnerchinese.com/content/what-guanxi.
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significant impacts from Taoism. In fact, ‘Tao’ is considered to be the “core of the overall
framework” for “The Art of War.” 62 Further within Tao itself, a balance between the two
variables of “Yin” and “Yang” is revealed to constitute the two essential ideas within Sun Tzu’s
general perspective that have permeated into China’s current national strategy.63 Additionally,
this balance in ‘Tao’ is distilled through two distinctive ideas. First, Sun Tzu’s general perspective
towards warfare includes prudence and victory without battle; and second, Sun Tzu’s strategies
and tactics on balancing are grounded on the notion of “Shi” or “situational momentum.” 64
Accordingly, the concept of ‘Shi’ is very much still present in the way China formulates its
strategic approach to national security. Mainly, ‘Shi’ is considered to be a Chinese strategy used
to “exploit the ‘strategic configuration of power’ to its advantage and maximize its ability to
preserve its national independence and develop its comprehensive national power.” 65 This
cultural element linked to ‘Tao’ is not only evident within Sun Tzu’s strategic philosophy, but
also appears to remain a vibrant influence in how China views the achievement of its national
security objectives.
Other important aspects of Chinese culture influence this religious variable as well. The concept
of Guanxi (mentioned earlier in relation to China’s economy variable) is also related to religious
influences on Chinese strategic culture as well. “Guanxi” is meant to embody “sharing favors
between individuals, connections, relationships, and the ability to exert influence, while the
concept of “mianzi” loosely translates to “face” or “saving face, losing face, and giving face.” 66
With both concepts indicating a concern with national image, this “non-kinetic, non-violent, but
still offensive” strategy provides an operational concept directly aligned with Sun Tzu’s deeply
rooted ‘Tao’ approach to warfare.67 Additional contributing elements within the mianzi concept
62 Peter Ping Li and Monsol Young,

“How to Approach the Ancient Chinese Wisdom? A Commentary Concerning
Sun Tzu’s The Art of War,” Management and Organizational Review, Dialogue, Debate, and Discussion, 13, no. 4
(December 2017): 913, https://doi.org/10.1017/mor.2017.60.
63 Ping Li and Young, 914.
64 Ping Li and Young, 914.
65 David Lai, Learning from the Stones [Electronic Resource]: A GO Approach to Mastering China’s Strategic Concept,
Shi (Carlisle, PA: Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2004), 1,
https://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps51974/LPS51974.pdf.
66 Emilio Iasiello, “China’s Three Warfares Strategy Mitigates Fallout From Cyber Espionage Activities,” Journal of
Strategic Security 9, no. 2 (Summer 2016): 50.
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are also important to mention as well. The Chinese are often thought of as “relational beings”
connected through specific obligations identified as “qing” (affection), “yi” (righteousness),
“bie” (distinction), “xu” (order), and “cheng” (society); this emphasis provides insight into the
importance of mianzi by explaining the attention paid “to the kind of respect that is given to or
given by others.”68 This view of respect is an important element within the religious variable, as
a perceived lack thereof from perceived adversaries can provide an impetus for certain types of
behavior or actions.
P HILOSOPHY
Modern Chinese philosophy has been influenced through various internal and external sources
of information. In addition to early Chinese philosophers being heavily influenced by European
and American political thought, science, and philosophy, Confucian influence (referenced within
the politics variable as well) also continues to endure as its classical education is applied to new
concepts that have been introduced within the twentieth century. 69 Other influential texts
include “The Book of Great Unity” (Datongshu) developed from Buddhist views on “the
inevitability of suffering,” and Confucian teachings on “perfectibility of humanity;” the
“Tianyanlun” text that discusses the tenets of social Darwinism provided some influence on this
variable as well.70
Additionally, another prevalent philosophical approach is embodied through the Chinese
conceptualization of deterrence, and the idea of compelling certain actions from a perceived
adversary. The Chinese philosophy on deterrence is typically referred to as “weishe,” 71 a
strategic concept employed to prevent the enemy from making certain movements, and to also
68 Rodney
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force an enemy to take actions that are advantageous to China.72 Accordingly, weishe can be
viewed as another embodiment of Sun Tzu’s philosophical approach to conflict, focusing on the
avoidance of prolonged conflicts with capable adversaries.
Within Chinese philosophy on coercion lies three separate and distinct elements: “capability,
will, and signaling,” with capability and will constituting the “two ‘wings’ of coercion.” 73
Concurrently, signaling 74 is a vitally important element within coercion. Although will and
capability remain essential, the effective communication of these elements is vital in an effort
to make targets aware of the full costs associated with a conflict.75 If these warnings and signals
continue to go unnoticed, then China may be compelled to deploy more offensive capabilities.76

CHINA ’S CYBERWARFARE STRATEGIES AND CAPABILITIES
The influence of the aforementioned independent variables for Chinese strategic culture has
resulted in the emergence of a distinct cyberspace strategy. That is, a formulation for how China
views the use of cyberspace in achieving its national strategic objectives. Accordingly, China’s
global advancements in Information and Communications Technology (ICT) reflect its strategy
of “informatization” of all national civilian and military infrastructure, which is meant to ensure
sustained economic growth, an ability to compete internationally regarding ICT, and an
effective means to safeguard its national security.77 China’s subsequent strategy can therefore
72 Pollpeter,
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Strategic Studies: National Defense University Press, China Strategic Perspectives, April 2013, 29. The concept of
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escalatory statements with explicit warnings of military force.
75 Pollpeter, “Part II Military Strategy and Institutions, Chapter 6: Chinese Writings on Cyberwarfare and
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provided warning according to this methodology, the continued U.S. route of North Korean land forces prompted
China to cross the Yalu River to repel their advance; contact with U.S. forces was minimal at first to present
another level of warning but was subsequently followed by a much larger response once this warning was
perceived to be ignored.
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be illustrated according to six dependent variables that demonstrate China’s cyber capabilities,
methods, and motivations. Consequently, how China understands the role of force in state
affairs, nature of the threat, efficacy in the use of force, use of non-state actors and proxies, legal
frameworks, and the military-civilian relationship constitute the variables that effectively
illustrate its capabilities, methods, and motivations by, with, and through cyberspace. This
approach is distinct to China and has been shaped through the construct of its own strategic
culture variables (history, geography, politics, economy, religion, and philosophy).
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DEPENDENT VARIABLES
R OLE OF F ORCE IN S TATE A FFAIRS
Although China has not been known to make a habit out of engaging in large-scale violent
military conflicts following the Korean War,
its expenditure on the instruments of war
has exponentially grown over the past 25
years to nearly $225 billion (illustrated in
Figure 2 from the Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute). 78 This begs the
question of how China sees the role of force
Figure 2: Stockholm International Peace Research

in its state affairs since it has shown itself to

be relatively innocuous when it comes to traditional forms of conflict and confrontation.
Accordingly, the role of asymmetric warfare within cyberspace that China has sought to exploit
cannot be ignored. Moreover, how China views the role of this asymmetric confrontation during
the modern era stems from the lessons it learned observing U.S. engagement during Operation
Desert Storm; it was at this point that Chinese military leaders observed what they perceived to
be an important role of “computer viruses to disrupt Iraqi information systems.” 79
The PLA specifically began to shift focus in this regard: PLA strategists started to concentrate
planning considerations on the role of Information Technology (IT) in connecting forces on the
battlefield, the exploitation of vulnerabilities within IT systems, and the drafting of new doctrine
for fighting in “high-tech” conflicts.80 Observing U.S. operations during Operation Desert Storm
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provided Chinese military leaders with an illustration of how precise and effective
interconnected joint operations could be. The leveraging of IT and information systems better
enabled communications between soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen. This observation
served as a “major wake-up call” for both the CCP and the PLA.81 The consequent result was an
abrupt change in course for Chinese military strategy. PLA leadership witnessed the potential of
“enhanced Information Warfare (IW), networked systems, and ‘digitalized’ combat forces,”
which resulted in their strategic focus on “informatization.”82
For China, the role of cyber has evolved into a means of advancing state affairs in multiple realms
to include economic, political, and military. 83 It can be argued that China’s military cyber
strategy exists not only as a primary instrument to advance political goals, but also as an
effective mechanism to achieve both economic and military objectives it views as essential for
national security. Accordingly, the Chinese military holds the role of cyber warfare in high regard
as “the best way to neutralize an enemy that is technologically superior;” the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) doctrinally views these tactics as extremely effective in the achievement of both
political and military goals. 84 Cyber remains a primary component of the PLA’s overall IW
strategy. As a result, Chinese military doctrine considers IW 85 a primary means to achieve
information dominance in order to counter larger and more capable adversaries.86
Within this IW doctrine, the components of the “Three Warfare” strategy are relevant in
discussing the role of force in China’s state affairs. Consequently, China’s IW approach is
described as a “three-prong information warfare approach” that includes media, legal, and
psychological components.87 Although “legal warfare” will be subsequently discussed within the
legal framework variable, the concept of “lawfare” has been characterized by some as a
“strategy of using-or misusing-law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve a
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warfighting objective.”88 Therefore, just as law has been specifically used by China to legally
enable cyber operations, lawfare acts as an integrated component of the modern warfare
approach the state takes to both domestic and international confrontations.
The psychological element of warfare is aimed at destabilizing the ability of perceived enemies
to conduct combat operations.89 Psychological warfare is in many ways considered to be “the
most far-reaching,” with a stated goal that focuses on the ability to “influence, constrain, and/or
alter an opponent’s thoughts, emotions, and habits while at the same time strengthening
friendly psychology.”90 China views the role of psychology in warfare to be an integral doctrinal
concept for the PLA. Accordingly, PLA writings stipulate a need to conduct this type of warfare
within the political, economic, technical, and military realms during peacetime operations in
order to effectively construct operational plans, successfully conduct gain-loss analysis, and to
ultimately gain an advantage that allows the PLA to dictate levels of attack.91 In addition to a
seemingly offensive employment of psychological warfare, China also utilizes a defensive
variation oriented towards strengthening indoctrination as well.92
China seeks to use the public opinion and media element of the “Three Warfare” strategy to
influence both domestic and international public opinion in support of Chinese military actions
and interests.93 Its purpose is to “shift the overall balance of strength between a nation and that
nation’s components.”94 Accordingly, Chinese writing on public opinion is constituted through
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the following pillars in framing military operations: following top-down guidance, emphasis on
preemption, exploitation of all available resources, and flexible response. 95 As with the other
elements of warfare applied to Chinese state affairs, both offensive

96

and defensive 97

applications can be employed. 98 These capabilities are expressly manifested within China’s
Great Firewall and Great Cannon references, which provide the state distinct mechanisms to
assume both offensive and defensive postures. The Great Firewall acts to prevent information
from sources perceived to be detrimental to the national message, while the Great Cannon
provides an offensive platform to launch cyber-attack operations against anti-government
targets as a show of force.
N ATURE OF THE THREAT
According to Alastair I. Johnston, Chinese strategic culture does not necessarily demonize the
enemy, but considers that it can be enculturated and pacified.99 Security is multidimensional: it
is in part a function of the behavior of the adversary and in part a function of one’s own internal
cohesion and socioeconomic well-being. Some scholars trace the roots of the minimal-violence
doctrine to Sun Tzu’s notion of “not fighting and subduing the enemy” and others to Lao Zi’s
“softness to overcome hardness.”100 However, Johnston points to the Confucian “emphasis on
the ruler’s cultivation of virtue and good government as the basis for the security and prosperity
of the state.”101 External security rests on creating conditions such that people will be content
with their place in the socioeconomic and political order, causing the adversary to submit
willingly to the ruler’s authority.102

preserving friendly morale, generating public support at home and abroad, weakening the will of a perceived
enemy to fight, and to introduce information that acts to alter an enemies sense of China’s intentions,
capabilities, or military objectives.
95 Cheng, 3–4.
96 The offensive approach is typically geared towards weakening an opponent’s will and support.
97 A defensive approach is characterized through strong counter-operations to combat the influences of enemymessaging efforts.
98 Cheng, “Winning Without Fighting,” November 26, 2012, 4–5.
99 Johnston, Cultural Realism, 62–64.
100 Johnston, 63.
101 Johnston, 62–64.
102 Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism. Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History, Princeton
University Press (United States, 1995), pp. 64-66

40

Chinese leadership views a majority of critical threats as emanating from outside. Of particular
importance to the cyber domain is the U.S. relationship with Taiwan,103 since it has emerged as
a global supplier of information technology and components. 104 China’s weariness to outside
threats is rooted in the Century of Humiliation, its perception of the Color Revolutions, and
Tiananmen Square experience. Viewed through a Confucian lens, China’s desire for economic
progress and modernization is an attempt to restore previous humiliations by confronting
perceived adversaries through its conception of socioeconomic betterment.
Multiple landmark events have also demonstrated how this Chinese threat perception has
continued to be reinforced. The 1999 Chinese embassy bombing in Belgrade during the Kosovo
War and 2001 aircraft collision with an American pilot were both influential events that
reinforced Western suspicions. In contrast to what the U.S. considered an accidental bombing,
China viewed the destruction of its Belgrade embassy as both a “barbaric attack” and “gross
violation of Chinese sovereignty” that reinforced a general feeling of mistrust about U.S. nature
and intentions. 105 This prompted some of the first observed Chinese deployments of cyber
capabilities in support of specified political objectives. Following this event, Chinese citizens
mobilized to deface several U.S. government websites that included the Department of the
Interior, the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, and the Department of Energy; these types of defacement
operations subsequently continued as a tactic against regional adversaries like Taiwan as well. 106
China also employed similar tactics following the collision of a U.S. surveillance plane and
Chinese fighter in 2001, an event that coincided with the second anniversary of the Belgrade
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embassy bombing. 107 These tactics have continued in recent years as well regarding Chinese
regional disputes.
This past September, Hong Kong’s pro-Democracy party “Demosisto” had its website defaced
with patriotic pro-Chinese messages in response to the pro-Hong Kong independence
movement. This attack was in addition to a 2016 intrusion targeting two Hong Kong
government departments prior to their legislative elections. 108 These response actions continue
to demonstrate an evolution in how China has sought to combat perceived threats from outside
actions and influences.
The advantageous nature of cyber operations provides China with numerous motivations, such
as deterrence of other states by infiltration of their critical infrastructure, acquisition of
knowledge through cyberspace espionage in order to quickly facilitate military advancements,
and most importantly, the attainment of economic gains through industrial espionage to
advance their technologies. Use of these actions in cyberspace can partially be attributed to
prolonged inequities experienced by China at the hands of Western powers, thereby providing
a perceived justification for these cyber actions that are meant to help close the gap created by
these historical humiliations.109 Consequently, even though China’s recent initiation of efforts
like the “Information Silk Road” (encompassed by the OBOR initiative) have been viewed as a
way to gain control of more information, it is primarily thought to be a part of the Chinese
broader strategy to enhance its economic standing, operation, and growth through “ecommerce, digital economy, smart cities, science and technology.”110
E FFICACY OF THE U SE OF F ORCE
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China’s interpretation of the efficacy of force is predominately non-kinetic but still maintains a
propensity to be offensively oriented. Sun Tzu’s concept of achieving victory without the use of
force has been linked to China’s use of cyberspace as a medium to gain advantages against
larger countries with superior military capabilities like the United States. More specifically, Sun
Tzu’s 111 advocacy for “the implementation of non-kinetic, non-violent, but still offensive
operations” to influence the “cognitive processes of a country’s leadership and population”
draws applicable linkages to China’s utilization of cyberspace in support of its peacetime
strategy. 112 China is assessed to lead the world in the number of attributed hostile cyber
incidents and is considered to maintain one of the best overall offensive cyber capabilities in the
world.113 These non-violent actions in cyberspace have been predominately expressed through
attempts to achieve information dominance in both critical sectors of industry, as well as foreign
government intelligence institutions.114
China approaches the efficacy of force through predominately asymmetric means, as it
understands that it does not match well conventionally with perceived Western adversaries.
Accordingly, China possesses a strategic interest in deterring other states by infiltrating their
critical infrastructure, acquiring knowledge through cyberspace espionage, and attaining
economic gains through industrial intellectual property theft; these actions are taken in an
A closer look at the influences of Sun Tzu’s approach to warfare reveal significant impacts from Taoism,
considered to be the “core of the overall framework” for “The Art of War.” Further within Tao itself, a balance
between the two variables of “Yin” and “Yang” is revealed to constitute the two essential ideas within Sun Tzu’s
general perspective that have permeated into China’s current cyber strategy. This balance in ‘Tao’ is distilled
through two distinctive ideas. First, Sun Tzu’s general perspective towards warfare includes prudence and victory
without battle; and second, Sun Tzu’s strategies and tactics on balancing are grounded on the notion of “Shi” or
“situational momentum.”
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attempt to avoid political and military pressure, accelerate its ability to rapidly develop
conventional military capabilities, and to gain technological insights that hasten its economic
advancement.115 Although the “death by 1,000 cuts” reference has been used to illustrate this
point in the past, stronger linkages and interdependencies between U.S. and Chinese financial
markets have cast some doubt on this comparison. 116 However, this strategy still aligns with
what Chinese military planners refer to as “a powerful asymmetric opportunity in a deterrence
strategy;” this strategy is viewed as a means to make the costs of conventional engagements
too high for other nations to interfere in China’s sphere of influence. 117 Subsequently, nations
considering interference measures in Chinese affairs would also need to account for second and
third order effects that might negatively influence their own domestic economy, infrastructure
security, and military system defenses.
Consequently, the “old wine into new bottles” parallel can be referenced when attempting to
explain China’s deterrent actions in cyberspace. 118 The predominant connection for this
comparison initially related to similarities in nuclear deterrence strategies: nuclear deterrence
represents the old wine, while cyberspace constitutes the new bottle.119 This reference suggests
a “modus operandi” comprised of punishment through coercion in the China-U.S. cyber
relationship.120 Consequently, China conducts information operations through cyberspace in an
attempt to not only strengthen its own economy,121 but to also maintain domestic stability and
national security.122
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Accordingly, China’s desire in creating a strong security environment and conducting malwarebased intelligence, reconnaissance, attacks, and interruption capabilities is “to achieve military,
economic, or political aims without having to send soldiers into the fight.” 123 China’s use of
cyberspace also appears oriented towards preemption through cyber mechanisms that are
focused on intellectual property and intelligence collection, as opposed to physical
confrontation.
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N ON -S TATE A CTORS AND P ROXIES
China’s cyber strategy has evolved to account for the presence of non-state proxies as well.
China’s “mass line” doctrine helps to depict this relationship, which constitutes a vital
component of Maoist ideology. Mao’s doctrine indicates that the mass line “blurs and
sometimes obscures the distinction between government and nongovernmental organizations
and activity.” 124 This relationship has further manifested itself in several different forms as
China’s strategic lens for the use of cyber capabilities has progressed. For example, the initial
patriot hacker activity related to the Belgrade embassy bombing and subsequent aircraft
collision events can be categorized differently than modern employment methods and
motivations for these same types of capabilities. Accordingly, Jason Healey’s “Spectrum of State
Responsibility” (shown in Figure 3) can help to characterize this relationship; initial Chinese
cyber activities can potentially be categorized as “state-encouraged” or at the very least “stateignored,” with the government tacitly supportive of this non-state activity or at a minimum
overlooking it. 125 However, modern-day integration of these non-state proxies has evolved
under President Xi Jinping with a focus on more consolidation and control. Classification of this
modern utilization can potentially better align with the “state-integrated” spectrum category,
as the national government has worked to closely integrate important third-parties with state
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forces that allow for more control of national
capabilities. 126 China’s gradual movement up the
spectrum of state responsibility is an assessment that
was reiterated in an interview with Jason Healey.127
Consequently, the existence of the Red Hacker
Alliance128 and China’s Voluntary Fifty-Cent Army129
demonstrate an increasingly reliance on the use of
non-state actors for cyber-attacks and operations in
this capacity. The Chinese continue to base their
military strategy on the mobilization of the entire
population in a struggle for their nation. 130 Taking
this vision into the cyber domain represents a
cooperative relationship between the PLA and
Chinese hacker organizations like the Red Hacker
Alliance; although the government denies any
relationship with the Red Hacker Alliance (claiming

Figure 3: Spectrum of State Responsibility

that Chinese law forbids attacks using the Internet), it is likely the Party at a minimum tolerates
its activities, which provides China with plausible deniability.131
The Voluntary Fifty-Cent Army can be seen as the materialization of China’s use of the public
opinion and media element within the “Three Warfare” strategy to influence both domestic and
international public opinion in support of Chinese interests. The CCP has neither the capacity
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nor the intention to censor all public expression; 132 in fact, “beyond a number of well-patrolled
‘forbidden zones’ the Chinese state speaks with many voices.”133 Although the Voluntary FiftyCent Army’s was spontaneously born, President Xi Jinping’s government has undoubtedly tried
to co-opt them.134 Moreover, compensation for this support is not necessarily directly dispersed
from the Ministry of Defense, and in some cases it may be constituted through a more indirect
payment in the form of state favors; this concept is further expanded upon within the
subsequent military-civilian relationship output variable.135
China’s integration of both unconventional and conventional cyber forces has also been
illustrated through its employment of numerous Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). One of
the first comprehensive exposures of a Chinese-linked APT was the 2013 Mandiant report, which
provided a detailed account of APT1 cyber operations (linked to PLA Unit 61398), to include
infrastructure, command and control, and “modus operandi” in cyberspace.
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CAMERASHY report 137 was another thorough attribution assessment that followed in 2015,
linking the “Naikon” APT group to the PLA Chengu Military Region Second Technical
Reconnaissance Bureau (PLA Unit 78020); this unit has been associated with malicious spear
phishing campaigns targeting Southeast Asian military, diplomatic, and economic targets in
order to “establish beachheads into target organizations” for follow on cyber operations. 138
These threat actors are considered to be “the most sophisticated form of cyber weapon that
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exists.” 139 Additionally, it has also been alleged that members of the PLA conduct cyber
operations outside of their conventional military capacity. Specifically, some PLA units have
been accused of conducting “moonlighting” operations for nefarious motivations and entities
outside the scope of their government-sanctioned activities.140
Consequently, APTs are thought to be constituted through both state military units and nonstate proxies as well.

Specifically, the cybersecurity firm FireEye has assessed Chinese

attribution for APT’s 1, 3, 10, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 30. 141 Significant Chinese employment of the
APT construct has been observed through APT1 (linked to PLA Unit 61398 within 3PLA), APT3
(the UPS Team), and APT12 (the Calc Team); these APT’s have been accused of targeting the
industrial Information Technology (IT), aerospace, satellites, and telecommunication sectors, as
well as journalists, governments, and the Defense Industrial Base (DIB). 142 Accordingly, these
APTs have been assessed to be involved in numerous significant cyber intrusions that include
Titan Rain143, Operation Aurora,144 and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) breach.145
China’s integration of APT’s into its military structure is indicative of its how it seeks to harness
the full array of its capabilities in order to achieve national strategic objectives.
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L EGAL F RAMEWORK
China’s “Three Warfare” approach again provides an important context for how China views the
use of legislative means to achieve its strategic objectives. In addition to psychological and
public opinion/media means, “legal warfare” is highlighted as an important mechanism that
allows China to gain political advantages in altering public and international opinions. 146 The
scope of legal warfare focuses on building legal authorizations for government sanctioned
actions. This strategic mechanism essentially refers to an attempt to achieve superiority through
mobilization of both domestic and international laws to gain political initiative and military
victory; tactics within this mechanism include “legal deterrence, legal attack, legal
counterattack, legal binding, and legal protection.”147 This approach allows China to “claim the
legal high ground or assert Chinese interests,” while also providing flexibility to shape
cyberspace in an advantageous way that builds international support and blunts political
repercussions.148
Furthermore, the aforementioned concept of “lawfare” has been characteriszed by some as a
“strategy of using -or misusing- law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve a
warfighting objective.” 149 These legal maneuvers are further enabled through the previously
examined influence of Confucian and Legalist elements previously discussed. 150
China’s legal framework is unique in how it views what constitutes cyberspace and the elements
therein. In contrast to how the U.S. views this domain, 151 China takes a more holistic approach
that includes both the technology aspect and the actual data traversing or stored within it as
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well.152 Additionally, the role of government has informed the Chinese national legal framework
that was created to govern cybersecurity and actions within cyberspace. With a tremendous
emphasis placed on the relationship between cybersecurity and national security, the Chinese
government views itself as “a holistic enabler supporting the protection and development of
economic and social initiatives;” economic initiatives are implied to include the technological
elements and data within its perceived national cyberspace that drives prosperity and social
harmony.153 Consequently, President Xi Jinping’s government has pursued a legal strategy that
in their view fully enables the fulfillment of this perceived role. This legislation has helped
provide the Chinese government with a legal mechanism that supports mitigation actions
against activity it deems to be unacceptable.154 Accordingly, a number of key cyber legislative
actions have been passed and implemented over the last few years in order to advance this
agenda: the “National Security Law” of 2015;155 the “Anti-Terror Law” of 2015;156 and the “Cyber
Security Law” of 2016.157
China has also approached legal frameworks and norms for cyberspace from an international
avenue as well. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is one mechanism that China
has sought to utilize for initiating the establishment of global cyberspace norms. Specifically, a
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2009 agreement between SCO members 158 regarding cooperation in the Field of Ensuring
International Information Security concluded with the submission of an initial draft International
Code of Conduct for Information Security to the UN General Assembly in 2011; an updated draft
was submitted for consideration in 2015 as well despite Western reservations.

159

China

continues to pursue this international initiative in an attempt to solidify its concept of
sovereignty.
These legislative frameworks and agreements have emerged as an important vehicle that better
enables the protection of Chinese national sovereignty. This concept is manifested through an
idea of “Internet sovereignty” that encompasses all individual and organizational entities
operating within Chinese territory, as well as the legislation that binds their compliance to these
mandated regulations. 160 This type of legal mechanism lacks kinetic military maneuvers, is
absent of violence, and appears to align with what other countries also view as nationally
important.
M ILITARY -C IVILIAN R ELATIONSHIP
The Chinese military-civilian relationship is intricately linked, as the relationship between the
PLA and CCP remains a top-down architecture. Historically, the PLA possessed a continued
allegiance to political leaders, influence in selection of the Chinese civilian leadership hierarchy,
and an ability to shape the domestic political environment.161 This characterization of the civilmilitary relationship evolved from Mao’s ‘People’s War’ doctrine, which emphasized utilization
and mobilization of the Chinese population as critical to its ability in gaining a military
advantage.162 Although this relationship has somewhat evolved over the past 20 years, the PLA
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and CCP still maintain close ties and continue to focus on the achievement of China’s national
security objectives.
President Xi Jinping has taken action in recent years to further solidify this relationship.
Accordingly, President Xi has “made the military central to his presidency and a main pillar of his
personal authority.” This includes taking the title of “Commander-in-Chief” for joint operations,
a title that has not been used since Zhu De under Mao Zedong.163 This relationship is evident in
the previously discussed concepts of “lawfare” and “legal warfare,” which further demonstrate
the development of legislation as a direct mechanism to achieve both military and political
objectives in cyberspace.
The interwoven connections between the government, the PLA, and some civilian industries
also helps to characterize this relationship as it relates to cyberspace. Technology companies
like Huawei, which operates in hundreds of countries and is the second largest supplier of
telecommunications equipment in the world, maintain suspected links to the Chinese military
and government.164 This relationship aligns with how China’s digital military strategy is thought
to be constructed. Consisting of three separate sections, this interwoven construct includes: one
unit known as the “specialized military network warfare forces” that is responsible for carrying
out cyber-attacks and defense, a second unit comprised of civilian teams that are authorized by
the military to conduct “network warfare operations,” and a third unit acting outside of
government departments that focuses on “external entities.”165 Additionally, this alignment has
likely contributed to the effectiveness of China’s “Golden Cyber-Shield.”166 This reference has
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become largely associated with the government’s tight Internet controls, and regulation of web
traffic within its borders.167
This relationship has been further fostered through the creation of additional mutually
supporting organizations such as the Strategic Support Force (SSF) and Cyberspace
Administration of China (CAC). The CAC stresses this relationship as “imperative for the military
to serve the people, and the people to prepare the military;” this emphasis is further constituted
through the Long-Term Program for Science and Technology Development effort that
highlights the importance of “integrating civilian and military scientific and technical efforts.” 168
Accordingly, the close relationship between the PLA and various Chinese cyber militias (also
highlighted in the previous discussion on APTs) has become apparent. Specifically, the PLA has
historically endorsed the use of cyber militia’s in order to support the achievement of national
Chinese objectives. 169 Additionally, the recent creation of China’s SSF constitutes another
mechanism that further fosters this military-civilian relationship. Mainly, the SSF has been
assessed to help mitigate “the risk of erratic cyber militias whilst still harnessing the power and
capabilities of civil society.” 170 Consequently, this relationship is one of mutual cooperation
towards the application of Chinese grand strategy for the achievement of Party goals.
Accordingly, this characterization subsequently aligns with the “mandate of heaven”
conceptualization that represents a “social contract” between China’s political and military
leaders who together seek to restore “the country’s standing in the world.”171
Lastly, the Chinese concept of “guanxi” is again relevant in this regard, as it helps characterize
the military-civilian relationship concerning integration of private industry. In a recent interview,
JD Work emphasized this relational attribute as a means for how the military and government
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employ civilian private sector capabilities in cyberspace; individuals or companies who possess
certain skills provide services to the state in exchange for favor in future government business. 172
This relational concept again highlights the potential for “moonlighting” and “for-hire-hackers”
that practice their professional capacities for monetary or nefarious purposes. 173 Therefore,
even though these civilian entities may not necessarily compensated monetarily for their
services, they can still be reimbursed through non-monetary transactions in the future.

ASSESSMENT OF CHINA’S POTENTIAL FUTURE DISPOSITION
Through the study of these individual variables and their applicable links to cyberspace, a better
understanding can be realized for how China may react to certain U.S. actions in various
domains of conflict. Accordingly, the subsequent assessment intends to characterize the most
likely and most dangerous trajectories for Chinese actions in an attempt to inform future U.S.
cyber policy, strategy, and military campaign planning.
M OST L IKELY F UTURE T RAJECTORY
Although China’s national strategy and objectives persist, a noticeable shift has been observed
in the intensity and frequency of its cyberspace activities. In 2015 the U.S. confronted China on
its intellectual property theft cyber activity, which prompted a threat of economic sanctions
against them. This resulted in a commitment by China to refrain from conducting or supporting
cyber-enabled theft that could provide an advantage to its companies. 174 However, proof of
Chinese cyber-intrusions continues (although less) after this agreement, with cybersecurity
firms like CrowdStrike tracing attacks back to China and National Security Agency (NSA)
Director Admiral Michael Rogers testifying to Congress on continued activity against U.S.
companies.175
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The U.S. and China also agreed to further discuss the establishment of international cyberspace
norms, which aligns with the previously discussed concepts of lawfare and legal warfare that
China continues to engage in as a mechanism to legitimize its cyber activities and actions related
to key territorial disputes. Consequently, despite these international agreements with other
countries, China is likely to continue to use its interpretation of international law to legitimize
both its domestic and international actions. Furthermore, despite these types of agreements,
China’s strategic goal of garnering “pre-conflict justification and post-conflict legal resolution”
remains intact.176 The domestic legislation and international norms discussed as part of China’s
legal framework will still enable the protection of its interests through cyberspace. Mainly, if the
U.S. or another perceived rival takes action against China for activities such as espionage, the
Chinese government now has the domestic legal legitimacy to “impose fines or expel” foreign
businesses in retaliation.177
The OBOR initiative that includes the establishment of the “Information Silk Road” is also likely
to remain a major focus in growing China’s economy through cyberspace; this greater
connectivity can provide the government with more oversight and control of information
domestically, while also opening new markets for e-commerce efforts within the country.178 The
interconnected nature of the public and private sectors within China lend further credence to
this assertion. Large Chinese telecommunications companies including Huawei and ZTE have
been assessed to be “instruments of the state, as well as possible mediums that can be leveraged
by the Chinese government for intelligence collection.” 179 Accordingly, a combination of stateinfluenced industry and larger e-commerce markets could likely make it easier for the Chinese
government to legally circumvent existing international agreements.
Another economic consideration should also be taken into account when examining China’s
most likely trajectory and its U.S. financial relationship. A recent interview with Sean Kanuck
highlighted that China remains a large holder of U.S. debt, and maintains a vested interest in
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the continued capacity of America to pay those debts; this factor is likely to maintain a strong
influence on Chinese decision-making when considering the impact of cyber operations that
could negatively influence or potentially damage U.S. critical economic infrastructure or
functionality. 180 Therefore, China is more likely to continue cyber operations that will better
enable its placement and access within these critical systems, while also attempting to
circumvent current international agreements that can further close the economic gap with
Western countries through industrial and intellectual property theft.
This includes further intrusions into U.S. companies, and the extraction of critical information
related to bid prices and contracts, as well as mergers and acquisitions. 181 This observed shift in
activity provides China with the same economic advantages, while also allowing it to claim
compliance with the 2015 intellectual property theft agreement. Accordingly, China has pursued
this industrial information through its own corporate acquisitions, which now account for an
average of 51% of all imports for the seven largest commercial IT manufacturers that supply the
U.S. government. Microsoft constitutes one of the highest dependencies in this regard, with 73%
of its components coming from China.182
China will also continue to take actions it deems necessary within a more regional sphere of
influence in order to ensure the state and its political regime can maintain its geopolitical
position power. Accordingly, China is more likely to undertake “soft power” initiatives through
cyberspace that will enable both information dominance domestically and deterrence of
international interference regarding regional confrontations associated with land disputes in the
South China Sea, Taiwan, or Tibet. Consequently, as reiterated by Sean Kanuck, confrontation
is likely to be an attempt to degrade regionally based actions. 183 Adam Segal also agreed that
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Chinese cyber actions in response to specific Western actions would likely be directed at regional
Command and Control (C2) targets, U.S. allies, or other Western interests, and would likely
unfold in a controlled escalation of small scale events. 184 Consequently, the U.S. must remain
politically, militarily, and economically cognizant of these strategically important geographic
disputes within China’s regional sphere of influence where certain actions might cause China to
react through cyber means.
All of these factors continue to support China’s use and application of its warfare strategies to
cyberspace as a means to achieve its strategic objectives. Chinese national strategy continues
to indicate a desire to achieve a ‘peaceful rise’ through economic, political, diplomatic, or
military struggles, which can potentially be achieved through cyber means. 185 This reference is
likely to indicate a regional and global rise in both influence and power. China is likely to remain
focused on establishing itself as a regional leader, and as a world power with a more
predominant status.186 Subsequently, espionage, intelligence collection, and enabling activities
are likely to continue in the current environment as China continues to avoid serious penalties
for these types of activity.
M OST D ANGEROUS F UTURE T RAJECTORY
Misperception of signals from Beijing based on how China seeks to engage in cyberspace can
lead to inherently dangerous global impacts. China’s understanding of its sovereignty in
cyberspace can lead to an escalatory situation even if this was not the intention of other nations.
The PLA maintains a large repository of cyber tools that can be employed with the diverse
placement and access gained through its espionage and intellectual property activities
throughout the years. Therefore, a situation where the PLA views U.S. actions to be a violation
of its cyber sovereignty or national geography in other domains maintains a propensity to be
perceived as an offensive action. This being the case, inaccurate signaling may trigger a
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preemptive response from China’s PLA.187 This view arguably can also maintain some linkages
to the philosophical influences of Sun Tzu who stressed that success of an attack could be
assured “if you only attack places which are undefended.”188 Consequently, this may lead to an
escalatory crisis scenario that maintains the propensity of spreading to other domains. 189
The nine-dash line reference can also apply to this most dangerous future trajectory. Chinese
claims to certain geographic markers within the South China Sea can pertain to similarly viewed
markers within cyberspace considered to be sovereign Chinese territory. Specifically, this
reference can illustrate how China views its own cyber sovereignty through what it deems a part
of its own Internet geography. President Xi emphasized this concept in a 2015 speech to the
World Internet Conference, stressing that Internet sovereignty must be respected as the “right
of individual countries to independently choose their own path of cyber development.” 190 If
escalation occurs through cyberspace, a U.S. response may not be able to achieve the desired
magnitude of its intended effectiveness against specific digital targets as a result of tight
controls across China’s internet. Accordingly, these factors may compel the U.S. or other nations
to consider kinetic avenues of approach toward their desired targets in some capacity.
The assessed persistent presence of Chinese cyber actors on U.S. critical infrastructure provides
China with advantageous targets of opportunity for this first strike preemptive mentality. With
China considered to be one of just a few countries capable of shutting down critical
infrastructure like the U.S. power grid, this type of action might be considered as either a
coordinated military action, crisis signaling mechanism, or punitive response measure.191 During
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an interview with Adam Segal, he emphasized the point that even though China is not likely to
undertake such extreme targeting measures in cyberspace, that does not mean they would not
take such actions if the perceived repercussions of U.S. actions were deemed to be
unacceptable; this situation might be categorized as the threat of regime collapse or an
attempted overthrow of the Party, and could also stem from Western actions in China’s sphere
of influence that are viewed as a direct threat to Chinese national security.192 Furthermore, as
previously mentioned, the PLA’s doctrinal approach maintains philosophical influences that
advocate advantageous preemptive strikes, and the display of capability, will, and signaling. As
such, this most dangerous type of scenario is certainly not out of the realm of possible for
Chinese actions in cyberspace and can potentially be activated in alignment with the PLA’s
doctrinal approach to preemption. Therefore, if U.S. policies, kinetic and conventional
maneuvers, or asymmetric actions are interpreted as overly offensive or as a violation of
sovereignty, China has the capacity, competency, depth, and most importantly the will, to
undertake such dangerous actions.

INFORMING U.S. CYBER STRATEGY
It is imperative to understand which levers the U.S. should consider using in order to best achieve
its various policy, kinetic, and asymmetric objectives. As such, we must understand that U.S.
actions within cyberspace will be viewed through a unique lens specific to China. This lens has
been distinctly influenced by each of the aforementioned variables, and subsequently impacts
China’s strategic approach to cyberspace. Whether U.S. actions are deemed to be offensive or
defense in nature, a violation of Chinese sovereignty (physical or asymmetric geographies), or
as an active attempt to delegitimize the state government will have profound impacts on China’s
deployment of its cyberspace capabilities.
Accordingly, contested physical geography such as Taiwan and the South China Sea (among
others) can provide more insight into how China views cyberspace. In the case of Taiwan, China
has deployed missiles along the Taiwan Strait in an attempt to deter the potential for Western
Interference, while the U.S. has countered these actions through the sale of arms to Taiwan and
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provided additional security support as stipulated under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA).193
As such, certain actions (such as political recognition of Taiwan, for example) could be viewed
by China as a violation of its national sovereignty. Furthermore, sovereignty violations of this
nature regarding contested geography may also act as a catalyst for malicious asymmetric
responses through cyberspace. Consequently, the U.S. must seek to understand what China’s
‘nine-dash line’ is in cyberspace, and how it can best formulate a strategy that will prevent an
escalatory response as a result of misunderstood signals in all domains of warfare.
An important point of emphasis in the formulation of U.S. cyber strategy with China should also
include a thorough analysis of how the Chinese government is likely to understand, interpret,
and implement future cyberspace agreements. The 2015 China-U.S. agreement to cease cyberenabled intellectual property theft offers an applicable case; although activity significantly
dropped after this agreement initially, a shift in strategy now indicates that Chinese operators
are targeting dual-use technologies and civil society groups that are not covered under the
current agreement. 194 Therefore the U.S. must seek to understand through China’s strategic
culture how these types of agreements on cyberspace policies will be adhered to in the future.
Mainly, will these agreements be interpreted exactly as their specific lettering indicates, or will
they be implemented as to the “spirit of the agreement” as well.195 In a recent interview with
Jason Healey, he emphasized the point that China perceives the U.S. to be extremely capable in
determining attribution for cyber intrusions, a capability the Chinese do not feel as confident in;
as a result, this perception makes China hesitant to enter into these types of agreements. 196
Accordingly, understanding distinctions such as these remain crucial, as they can help the U.S.
strategically shape its policy, targeting, and operational characterization in regards to China.
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It is also important to highlight the timeline and planning cycle that China utilizes in preparing
necessary movements for the achievement of its strategic objectives. This past October,
President Xi Jinping outlined his plan to make China into a superpower within the next thirty
years; in this speech he refers to the start of a “new era” in which China will move closer to
“center stage,” and emphasized that “to achieve great dreams there must be a great
struggle.” 197 Accordingly, it must be understood that even though China appears to be more
regionally focused at this point in the short term, its long-term planning objectives may be
indicating aspirations that are more global in nature. Therefore, the U.S. must strive to account
not just for China’s short-term strategic objectives, but also their long-term global ambitions
twenty to thirty years from now. With this consideration accounted for, the U.S. can better
formulate its own strategic planning cycle that can more directly and accurately inform Cyber
Command’s planning considerations for full spectrum cyberspace operations.
Lastly, the previously discussed consolidation efforts of President Xi Jinping this past year may
be signaling a new development in how China seeks to use cyberspace to its advantage in the
future. With plans to add President Xi’s full doctrine on “Thought on Socialism with Chinese
Characteristics for the New Era” into the national constitution, new parallels are beginning to be
drawn between President Xi and Mao in terms of their political power. 198 Mao’s view on political
power is that it grew out of the “Barrel of a Gun,” and that those intending to maintain this power
must control the armed forces.199 With the recent restructuring and consolidation of Chinese
cyber capabilities under the newly established SSF, it appears President Xi is moving closer to
Mao’s methodology. These recent developments might therefore necessitate a different
characterization of China’s strategic approach to cyberspace, one that more closely aligns with
Chinese views on legitimacy. Specifically, the Confucian “mandate of heaven” 200 can be

Debra Killalea, “China’s 30-Year Deadline to Rule the World,” news.com.au, October 20, 1017,
http://www.news.com.au/finance/work/leaders/chinas-30year-deadline-to-rule-the-world/newsstory/70f62a5bc0e4580b83d5ca89a2479e94.
198 “Xi Expected to Be Written Into Chinese Constitution,” Bloomberg News, January 19, 2018,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-19/xi-jinping-thought-to-be-written-into-chineseconstitution.
199 “Some Background Notes on Mao Tse-Tung’s Philosophy of Force,” 14.
200 WeiWei, “For China’s One-Party Rulers, Legitimacy Flows From Prosperity and Competence.”
197

62

conceptualized as a potential representation for how President Xi’s legitimacy has been built
upon his intent to restore China’s world standing, and how a newly consolidated cyber force
represents another means to achieve this national objective.
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RECOMMENDED AREAS FOR F UTURE RESEARCH
In order to reduce the potential for more dangerous outcomes, the U.S. can consider additional
research or studies on potential influencing topics that may shape China’s trajectory. The use of
law as an instrument to legitimize China’s domestic and international cyber activities may prove
to be a rewarding area for deeper study. Understanding how these legal frameworks can be used
to circumvent international agreements in cyberspace can better inform which policy levers to
pull in future security situations. An additional recommended area for future study is how China
might use its “Information Silk Road” to continue its international espionage activities as a result
of the access it may gain from state-influenced Internet Security Providers (ISPs). A more indepth study of how this topic may affect U.S. companies who choose to conduct business
operations within China can help inform cybersecurity protocols and information protection
procedures. This effort can also include a comprehensive study of the substantial increase in
Chinese acquisitions of U.S. businesses following implementation of the intellectual property
theft agreement in 2015. Chinese mergers and acquisitions involving U.S. companies have risen
steadily from less than one-hundred in 2013 to just under three-hundred in 2017.201
Another potential area for future research might also include how China may seek to respond in
cyberspace as a result of currently planned U.S. tariffs for certain Chinese imports. In response
to new tariffs on steel and aluminum, China has already decided to move forward with
retaliatory tariffs for 128 specific American products.202 However, an important area for future
observation can include if, when, and how China decides to go beyond conventional actions by,
with, and through cyberspace. China’s cybersecurity legal framework already provides a
mechanism for potential retaliation through the use of “a number of informal tools to hurt U.S.
firms” if the government eventually determines these actions to be hostile; some of these tools
could include: “black box cybersecurity reviews,” “hardline interpretation of ambiguous rules in
China’s cybersecurity law,” and future implementation of “encryption requirements” that would
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require pre-approval of domestic encryption products.

203

Additionally, the CCP’s newly

approved constitutional amendment to remove Presidential term limits will allow President Xi
Jinping to continue his tenure. 204 President Xi Jinping has already moved to consolidate his
power and silence domestic criticism through the use of Internet censorship; this censorship has
focused on blocking searches related to criticism of President Xi Jinping’s recent rise in power,
as well as his actions to suppress free speech through cyber means. 205 Accordingly, President Xi
Jinping has also taken actions to somewhat consolidate Chinese national cyber capabilities.
Therefore, in contrast, the lack of a significant cyber response to these economic actions could
also prove to be a significant finding for the evolution of China’s strategic employment of cyber
capabilities.
Lastly, China’s deployment of the newly established SSF in support of the Party’s objectives in
cyberspace can prove to be a prolific area for future research. The consolidation of China’s cyber
capabilities appears to be another consequence of President Xi Jinping’s desire for more state
control. In a recent interview with Adam Segal, he reiterated that China’s SSF construct is an
area where the state is seeking to consolidate more but not completely decentralize; he believes
some APT groups are likely remain outside the SSF and within the Ministry of State Security to
support espionage objectives. 206 Therefore, how this force will be employed and for what
purposes is still not completely clear. Adam Segal further elaborated that this current
consolidation and how China decides to use the SSF is likely to be driven by what happens with
U.S. and China trade relations in the next six months to a year.207 Accordingly, a concerted effort
to observe how these new cyber forces are constituted, employed, and controlled can provide a
better understanding for how this potential evolution in China’s cyber strategy may manifest
itself in future international security situations.
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RUSSIA
A series of successive operations is a modern operation. Without depth, an operation is deprived of
its essence and becomes historically conservative, failing to correspond with the new conditions
that define it.
-Georgii Samoilovich Isserson, on offense-in depth
in The Foundation of Deep Strategy208

INTRODUCTION
In line with the Clausewitzian dictum, the practice of international politics as war by other means
is characteristic of relations between the United States (U.S.) and the Russian Federation
(Russia). Russia’s activity to date has manifested as an extension of its national interests,
whether symbolic or strategic. These are i) disruption of the status quo abroad; and ii) exercising
what it terms “information security” for the preservation of order, and the Russian state as we
know it.209
Given events of the past 15 years, it is easy to fall into the trap of examination of Russian
machinations through our own paradigms and contexts. Russia is a unique actor in the
international arena, and its behavior is a product of many factors which have reverberated into
Russia’s development of a strategic culture in cyberspace. Russia has an Information Security
Doctrine to complement its National Security Doctrine. 210 Consequently, this case study
examines the Russian understanding of cyberspace as a domain and vector for the propagation
of its national interests. Such elements include the employment of non-state actors and proxies
in pursuit of national objectives; the legal lens through which the Russian government interprets
domestic law and international commitments; the civilian-military relationship; and the
development of the domain from Relcom to Kaspersky. 211 The analysis of the factors outlined
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above will provide greater insight into the elements that inform Russia’s conduct and posture
within cyberspace.

DEFINING RUSSIA ’S STRATEGIC CULTURE
The following section provides insight into the distinctive body of beliefs, attitudes, and
practices regarding the use of force, which are specific to the Russian nation-state. By
characterizing Russian behavior in cyberspace as a product of its long existence and unique
factors in its development of nationhood and national cyberspace, we begin to understand how
they inform Russia’s external defense posture.
Russia’s conduct within the cyber domain has been informed through a variety of independent
variables. Beginning with its history, the composition of Russian strategy maintains a
connection with a key Russian military theorist: Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze.212 Frunze’s Unified
Military Doctrine 213 takes an approach informed by state affairs and political developments,
adapting the German Reichwehr’s
aggressive model to the WorkerPeasant-Soldier model of the Red
Army, with particular emphasis on
offense.
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The more contemporary iteration of Frunze’s theory, deep operations, has considerable visibility
and applicability in Russia’s approach to cyber warfare. Frunze’s influence appears most
demonstrably in Russia’s offensive posture in cyberspace, especially in the earliest days of
interstate cyber warfare, such as the 2007 Estonia attacks in response to the proposed removal
of the Russian “Bronze Soldier” monument, and as a combined element of political and kinetic
means and objectives during the 2008 Georgian war. Both of these instances, within the greater
diplomatic aggressive posturing, also exhibit the offensive maneuvers in the realms of
Command and Control (C2), Psychological Operations (PsyOps), or Action on Objective.
A connection to Frunze’s influence is evident in Russia’s Information Security Doctrine of 2008,
sponsored by the Medvedev administration. This doctrine incorporates the defensive nature of
“information security” as part of an integrated treatise that marshals all sectors of Russian
society to exercise efforts in furtherance of Russian national information security objectives. 218
However, according to the UNRISD, there is a touch of irony in this orientation, as it was the role
of the Relcom/Demos network that maintained open lines of communication during the USSR’s
August 1991 coup attempt against Gorbachev that kept the public informed and allowed for a
mobilization against the coup. 219
Another point of consideration in this defensive point of view is how Russia approaches practical
information security beyond doctrine. While China and Iran are considered models in web
filtering, Russia is not up to this par. 220 While Russia has not met first generation filtering
standards, it does serve as a model in the political information security mold, wherein SORM II
regulations dictate that ISPs must provide the FSB with access to “any and all content”, and that
anything objectionable by the FSB is grounds for shutdown. 221 Furthermore, progression to
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greater state control of the Internet appears to proceed in a piecemeal manner, where in lieu of
a nationwide firewall, legislation has been passed addressing specific facets of information
security, such as VPN prohibition, data localization, or mandated operation through local
telecoms, among others.222
It is in these series of prohibitions that we find a source in Dostoevsky, who throughout The
Brothers Karamazov, illustrates the dichotomy between Slavic and Western influence in Alexei
and Ivan, respectively. 223 In the eyes of Dostoevsky, it is of utmost importance for Russia to
embrace its inner Alexei when facing Ivan, the permanent threat to the integrity of the
Karamazov family, and therefore of the Russian Orthodox spiritual community in the face of real
threats.224
In order to understand the Russian approach to the cyberspace domain, it is essential to
recognize the role that the Internet and information play vis-à-vis the state. For Putin, according
to the Center for Naval Analyses, Russia is engaged in a persistent struggle for state security, in
which there are internal and external actors in the information sphere.225 To the brainchild of a
former KGB Colonel, such arguments bear considerable similarity to the Bolshevist idea of kto
kovo, or Who Against Whom. The idea is a Hobbesian zero-sum interpretation of the anarchy of
the international arena, in which a failure to vanquish spells defeat. 226 This would later be
tempered in Soviet practice, which would indicate willingness to cut losses, as exemplified in the
Yom Kippur War.227 Nevertheless, the modern iteration remains consistent with the Western
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and self-described “anti-hegemonic” group of powers, to forgo the interpretation of
cybersecurity as network security, for their definition as information security.228
The religious and philosophical variables of Russian culture have considerably contributed to
strategic culture and the Russian approach to cyberspace. Some of the cornerstones of Russian
literature have been emphasized as part of post-Information Security Doctrine policy musings
by the Russian General Staff. One example of this is the Gerasimov doctrine, which reiterates
the Russian fear of external influences affecting a state to such a great extent that even with the
strongest consolidation, military might, and power projection can succumb to anarchy, citing
the Arab Spring as a “lesson”.229 Gerasimov points out the covert nature of the machinations
leading to such an eventuality.
Other important aspects of Russian strategic culture which influence its approach to the cyber
domain include favoring first-order sources in lieu of documentation for collection and analysis
for intelligence purposes. Ultimately, our analysis will have to understand how Russian cyber
strategy revolves around how the dichotomy between Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, War & Peace
and Crime & Punishment, governs Russia's propensity to use force and hold itself to a standard
of behavior.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
H ISTORY
Russian history has long possessed conditions non-catalytic to positive external relations. Since
Kievan Rus, we can trace this archetype to two founding external forces: the Mongol Hordes and
the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Ever since the start of Russia as we know it with the
nascent Kievan Rus to the Duchy of Muscovy, the Mongol invasions of the 14th century,230 and
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the Time of Troubles, have bred an early suspicion of external pressures against the Russian
state,231 whether forceful or political.
For the case of historical comparison, we must also determine what the proper early warning
paradigm is, and whether
this

has

offensive

or

defensive implications. In the
US,

this

Secretary

is,

as

of

former
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Fig.2: Russian language propaganda in Donetsk, saying ““The fate of the
Russia instance would have a
Russian people- repeat the feat of their fathers, defending their native land.
Enroll in the people’s army of the Donetsk republic,” calling upon themes of few of note: politically, the
the Russian Civil War and WWII, courtesy of medium.com

Time of Troubles, with a

defensive implication as a reaction to the perception of an adverse state of political affairs being
the machination of external powers. For a preliminary examination, we must consider the
majority defensive instances in Russian history. This may be considered as a byproduct of early
Muscovy and the Tsardom, yet we consider the following. For a surprise attack in the mold of a
Russian Pearl Harbor, the closest parallel we have is the casus belli of the Russo-Japanese War
of 1904-05, where the Japanese shelling of the Russian city of Port Arthur, now Lyunshunkuo
District in historical Manchuria, China, started the war.
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mediation by President Theodore Roosevelt, the conditions of and territorial changes accepted
and outlined in the Treaty of Portsmouth, are widely accepted as a Japanese victory. 235 While
Russian strategic thinking had not evolved at this juncture to consider this Japanese result as a
kto kovo moment for Russia, the war nonetheless contributed to a deteriorating political
situation, the period during which included the 1905 revolution. 236 After this metaphor, the
second greatest defensive paradigms, more familiar to the majority of readers, are Napoleon’s
invasion of Moscow during the first Russian Patriotic War, and the Battle of Stalingrad, within
the greater context of the Great Patriotic War (WWII).
Up to the early 20th century, Russian did not have a wealth of military philosophy, theory, or
scholarship to call its own. Compared with Clausewitzian developments contributing to Prussian
military theory up to German unification, Russia from the time of the Tsardom and Empire
lacked such development. Starting with Peter the Great, the first Tsar to be titled Emperor,
Russia’s strategic goal was to develop in line with the great powers of Western Europe. 237 This
all changed with the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, in which Russia started to develop in its own
mode in line with Marxist-Leninist teaching. This brought us Frunze, and his many iterations of
the Unified Military Doctrine. This gave us the most contemporary Soviet iteration, which was
its utilization under Marshal Zhukov.238 After the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia’s strategic
orientation lacked a main adversary, and wound up in a geographic tailspin.239
After the loss of the Eastern Bloc and the Soviet Socialist Republics, the Federation itself was
under risk as Chechen rebels managed to trounce the Russian Armed Forces during the First
Chechen War, gaining de facto independence. 240 Upon repeat of their actions, increases in
jihadist activity, and the Chechen invasion of Dagestan, this final death knell for the Yeltsin
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administration gave way to former KGB Colonel, FSB head, and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.241
While the conventional phase of
the Second Chechen War lasted
about a year, a long and protracted
guerrilla phase shook Russia up to
2008, with the consolidation of
federation control as well as that of
Fig. 3: Map of the Russian Federation, courtesy of CIA

Ramzan Kadyrov.242 In summation,
the importance of this period was

that the deteriorated security situation in the Federation, as well as the ever-present threat of
external interference from the west, provided Putin with the ideal pretext to draft his
Information Security Doctrine of 2008. The premise of the doctrine is best surmised as
protection of the Russian information space from threats to state stability and sovereignty,
regardless of origin. This is a precept that has extended not only to the Federation, but as
enforceable in Russia’s near abroad, as evidenced in 2007 and beyond.
G EOGRAPHY
The embrace of Eurasianism is evident in the delegation of responsibility for Russian
intelligence. For many years after the fall of the USSR, GRU had the primary responsibility for
the near abroad, while the FSB would have responsibility for everything but. 243 Moreover, this
has been evident in Russia’s geopolitical orientation to Eurasianism as well. According to Penn
State, a key manifestation of Russia’s Information Security Doctrine was a UN General Assembly
resolution, along with other post-Soviet states, for international information security
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tightening. 244 Such behavior appears to be consistent, as Putin and Xi Jinping of China have
mutually pledged a policy of non-interference.245
Moreover, there is consideration of geographic weaknesses informing Russian defense
weakness, and therefore suspicion. In an interview with Columbia SIPA’s Senior Research
Scholar Jason Healey, a considerable portion of Russian geographic weakness is the existence
of steppes and poorly defensible terrain in a large portion of Russia’s western territory up to the
Urals.246 Also, the terrain of Siberia is nonconductive to effective defense in the East. As these
have proved to be independent of the Time of Troubles and the Mongol Horde, they have proven
to be invitations to adversaries from Napoleon and Hitler in the West, to Japanese and Chinese
saber rattling in the East. 247 Finally, it would be a combined experience of set-back in Chechnya
as well as the humiliation faced in Afghanistan that would form an immutable orientation of
zero-tolerance towards any insurgencies in Russia proper and the near abroad, a fundamental
tenant of Russian national security policy. 248
P OLITICS
According to Critical Threats, linguistically it is also important not to underestimate the role of
language in intelligence activities. Aside from Cyrillic and transliterated or Romanized domains
among forensic clues, suspect domains can also be written in the closest equivalent Roman
character to the Cyrillic original.249 One example of which is the community of Russian hackery
hosted on xakep[.]ru, whose URL best approximates the original Cyrillic spelling. 250
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To understand the Russian political trajectory today, we must understand Putin. Those familiar
with the immediate post-Soviet period recognized the turmoil and lower standards of living than
many were accustomed to in Soviet times. This gave rise to Putin in the aftermath of a combined
moribund economy, jihadist threats from the North Caucasus, and ever decreasing public
confidence in Boris Yeltsin. A unique feature of Putinism from the start was its ability to
transcend political philosophy, gaining the support of the major Russian schools of political
thought.251
Moreover, within these schools of thought, the ever-present authoritarian streak in Russian
politics merits recognition. Present since Tsardom and Empire, as well as the Soviet Union
through Lenin’s “dictatorship of the proletariat”, even in iterations of democratic facade the
post-Soviet period demonstrated the political ambient that fostered authoritarianism. Some
theorize its roots in Mongol times, a period that officially separated Russia from the
conventional West.252 The 1993 constitutional crisis,253 Putin’s return under Medvedev,254 and
Alexei Navalny's expulsion from the 2018 election255 all predicate Russia's return to personal
rule, as was present during Tsarist times, in order to rule over a vast and ungovernable space.
Furthermore, given the status quo and the Russian penchant to view relations as a zero sum kto
kovo, if one is not with Russia or its leader, the default is to view it as an enemy, and as such,
given Russian theories of total war and skepticism towards the west, makes for a belligerent
mobilization in support of the vodzh, or leader.256
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The economic factors contributing to the current Russian posture are attributable to the shock
therapy during the collapse of the Soviet Union. Massive privatizations and acquisitions by
oligarchs in the wake of the fall of the Soviet Union, which coming on the heels of ample
educational investment in the sciences in the heyday of the USSR, led to a glut of computer
scientists with a dearth of employment opportunity. 257 This later created a cost-effective
workforce/contracting situation for GRU, which presently bears the brunt of external
intelligence and information operations.

258

According to Critical Threats, the role of

programmer also holds considerable prestige as the title of economist did in Soviet times, but a
glut of programmers with few jobs to match challenged this perception.259
As such, Russian nationals would be sought after by firms abroad such as Microsoft and IBM.260
This, combined with a lack of an economic environment that fosters innovation, per Thomas
Friedman, results in a market where "more patents are registered by Microsoft alone than all of
Russia.” 261 Furthermore, criminal actions perpetrated by Russian nationals do not receive the
universal opprobrium that they would in other countries due to the perception that because of
Russia’s current economic situation, as long as foreign entities and not Russians are the victims,
such acts are acceptable.262 Moreover, Critical Threats states that a popular Russian perception
is that if Westerners neglect to protect themselves from criminal activities, then their suffering
is merited.263
An additional factor is the organized crime factor, which not only perpetuates a widespread
system of pervasive corruption in Russia proper, but can also serve as an autonomously funded
vehicle for extortion abroad. Aside from the mafia, Critical Threats cites the Russian Business
Network (RBN), a crime syndicate rife with petty criminals as well as the siloviki, or collective
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Russian security services. While the RBN has been absent for some time now, and many have
contemplated its extinction, it gained a reputation for its criminal activity of the most notorious
nature.264 Finally, as far as Putin is concerned, while the trials and tribulations of the Yeltsin era
provided no reprieve from the opprobrium that he received, the payoff of shock therapy, an
economic recovery joined by a rise in commodity prices, oil included, in the early 2000s provided
a boost to the Russian GDP per capita, as well as Putin’s popularity. 265 This employ of the
criminal underworld combined with technical prowess represents a departure from past Soviet
tactics of using fellow travelers as agents, in that it uses private Russian citizens in a vast effort
to act on the state's behalf while obfuscating as much as possible.
R ELIGION
According to the DIA, the Eurasianist and traditionalist paradigm are often iterated in themes of
Russian propaganda, if not on their own merit, then in denunciation of the West and the values
of the liberal world order that it has embraced.266 The dual role that the Orthodox Church played
during Soviet times, whether as active opposition via the ROCOR, 267 or collaborator with the
KGB for synods in communion with Moscow, is important to recall as an element of
counterintelligence.268 While this wouldn’t be a dismissal of the potency of the Church in Russian
state affairs, consideration of this history leads us into a political-religious-philosophical axis
from which Russians orient their views on international relations.
A notable aspect of religion as it relates to this assessment is twofold: given the integration by
writers such as Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, there is considerable intersection between
contemporary Russian philosophy and the Orthodox Church. And Russian re-emergence of
religiosity given the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of state atheism, with considerable
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attention given to predominant Russian Orthodoxy.269 According to RAND, as a trend the state
has shown a gradually increasing embrace of the Church as legitimator and guarantor of popular
legitimacy. 270 Furthermore, with Russian state embrace of the Church as one of the four
traditional religions of Russia, including Judaism, Islam, and Buddhism, allowed for a greater
dimension of state control in the face of potential subversion from external religious
elements. 271 The overall guise for legitimacy in this instance was traditionalism, where even
those outside of the big four were granted the courtesies of state as long as they conformed to
traditional Russian values. The same could not be said for anything outside of this traditional
veneer.272
Moreover, starting under the Medvedev administration, there has been greater emphasis of
placing the Church at the forefront of patriotic education, or dukhovno nravstvennoe
vospitanie.273 Moreover, the Church provides a guise of legitimation of the protonationalist idea
of Rus. Coterminous with the original patriarchy and Russia’s adoption of Orthodox, to include
a see and territory coterminous with present day Russia, Belarus, and the Ukraine. Any threat to
this, in Putin’s eyes, would undermine the security of the state as well, or the dukhovnaya
bezopasnost.274 This role therefore allows not only the Church, but traditional religious elements
within Russia to set the tone for the information security standard, up to the point of Patriarch
Kirill blessing Ministry of Internal Affairs hardware to protect against cyber attacks. 275 This news
is novel, and we have yet to see Russian Orthodoxy or the other traditional faiths manifest as a
decisive influence on doctrine or operations, its presence merits our attention.
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“The Karamazovs are not scoundrels but philosophers, because all real Russian people are
philosophers…” -Dimitry Karamazov in Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov 276
In Russia’s strategic position in Eurasia, it has had ample opportunity to adopt philosophical
teachings from both East and West to create its own national raison d’être. From the East, we
see elements of the Sun Tzu Bing Fa in military strategy.277 However, from the West, we see a
more profound influence. The pursuit of philosophy, per Dostoevsky in The Brothers Karamazov,
has become a Russian pastime. For the pursuit of meaning with derivatives in Plato’s pursuit of
virtue, wisdom, power, and ideals. 278 Furthermore, philosophy served as a dual edge sword
throughout Russian history, as a consolidating model for which the state could call upon in
governance, as well as a means to subvert the state.
Additionally, we see historical development. The 19th century saw debate on how Russians
relate to the rest of the world and to God, and in the 20th century with how to create the ideal
society. Whether through material means which brought Marxism-Leninism, or in one’s self, in
the debate between existentialism and personalism, to the debate between structure and
personality. Such debates share relevance to the core principle of theories of information and
communication. Of the most potent influences, as far as military power goes, one may look no
further than Dostoevsky. It was he who pioneered existentialism before its popularity via
Sartre.279
In summation, Russian philosophy can be reduced to two ever-competing dichotomies. One is
the totalitarian tendency, in which we see themes such as sobornost (spiritual community),
national unity, resurrection of the fathers, among other tendencies attributable to the Tsarist
era, communism, or Dugin’s Eurasianism. On the opposite side, we see the anti-totalitarian
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tendency, featuring themes such as existentialism, polyphony, personalism, critique of
ideology, and post-utopian thinking.
Eurasianism, while not new, also had to compete with Western oriented and Greater Russia
theory. Western orientation, common since Peter the Great but given new life in the Yeltsin era,
proposed alignment with the West in order to prevent recalcitrant elements in Russian society
from engineering a “Weimar Russia”.280 In contrast, Greater Russia theory, promoted by those
such as Alexandr Solzhenitsyn and Vladimir Zhirinovsky, is a classical revanchist theory on the
reassumption of Russian hegemony not only over the former Soviet Union, but over the Eastern
Orthodox world.281
Additionally, we have the notable Bolshevik contribution to Russian philosophy, in the game
theorist’s zero-sum interpretation of kto kovo. Translated into “Who, whom”, this was
elaborated by Lenin to signify “Who will overtake whom?”. This is a very zero-sum approach to
the Russian view of international affairs, as it assumes that one is either a conqueror or is
conquered. 282 This also aligns well with the summation of Russian nature as “messianic,
totalitarian, ascetic, nihilistic, and cynical.” 283 While Russia is no longer Bolshevist, it can be
effectively argued that this at the very least aligns well with Russian perceptions of encirclement,
as well as with Putin’s exploitation of poor relations with the West to maintain an offensive
position. From these themes, we can assert and determine that Eurasianism and its sobornost
are the deepest philosophical contributors to Russia's orientation in the domain, whereas
Solzhenitsyn and Bolshevism are corollaries and tactical informers, respectively.

RUSSIA ’S CYBERWARFARE STRATEGIES AND CAPABILITIES
With an understanding of Russia’s development as a nation-state and how factors in this
development have affected its perception of the international environment and its national
defense, we will examine how this posturing is manifest in cyberspace. Given Russia’s long
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existence, we will see how entrenched practices that have become part of its national raison
d’être have become part of critical applications of this culture. In the role of war in state affairs,
we will see internal and external applications of cyber power. This is based on what Russia’s
perception of the enemy is, the prowess it has, and its ability to respond. From there, this will
determine Russian propensity to use force, and the actors it employs to do so. Whether they are
regular Armed Forces and official intelligence officers, or anything but. This topic will be further
parsed in understanding how Russia understands the rules of war, how this relates to civilian and
military pursuits to cyber war, and what this implies for restraint. These dependent variables will
provide us with the best commencement for understanding the Russian way of cyberwarfare,
and its implications for the national defense.

DEPENDENT VARIABLES
R OLE OF F ORCE IN S TATE A FFAIRS
According to the Center for Naval Analyses, Russia’s adoption of informatsionnaya voyna, or
information war, is an important distinction from the direct translation and practice of what we
would term kibervoyna, or cyber war.284This allows for Russia to exact offensive and purportedly
nonlethal operations against its adversaries without the risk of sparking the kinetic action that
its adversaries perceive as cyber war, thus not risking a response. A consideration brought to
light with the conduct of pure cyber in Estonia and combination with kinetic means in Georgia.
The same source states, according to Col. Chekinov and Lt. Gen. Bogdanov, that the key to this
is plausible deniability.285
Moreover, Russia commonly views information warfare as one component of total war, in which
the entire resources of the state are mobilized.286 However, according to the Swedish Defense
Research Agency, Russia views information warfare as a traditional prelude to kinetic, evident
in its implementation in the pre-C2 obfuscation phase of the 2008 Georgia war. The same
source, citing Russia’s willingness for negotiation and treaty definition of acceptable behavior in
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a discussion of war and peace, but not law and order, is demonstrative of the acceptability with
which they place both behaviors. It is a trend that has been described as a fusion of traditional
Leninist obfuscation enhanced with the potencies that information and network operations
afford.287 Overall, what we witness is a greater willingness to exercise force in cyberspace when
the core or peripheral are deemed compromised.288
N ATURE OF THE T HREAT
“Russia is built on what it’s afraid of.” -Jason Healy289
From our understanding, Russia has adopted a total war strategy based on its efficacy in past
operations and based on perception of the threat facing it. From roots in medieval to post-Cold
War history, it is evident that Russia is deriving its strategic orientation from its perception of
nation-states motives towards it and its exercise of power. According to DIA, Russia’s
articulation of international vision includes “multipolarity predicated on state sovereignty and
non-interference in internal affairs”.290 Per Galeotti, while not a blockade, which is the correct
definition of an economic application of war, Russia interprets economic sanctions as an act of
war.291 Even more revealing is the absence of “phase zero” as we understand it, which combined
with the siege mentality present in many non-democratic regimes, perpetuates the mindset of
permanent fusion of war and peace, albeit with less emphasis on peace.292
Runet is a component of Russian distinctness and how they view the web. Several entities speak
of Runet as an amalgamation of the Russian internet. Coined by Azerbaijani-Israeli Raffi
Aslanbekov, Runet remains distinct as the community of Russian-language websites designed
for the Russian domestic market. A component of which was also embraced by foreign IT
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companies in Russia as a way to cater to the non-English speaking market. 293 However, this
approach has historically faced setbacks when implemented by foreign IT providers such as
Google, where Russians tend to prefer domestic and locally tailored IT services. 294 While not
used to describe a Russian territorial intranet, the term has come into favor by the Russian
government as a descriptive term for Russian cyberspace territorial delineation. 295
In addition, according to the Swedish Defense Research Agency, Russia holds its immediate
operational goal as gaining and holding an information advantage over its adversaries. 296
Moreover, since Russia’s interpretation of the information warfare doctrine is inclusive of
internal and external information security, victory for them is predicated on the indisputable
defeat of their adversaries in the information domain. 297 Finally, we see an influence of
Eurasianism in current perceptions of the West. While mistrust of foreigners is nothing new for
Russians, a core tenant of Eurasianism is the perception of American encirclement.298 While fear
of state disintegration by external force was a motivating factor for Chechnya and supporting
Operation Enduring Freedom, NATO enlargement and the prospect of a Chechnya-like situation
in Syria motivated Russia to act.299 300
Finally, beyond the American consideration, according to CFR’s Adam Segal, it appears that due
to the overwhelming consolidation of power by Putin via United Russia and the All-Russian
People’s Front, Putin’s worst fear is any mass public manifestation that threatens his rule. 301
Mr. Segal stated that this started to pick up steam during the Color Revolutions as well as the
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Arab Spring, and Columbia SIPA’s Adjunct Professor for Cyber Threat Intelligence Analysis, JD.
Work, stated that Euromaidan was a further escalator.302
E FFICACY OF THE U SE OF F ORCE
According to the BBC, a considerable portion of Russia’s efficacy of use of force is based on its
practice of military deception, or maskirovka. This was first harnessed in the Battle of Kulikovo
Field, ousting the first major strategic enemy of the Russians, the Mongols. In terms of efficacy,
maskirovka is designed to be the utmost expression of fury in battle as part of an ambush
designed to vanquish an enemy or force it to retreat. Not only has this been a staple of
conventional warfare, but it is also crucial to unconventional warfare, such as its employ by the
covert military actors of the Crimea takeover. Tactics such as kamufliazh, demonstrativnye
manevry, skrytie, imitatsia, and desinformatsia have all shown to be Russian information and
cyber operation staples, from the 2016 DNC breach to Olympic Destroyer. It also manifests in
cyber
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According to Small Wars Journal, an additional notable Russian tactic that has allowed them
great breadth and control on the battlefield, whether kinetic or cyber, was harnessed during
Napoleon’s invasion. In this instance, the Russian army relied on the depth of the Russian
territorial terrain, using it as a lure to draw in Napoleon’s army. Where in a case study worthy of
Clausewitz, once the French logistic chain was overstretched, the Russian army would attack.
This, combined with the famed winter that weakened Napoleon’s troops and later forced his
retreat, is a cornerstone of Russian strategy. Aside from its obvious advantages between Russia
turning the tide against Germany in WWII and the conclusion of Stalingrad, it also has
implications for the cyber domain.304
Organizationally, we can classify active measures as our domain-agnostic grand operational
framework for influencing the events in a target country to compel will. Deception, in turn, is a
tactic designed to obfuscate the origins and future plans that the operation's initiator is
performing. As for the information operation and warfare domain, this fluid and hard to govern
venue offers a ripe environment for Russians to exploit political differences, while employing as
many masks and fronts as possible so that a Russian connection is near invisible to the untrained
eye.
In the information domain, active measures gained its popularity in this era as well, as not only
a contribution to the partisan effort behind German lines in the USSR, but also in support of
resistance and partisan movements in Western Europe, which would form the groundwork for
communist electioneering after the war.305 Seeing any opportunity to exploit a lack of consensus
would be the crux of Soviet information operations became an cornerstone of operations
against the United States since the 1960s, aping in the 1980s.306 For the lures, social engineering
and spear phishing have proven to be key components of the reconnaissance phase of Russian
cyber operations. Moreover, the extent to which a cyber force is enveloped in the depths of the
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Deep and/or Dark Web is a testament to the risks of being drawn in and, without proper
precautions in place, expose themselves to operational security breach. This is also a testament
to the risk that Russian forces run themselves of over-extension in territory not their own, as
Afghanistan has proven.
According to the CNA review, we can interpret the Russian efficacy of the use of force as follows:
tolerance for setbacks in the mold of the later Soviet tolerance to pull back in exchange for
greater strategic success. It is a modus operandi that was practiced in Estonia, where the tactical
objective was not achieved, as damage to Estonia was minimal and the plan to relocate the
Bronze Soldier proceeded. However, it was a strategic coup in that it paved the way for
Georgia.307
According to Galeotti, use of force, even in deft navigation of the legal gray zone with the
employ of semi legal actors, it is measurably and cyclically inefficient. 308 Most succinctly, it is
capable of overstretch. This is often a reflection of Russia’s own limited resources. This also
comes on the heels of its incumbent military modernization efforts, which while producing
notable hardware for itself and its partners, also conjures up images of the Brezhnev-AndropovChernenko military buildups.
N ON -S TATE A CTORS AND P ROXIES
According to Newsweek, the employ of non-state actors is additionally worrying as they are not
only script-kiddies, but developers as well. The creator of BlackEnergy was notable in his
distribution of an intended bank fraud malware and use it against governments. There is a
distinction in activity, however, that can distinguish between actions for materialistic financial
gain and those intended to benefit the Russian state: in recent analysis of APT28, researchers
noticed a decrease in intellectual property theft, and an increase in reconnaissance of defense
ministries and departments. 309 Moreover, the recent restrictions on federal acquisition of
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Kaspersky products due to Yevgeny’s affiliation with a KGB Technical School, 310 while not
indicative of collusion, is a testament to the extent that non-governmental actors can show roots
in Russian intelligence. This offers considerable depth and capacity for non-official action, as
evidenced by the recent employ of GameoverZeuS.311
The CNA review attests to the difficulty in attribution of non-state actors to the Russian
government. That being said, as is typical with like-minded peers, Russia has enlisted the
services of non-state actors, ranging from underemployed hackers to thieves-in law. In addition
to cost efficacy of employ of these actors, there is a potent legal rationale for employ: in current
practice, handlers provide the proxies with actionable intelligence, in which the officers involved
can claim plausible deniability. Furthermore, based on ideological alignment, Russia may be able
to enlist the assistance of hackers free of charge.312
According to Critical Threats, we can also see similarity in the origins of the domain in Russia,
albeit with different public-sector applications. Like in the early days of our hacking, Russian
hackers would be arrested and offered the options of prison or service for the FSB.
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believed that this initial cadre provided the manpower for the Moonlight Maze breach as well as
initial information operations against Chechen rebels during the 2002 Moscow theatre crisis,
using similar TTP that would be employed in Estonia.
According to the DIA, there are two ways that the GRU and FSB can influence the management
of non-state actors and proxies. Often, if the groups in question such as Wikileaks have
ideological aims that parallel Russian interests, then Russian intelligence services will act in
tandem so that there is sufficient distance for reasons of plausible deniability in the case of
belligerency or attribution. In another instance, Russian intelligence will often sponsor its own
third-party actors, such as with the breach of the USCENTCOM feed by the “Cyber Caliphate”.314
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Moreover, an oft-used method void of middlemen, or greater difficulty in attribution, in the
employ of professional trolls and bots, such as those under the aegis of the Internet Research
Agency.315
L EGAL F RAMEWORK
In the practice of plausible deniability as part of maskirovka, Russian diplomatic and justice
establishments can claim adherence to the letter of the law. Thus delegitimizing any attempt by
an adversary to pursue punitive measures.316
According to DIA, we gain further insight into the practical view of legalism by Russia from
Putin’s speech of March 18th, 2014. Wherein he criticizes the US for purported manifestation of
state power in the international arena by exercise of force as opposed to international law,
providing fortification for adoption of the literalist school. 317 This combines with Russian
perception that the US seeks to impose international norms.
There is an interesting take, however, on the termination of adherence to legal norms and
practical adherence to realist paradigms exhibited in Mark Galeotti’s Russian New Way of War.
He cites Tolstoy’s War & Peace, wherein the First Patriotic War is described as a fencing duel
between Napoleon and Tsar Alexander, where Napoleon’s goal was to compel the Tsar to do his
will. Tolstoy then describes the next phase, or the Russian repel, as Alexander donning a club, to
which Napoleon protests based on the rules of war, which the Tsar had assumed did not exist.318
This further joins philosophically with a nihilistic approach to law, wherein citizens question the
need to obey the law when, in their estimation, the state does not.319 This also provides insight
into the Russian approach to war from a legal standpoint. According to RAND’s Bruce
McClintock, Russian’s are experts, when the letter of the law is or is not articulated ad nauseam,
at operating in the grey areas of the law, evading questions of illegality, and refuting claims of
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with the assertion of countermeasures.320 Moreover, Galeotti states that the assertion of the
Gerasimov doctrine is as a corollary to the Clausewitzian dictum on politics and war, albeit
reversed. 321
Additionally, Russia has proven, not only through proxies, but also through the employ of
russkiye (ethnic Russians) abroad, to place as many degrees of separation between act and the
Russian Federation itself. As to obscure liability and attribution. However, most notable
according to the Swedish Defense Research Agency is that Russia has not made public any cyber
policy document comparable to our JP 3-13.322 From what we do know, outside of the spectrum
of information warfare, Russia does make mention of the components of what we know as cyber
warfare, inclusive of electronic warfare and implementation of the kill chain, albeit with one
glaring replacement: in lieu of computer network operations, they refer to mathematical
programming impact, a decidedly root view of OCO and DCO.323
M ILITARY -C IVILIAN R ELATIONSHIP
According to the Swedish Defense Research Agency, the employ of the GRU in handling nonstate actors ranging from Russians abroad to patriotic hackers, risks muddying the civil-military
divide. Yet this is in accordance with Russian interpretations of total war when they believe their
national integrity or existence is threatened.324
Additionally, it is important to consider the possibility of division between expectations,
willingness to embrace risk, and acceptance of consequences. This is a debate that not only
pervades the divide between civilians and the military, but also within the military. It most
notably arose when Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev and Chief of General Staff Gen. Anatoly
Kvashnin endured a three-year disagreement about apportionment of resources, whether to
rebuild the nuclear arsenal or conventional forces.325 Brian Taylor reiterates this, where he notes
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that dependent on the years in service that a Russian officer has, there can be gaps in
understanding with respect to implementation of policy. 326
Moreover, as Russian society grows more and more autocratic, there is another force at work
coaxing a divide. Like a popular
perception of the Foreign Service,
the

Russian

foreign

policy

establishment has been perceived as
effete and cosmopolitan. They saw
good relations with the West as key
to consolidation of power at home.327
The intelligence corps, however, who
saw their priorities as protection of
the Russian state at home and

Fig. 5: Depiction of combined operational methods by APT
28 (a.k.a. Fancy Bear/GRU) and APT 29 (a.k.a. Cozy
Bear/FSB), courtesy of us-cert.gov

abroad, challenged this. Clashes involving this divide include the attempts during the 1980s by
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to preserve detente while the KGB triggered direct action from
Africa to Afghanistan. As such, especially given present Russian official discourse of Americanled “globalist” attempts to isolate Russia, this is indication of the heavy predominance of the
spies in Russian government. This would be indicative of a greater propensity for offensive
engagement in the domain. If the Russian foreign policy establishment cannot be an effective
check on the belligerent propensities of the intelligence community, then a greater divide would
indicate a greater willingness to use force.
Moreover, there is a perceived divide between the FSB and GRU. While the GRU has been at the
forefront of cyber operations, most notably through APT28, it had to re-earn this favor as a
result of its substandard performance during the 2008 Georgia War, a conflict that it should have
Brian D. Taylor, Politics and the Russian army: civil-military relations, 1689-2000. Cambridge University Press,
2003. p. 34
327 Alex Hazanov and Yakov Feygin. “Analysis | Russia Hacked Our Election Because the Spies Took Over.”
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mastered given its responsibility for Russia’s near abroad. 328 Therefore they are seen as in a
popularity contest with the FSB, whose former Director Putin has described as his favored
Chekists, hearkening back to the legacy of the pre-WWII Soviet Cheka.329

ASSESSMENT OF RUSSIA’ S POTENTIAL FUTURE DISPOSITION
Cognizant of the factors that constitute Russian cyber capability today, the implications for the
future are to be examined on the basis of likelihood and danger. The Russian arsenal and
propensity for use as a component of Russian expeditionary offensive activity, as well as in the
exercise of cyber warfare in its own right, is demonstrative of intent. Therefore, while not
perfectly analogous to the most dangerous scenario, it is our evaluation that the most
dangerous scenario will consist of tactics, techniques, and procedures that Russian actors have
employed in the past, as well as some that have yet to be tested.
M OST L IKELY F UTURE T RAJECTORY
Cognizance of Russian information and cyber capability has grown multifold in the aftermath of
the 2008 Georgia war, and exponentially after the deterioration in relations between Russia and
the West. Starting with Russian operations in Ukraine around 2014, and even more so in the
aftermath of the 2016 election. In that time, conventional intelligence has shown greater
Russian acceptance of willingness to use force in the cyberspace domain.330 This has included
using Ukraine as a testing ground for more of its advanced cyber weaponry and tactics, which
have been employed in support of kinetic operations. Or in pure cyber missions, as evidenced
with DDoS attacks on Ukrainian critical infrastructure.
One example of implications for the West has been the aftermath of WannaCry/NotPetya, in
which an initially Ukrainian targeted attack spread with implications for critical infrastructure
across the West. Moreover, given past Russian success in cementing frozen conflicts, including
that of Georgia with integrated kinetic and cyber means, it is the evaluation of Sean Kanuck that,
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also given Russia’s need for cognizance in its actual capacity and the risk of over stretch, that
further belligerence most likely will occur in the Near Abroad.331 According to Columbia’s Steve
Bellovin, Russia’s tendency with intrusion sets and related means is to employ them to the
maximum of their utility, and to discard said methods when their utility has expired. 332
Therefore, we can expect Russia will be active in group operations across domains, until they
see their adversaries parried.
M OST D ANGEROUS F UTURE T RAJECTORY
From what we have seen in the most potent employs of Russian information and combined
kinetic operations, a considerable point of no return as has been demonstrated in Estonia,
Georgia, and the Ukraine. In all three of these instances, Russia has iterated, or it has been
determined that, the casus belli are Russian historical memory, its strategic position vis-à-vis
NATO, or the citing of the interests of ethnic Russians. There is credence to the ethnonationalist
argument here, yet it is not our belief that it is not strong enough to provide impetus to the types
of strategic investments that Russia has made.
Furthermore, the image of Russia as a power of unemployed criminal hackers has gained
credence with the static of Russia among the top five nations of origin for cyber intrusions. 333 It
is possible that this interpretation can be put to rest, given the current knowledge of GRU
employment of hackers and the Russian desire for dominion over the domain within Russia
proper (while directing targeting efforts externally), and especially the best internationally
known product of this investment being Yevgeny Kaspersky.
What appears to be the worst-case scenario is articulated by Sean Kanuck, who states that with
minimal and shrinking economic and diplomatic common interest and links with the West,
Russia will exhibit even less reticence to engage in aggressive behavior.334 This is an evaluation
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seconded by Adam Segal, who includes the possibility for the DNC breach, that if it wasn’t error,
which is unlikely due to the fact and perception of Russian aptitude in penetration, that it was a
sign of Russian disregard of the consequences of their actions.335 If this were to be the case, then
it would be more than reasonable to anticipate the most dangerous scenario to be a Russian
doubling-down in the face of confrontation.
In terms of capability, what appears to be the most dangerous scenario follows from Kanuck, in
that with every capability that Russia has perpetrated on the West, there was a precedent in its
near abroad. Whether through pure information operations in Estonia, hybrid operations in
Georgia and Crimea, or infiltration of critical infrastructure systems in Eastern Ukraine. There
are parallels in information operations to influence elections, the possibility of clash in
flashpoints featuring the Russian Armed Forces, Syria included, as well as the discovered
presence of Russian malware in our SCADA systems. As for intent, in addition to Kanuck’s
assessment of greater willingness to use, Professor Steve Bellovin assesses that the only reason
that Russian penetration and information operations were not successful during the French
presidential election of 2017 was due to the fact that the Macron campaign placed false
“evidence” among scoured servers. Russian hackers obtained and attempted to portray as
seized and leaked evidence.336 This combination of capability, from election breach to SCADA
hack, times intent, with less reticence and greater willingness to play fast and loose regardless
of risk to others or self, makes this the most potent threat. Which in the worst-case scenario,
could result in an intentional devastating offensive destructive attack on our infrastructure.

INFORMING U.S. CYBER STRATEGY
The intent of this section is to determine the gap between capabilities, areas for improvement,
and how to proceed with further research in order to gain a stronger understanding of what we
must do in order to shore up the cyber national defense.
It is clear in our findings that Russian action, whether pursued directly via GRU or through
proxies, is trying to maximize its push for hegemony in what it deems its traditional spheres by
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336
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any means necessary, just short of war. This was not only emphasized during the era of the Cold
War balance, but remains true today in light of aggressive posturing that attempts to push the
boundaries of what is acceptable. Whether it be Ukraine, elections, or NATO itself and its
determination to invoke Article V. A considerable portion of this, analogous to Russian practice
of disinformatsia to sow doubt not only on the battlefield, but in command centers, is perfectly
analogous to the Western practice, albeit more restrained, of sowing “fear, uncertainty, and
doubt” or FUD. Furthermore, per NDU, there exists the possibility of underestimation of how far
the Russian interpretation could proceed, given their penchant to push buttons as well as the
generous Cold War definition of cyber that not only includes our network and their information,
but both of our C2.337 As for implications for the US, countering deception in the information
space will require an understanding of the means and disguises through which Russians will
obfuscate their actions in the domestic space. Moreover, countering the threat will require
hardening of soft targets, such as social media and defense against guerrilla cyber operations
through proxy TOR servers.
Furthermore, it would behoove us to comprehend how Russians approach systems. Olympic
Destroyer proved to be an anomaly, albeit in the guise of a false flag. How Russians typically
approach systems is through viewing them as formulas for input and output. They possess the
capability to feed their own input for a desired output. Forming the base of social engineering
operations that lead to leak disclosures, where the greatest product is not purely a deniable
falsehood, but revelation of a secret. Therefore, if our evaluation were that the Russians would
start to employ newer capabilities after our discovery, and therefore would be better prepared
to anticipate and defend against them, one potential solution would be to employ more
honeypot servers to trap actors for forensic purposes. As Steven Bellovin has stated, since the
Russians got sloppy, we can count on this as a definite and employ it to our advantage.338
Moreover, it will be necessary to adapt to the Russian understanding of deterrence. Per the DIA,
the Russian translation of deterrence does not bear its adversaries in mind, but is a reiteration
Richard D. Hooker, Charting a course: Strategic choices for a new administration. Chapter 11: Russia,
Government Printing Office, 2017. p. 226
338 Bellovin, 2018
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of active measures.339 In addition, their idea of strategic deterrence is as true to the Gerasimov
doctrine than any other. However, the missing link here is the Russian desire for strategic
stability, specifically a vision of stability that aligns with great power balance, and one that
reinforces the Russian perception of a multipolar world.
Given the lengths Russians will go to for symbolic measures combined with action that under
present definition, reinforced via their literal interpretation of the law, events such as Estonia
serve as strategic invitations to Russia, especially as a vector to affect NATO. Moreover, with
states ambiguous towards NATO, events such as Georgia highlight the risk present to inviting
kinetic warfare along with information. Finally, as the strategic stakes increase with symbolic
and strategic importance, we see the lengths Russia will go to, such as SCADA attacks, as
evidenced in Ukraine. One factor unites these, however. Without communicated direct response
or show to force from the west, Russia will feel emboldened to proceed with impunity.
Moreover, should attempts to improve legal definition and agreement on cyber action
acceptability fail to deter Russia, it will offer a greater definitive pretext, and less gray area, to
respond.
This is a position that not only the US should embrace, but NATO as well. In response to Russian
influence operations during the 2016 election, notable steps were taken with respect to
diplomatic and judicial retaliation. It is time that these are joined militarily. Atlantic Resolve is
just one of many steps taken in the kinetic realm. A potent next step would be to join this with
an OCO that imposes cost on Russia and makes them cognizant of not only the lengths to which
we will proceed offensively, but what risk they pose to themselves.

RECOMMENDED AREAS FOR F UTURE RESEARCH
The most recent iteration of the Tallinn Manual has come to account for the duplicitous and
evasive ways in which Russia approaches the letter and spirit of the law. Yet will require constant
adaptation, as well as corollary adaptation of our ROE and JAG interpretations of LoAC for
engagement with discernibly Russian actors in military cyberspace. Furthermore, per Roland
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Hieckerö of the Swedish Defense Research Agency, as has been suggested not only in the
context of U.S.-Russian relations, but also in that of multilateral diplomacy, that we are
seriously, beyond iteration in manuals, the enumeration of legality of cyber tactics, techniques,
and procedures.340 Any attempt to require Russian definition of acceptability in the rules of war
in cyberspace, or defining Tolstoy’s War & Peace, will also require, for our sake, a definition of
Dostoevsky’s Crime & Punishment. This way, it must be made known to Russia that its
intersection of the two and attempts to obfuscate are not only unacceptable, but risk it being
exposed to and drawn into a war that it cannot win.
Further research in this area would best encompass a combination of legal analysis, neoKremlinology, and cyber deterrence. We have an idea now of how Russia will act in response to
threats to its existence and national interests. What we lack is an understanding of how to
anticipate and countervail Russian machinations, particularly those of a destructive nature,
before they occur. This will require understandings of the cyber version of a Cuban missile crisis.
This provides an ideal comparison as it represented the brink of warfare for the nuclear age. We
must now formulate a study for response and standoff with the known, such as mutual
infiltration of critical infrastructure, as well as the unknown. The disciplines outlined above will
provide a greater understanding of the issue as a means to:
1) Catch Russia in the act, as US Ambassador to the UN Adlai Stevenson did to Soviet
Ambassador Valerian Zorin on the Security Council floor in 1962,
2) Comprehend Russian military and intelligence leadership and relationships beyond
institutions, as the institutions and culture studied here go so far with the personalized style
of Vladimir Putin, and whoever shall succeed him, as EXCOMM did with the Khrushchev
communiqués, and
3) Definitively formulate a plan of action through present and future cyber assets to deter
Russian aggression and compel cooperation. As was done through a strategic information of
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operational plans and means to apply network defense principles to kinetic practices such as
quarantine.
The elaboration of these studies, and their ability to inform strategic decision-making will be the
best point of procedure to anticipate Russian action in preparation of the national defense.
These, however, must be compounded with dynamic elaboration in the domain as to best
anticipate the next Russian moves in exercise of their national might. The DNC breach was
unprecedented in our history as well as Russian history. Past Russian attempts to influence
politics were confined to incumbencies and responding to specific policies, but never the
electoral process itself. While there is legitimate argument that Estonia, Georgia, and the 2016
election were sufficient wakeup calls, this is insufficient to compensate for failure to anticipate
Russian reconnaissance.
Further areas of research would also have to include the probabilities of discovery of existential
threats in our systems, as interception rates of Russian intruders are already quantifiable
measures which are easier to attribute with each passing day. However, real-time measures do
not assist us in anticipating the next possible manifestation of power. Such manifestations could
take the form of an executed attack on our critical infrastructure to an event of international
significance. Other retaliations could also manifest in a manner least expected, such as exposure
of employees of the Intelligence Community as well as assets worldwide in retaliation for
expulsion of Russian diplomats and non-official cover officers of the Russian intelligence
services. In summation, consideration of these possibilities and developing research on their
effects and our current capabilities across DoD and the IC are essential to best anticipate and
counter Russian adversarial action.
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IRAN
We have armed ourselves with new tools,
because a cyber war is more dangerous than a physical war
-Abdollah Araqi, Deputy Commander of ground forces,
Iranian Revolutionary Guard341

INTRODUCTION
Iran’s history is important to the national identity as it was once a great empire ruling its
neighbors with a mighty military and advanced civilization. This history is invoked repeatedly to
stir national pride. This identity was a factor in the evolution of Tehran’s cyber activities from a
tool to ensure the survival of the political regime in the face of political threats to a tool to
supplement Iranian hegemonic expansionist policies.
Another factor in its development of cyber activities is its hostility towards Israel. With the ArabIsraeli conflict being central to modern-time politics in the Arab world,342 Iran finds it beneficial
for its role in the region to assume the image of Israel-bashing leader. In addition, those politics
are influenced by Iran’s rivalry with its Arab neighbors. Iran’s perceived role –locally and in the
region- as a “resistance” leader has allowed it to recruit supporters of its cyber activities,
including proxies who can use cyber-attacks on Tehran’s behalf, which in turn allows it
deniability of responsibility.
Iran’s modern politics are dominated by the religious clerics regime, which was installed as a
result of the 1979 Islamic Revolution. This political version of Shiite Imam-government is
particular to Iran, but Iran has been trying to “export” it throughout the region -not only to
countries with considerable Shiite population like Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain and Yemen, but also
to countries where Shiites are small minorities, like Syria. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
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(IRGC), who is referred to often as the guardian of the revolution, assumes a major part in
supervising cyber activities of Iran.
Within a decade of its first connection to the internet in the early 1990’s, the Iranian regime,
represented by the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, controlled cyber activity in the
country. About the same time, the hacking community thrived and contributed to the
oppression of political dissidents. With that, the earliest purpose of Iranian cyber programs
emerged: the protection and preservation of the political regime.
In 2005, the hardline political wing, represented by former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad,
assumed leadership and expressed animosity toward the West and democratic values. By the
next election cycle in 2009, popular dissent, which relied more on new ICT technologies, posed
a more serious threat to the hardliners. These popular demands were the beginning of a series
of uprisings in the Middle East as the Arab Spring began in late 2010.
The domestic political threat to the regime made the Iranian authorities rely on cyber
surveillance as an effective strategic tool to counter the dissent. The success of these strategies
became conducive for government-sponsored cyber and hacking capabilities to be developed,
including offensive strategies to use these capabilities against external targets, such as the Saudi
oil company Aramco and the banking sector in the U.S. Currently, some of these capabilities are
finding their way into the hands of allies of Iran in the region, where they are also being
employed to quell political dissent.

DEFINING IRAN’S STRATEGIC CULTURE
The regime is in a state of flux, not far removed from the initial fervor of the 1979 Islamic
Revolution, the horrific costs of the 1980-1988 war with Iraq, and the consolidation of a new
ruling religious elite drawn from the ranks of the nation’s Shi’ite Muslim clerics headed by the
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei.343 The decision-making process since the establishment
of the Islamic Republic, led by Shia Ayatollahs, is being shaped by Shia doctrines. This religious
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elite leadership consists of a small group of decision-makers belonging to different competing
factions, from traditionalists to reformists, who are nonetheless loyal to the Supreme Leader. In
order to consolidate the political system after the Revolution, the IRGC was formed based on
ideological and religious foundations from the Shia militias that helped the Revolution Leader
Ayatollah Khomeini seize power. Since then, the IRGC has been a military arm of the state,
whose role has extended to all aspects of activities in Iran. Additionally, the regime is hostile
toward the West since the revolution. All these factors have had an important effect in shaping
Iran’s strategic culture.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
H ISTORY
Known as Persia until 1935, Iran was an empire that occupied much of Asia Minor and
Mesopotamia in ancient times. That empire, whose official religion was Zoroastrianism, was a
great military power in the Old World, with several nations under its hegemonic rule. This
civilization ended in the seventh century A.D. with the advent of Islam, which emanated from
the Arabian Peninsula. Along with that, the majority of Zoroastrianism ended as populations
under Persian rule converted to Islam and participated in the demise of the Persian Empire.
Although Iran became a Muslim nation and an important center of the Islamic civilization, many
note this bitter history as an important element in the Iranian psyche and a factor that has
contributed in modern times to shaping Iran’s attitude toward neighboring Arab states.
For much of its recent history, Iran was ruled by a monarchy. In his book Countercoup: The
Struggle for the Control of Iran, Kermit Roosevelt recalls the story of the CIA’s most notorious
covert action that involved the coup that overthrew Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed
Mossadeq in August 1953. 344 That event changed dramatically the course of modern Iranian
political history, thereby shaping its strategic culture ever since. The involvement of the United
States in this operation was a major factor in shaping the relationship between the two countries
and how they behave towards each other.
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In 1979, the most defining factor in Iran’s modern history took place, namely the Islamic
Revolution led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, to overthrow the ruling monarchy and force
Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi into exile. As a result of the revolution, a theocratic system of
government was established with ultimate political authority vested in a religious cleric, the
Supreme Leader, who is only accountable to the Assembly of Experts, an elected body of clerics.
The then-prevailing excellent relations between Iran and the United States suffered irreparable
damage as a result of this incident, in which a group of Iranian students seized the U.S. Embassy
in Tehran and held more than 100 Americans hostage.
Following the establishment of the State of Israel, Iran developed a close relationship with it
based on shared interests in keeping the Soviets out and pan-Arabism down. Various types of
diplomatic, military, and trade ties endured for about three decades. Iran was an important
source of oil for Israel, but the mutual interests that sustained relations withered after the 1979
Iranian revolution and the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1989. This relation turned into bitter enmity
to the point of proxy war between Israel and Iran via its client in Lebanon, Hezbollah in 2006.345
For most of the 1980s, Iran was involved in a major war with neighboring Iraq. The war eventually
expanded to become a major rivalry in the Gulf, as Iraq’s president Saddam Hussein often
stressed that he is fighting on behalf of Arabs and fending off the Persian threat.346 This rivalry
has continued ever since, especially with another regional power in the Arab Gulf, Saudi Arabia.
G EOGRAPHY
Iran is surrounded by rival powers, whose interests do not align with its own. These include Saudi
Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan, and Israel. Iran’s neighborhood has been the site of many international
conflicts that brought international powers, from the British Empire to the United States and
Russia, to the region. Many of the Arab countries in the region became aligned with the United
States, which left Iran feeling part of a region with many foes and adversaries.
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Iran is located in a complicated region at the intersection between the Middle East, Asia Minor,
and Central Asia. These regions have had geopolitical issues that spill out to become
international threats. A major protracted conflict in the Middle East region has been the ArabIsraeli conflict, in which Iran was not a party, but has extensively used as an excuse for
intervening in the region, recruiting Arab proxies and building its military capabilities.
Several countries in the region have connections to Iran, especially through religious minorities
that identify with Iran’s religious regime and who have relied on Iranian support, becoming its
proxies. These include Hezbollah in Lebanon, as well as political and mercenary groups in other
countries like Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.
P OLITICS
Following the election of reformer Mohammad Khatami as president in 1997 and a reformist
Majles (legislature) in 2000, a campaign to foster political reform in response to popular
dissatisfaction was initiated. The movement floundered as conservative politicians, supported
by the Supreme Leader, unelected institutions of authority like the Council of Guardians, and
the security services reversed and blocked reform measures while increasing security repression.
In June 2013, Iranians elected a moderate conservative cleric Dr. Hasan Ruhani to the presidency.
He is a longtime senior member in the regime but has made promises of reforming society and
Iran's foreign policy. Since the Revolution and until the time being, internal politics in Iran
continue to witness rivalry between reformists and hardliners. However, popular dissent
continues to push towards more liberty and openness to the West as well as political, economic,
and social reforms.
The regional politics of Iran’s neighborhood is influenced by Iran’s continued rivalry with its
Sunni Arab states and with the State of Israel. One recent regional trend is the strengthening of
Israeli ties with the GCC states, stimulated by common hostility to Iran.347
As for the relations with the U.S., following the Revolution, U.S.-Iran relations continued to be
marked by enmity. The U.S. sided with Saddam Hussein against Iran and the Gulf war led to
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clashes between the U.S. Navy and Iranian military forces. Iran has been designated by the U.S.
as a state sponsor of terrorism for its activities in Lebanon and elsewhere in the world and
remains subject to U.S., UN, and EU economic sanctions and export controls because of its
continued involvement in terrorism and concerns over possible military dimensions of its nuclear
program.
In Iran’s international standing and relations, one of the most important factors is Iran’s nuclear
program. The UN Security Council has passed a number of resolutions calling for Iran to suspend
its uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities and comply with its IAEA obligations and
responsibilities. In July 2015 Iran and the five permanent members, plus Germany (P5+1) signed
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) under which Iran agreed to restrictions on its
nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief.348
E CONOMY
Iran's economy is marked by statist policies, inefficiencies, and reliance on oil and gas exports,
but Iran also possesses significant agricultural, industrial, and service sectors. 349 The Iranian
economy is mostly owned and operated by the state, especially the office of the Supreme
Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei350, and many companies are affiliated with the security forces,
mainly the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
The international sanctions imposed on Iran have had huge impact on the economy and made
Iran face increasing challenges.351 Nevertheless, those sanctions were targeted and did not do
much to stem the steady revenue from oil and gas funding clandestine activities, even those
sponsored by the sanctioned entities like the (IRGC).
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Following the JCPOA agreement, sanctions were lifted, providing large cashflows that Tehran
used to fund its activities and policies in the region and beyond.
R ELIGION / P HILOSOPHY
Iran was not a particularly religious country until the 1979 Islamic Revolution of Ayatollah
Khomeini forced the population into a strict version of Shiite Islam in public and controlled all
aspects of public life. Iran’s strategic culture is now mainly shaped to a great degree by the Shiite
version of Islam.
The revolution brought Shiite clerics to the helm of the political institutions in the country, who
govern according to the Wilayat Al-Faqih, or the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist, which is
central to the Shiite sect of Islam. With the revolution, religion took control of all government
institutions, including the military. In addition, religious police and paramilitary units were
established. One of the most powerful of which is the IRGC, whose role is to protect the religious
revolutionary institution, and which has later become a leading sponsor of Iran’s warfare activity.
The effect of the Revolution went beyond the borders of Iran as the religious elite had bigger
goals to export the revolution, along with its strict version of interpretation of Islam and
politicization of religion, to the region. The obvious targets have been the Arab countries, but
since the population of those countries is mostly Sunni Arab, these actions have led to a collision
course and caused rivalries that have manifested in different ways.

IRAN’S CYBERWARFARE STRATEGIES AND CAPABILITIES
These independent factors have contributed to shaping Iran’s strategic culture. They have
dictated Iran’s foreign policy and military activities in general, and its cyber warfare activities in
particular. The result of these factors can be shown in the following aspects of Iran’s evolving
cyber threat, the nature of which will be further enunciated.
The history of Iran as a major civilization and hegemonic regional power has been reflected in its
cyber policies, which seek to leverage its influence in the region. This has manifested in Iranian
cyberattacks, many of which have targeted its regional adversaries such as neighboring Arab
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Gulf countries and Israel. As Iran has directed its attacks against these adversaries, it has
resorted to using proxies in carrying out these activities.
Iran’s sour relations with the United States have driven Iran’s cyber operations against the U.S.
In addition, its presumed role as leader of the “Axis of Resistance” (to Israel) has channeled its
aggressive cyber operations against U.S. and Western allies in the region. This presumed role
was also used by Iran to recruit cyber operatives from the region to attack Arab nations on the
bases of collusion with Israel.
Iran’s extensive hydrocarbon resources have been used to support Tehran’s ambitions in the
region and activities that include cyber espionage and sabotage. This has not been limited to
that extent as Iran recently has reportedly exported cyber technology and know-how to its allies
in the region, such as the Syrian government, in order to suppress popular demands. 352
Moreover, cyber-attacks initiated by Iran have been often targeted at the oil and gas sectors.
The most prominent examples are the cyber-attacks by Iran on the rival Saudi Arabia’s oil
company Aramco and the attack on Qatar’s Ras Gas company. Those attacks were driven by
political factors of course, but economic aspects in targeting competing economies and
competing oil sectors must also be considered. Additionally, as a guardian of jurisprudence, and
by extension a guardian of the state, the Supreme Leader and the Ayatollahs exert major control
over guiding the use of cyber as a weapon.
That is reflected in Iran’s cyber warfare activities being geared not only to preserve and protect
the regime from domestic and foreign threats, but also to go on the offensive against these
adversaries. Iran’s success in using cyber strategies to quell domestic dissent became the
foundation for further development of cyber capabilities and strategies. Recently, it began to
find in cyberwarfare an effective addition to its arsenal. Iran’s leadership began to consider
applications of cyberwarfare as a deterrence weapon against foreign threats to the regime, as
well as a way to spy on foreign nations. Thus, both defensive and offensive aspects were
followed as Iran used cyber espionage and sabotage tactics.
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Today, significant features in the strategic culture of the Islamic Republic of Iran are: strong
national cultural identities, dominant leaders, and powerful military organizations as important
players in strategic development as well as important receptors for strategic targeting. These
features are woven together such that they produce a comprehensive strategic culture that
guides and shapes Iran’s cyber activities. To explain, both the strong national cultural identity,
which is rooted in regional hegemonic ambitions, and the dominance of the theocratic ruling
regime lead to a culture in which a powerful military arsenal is a must. Similarly, the powerful
national identity and military culture lead to confrontation and rivalries with regional foes, which
themselves become part of the strategic culture of Iran.

DEPENDENT VARIABLES
The Iranian strategic culture will be examined, including the role of force in state affairs, the
nature of the adversary and of the threat, the efficacy of the use of force, military-civilian
relations, the use of non-state actors and proxies, and the legal framework. To summarize,
military institutions, namely the IRGC and the Ministry of Interior, are central to all aspects of
state affairs, as they direct, finance and supervise cyber warfare. Iran, which is considered a
“second-tier cyber power”, conducts extensive espionage against the West, and sabotage
against the U.S. and its neighboring allies. The Iranian military institutions maintain full
dominance on all aspects of life. Iran has been using civil institutions, including universities, to
launch attacks, putting to use the culture of strong nationalism, countering Western pressure
and sanctions, and “resistance” to the West in order to recruit operatives. In addition, it uses
foreign proxies as an attractive option to cause harm while maintaining deniability.
R OLE OF F ORCE IN S TATE A FFAIRS
Iran has found in cyber warfare an effective tool to inflict damage on its adversaries with minimal
commitment of resources and technology, but with substantial effect. In using this tool, Iranian
defense planning is also motivated by a desire to enhance the deterrent capability. To this end,
Iran has created a force tailored to deter the countries that it believes pose the greatest threat
to it.
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The Iranian regime has used the context of the conflicts that Iran has been a party in -and the
conflicts in the region more generally- to shape and leverage its policies. Therefore, Iran has a
declaratory policy of deterrence by punishment as well as denial. It has threatened, for example,
to respond to an American or Israeli preventive strike on Iran with a “crushing response” by
destroying the Israeli cities and by launching missiles strikes against U.S. bases throughout the
region.353 It has vowed that any attack on Iran would result in the defeat of the enemy’s designs.
Also, Iran has created a “Passive Defense Organization” to harden and disperse critical
infrastructure, to limit the benefits an adversary might accrue from striking them. 354 Most
recently, Tehran has been developing its cyber capability into what may eventually become a
fourth leg of its deterrent complex, which currently consists of the ability to disrupt maritime
traffic in the Strait of Hormuz; conduct unilateral and proxy terrorism on several continents; and
launch long-range missile and rocket strikes against targets throughout the region. 355 The
potential to cause great harm to the critical infrastructure of its enemies, while maintaining a
degree of deniability, likely makes cyber a very appealing option for Iran.356
Geography and politics are two factors that influence this dependent variable. To illustrate, Iran
will pursue an aggressive regional policy that employs cyber tools that affect its neighbors and
the West. While Iran’s purpose of cyber warfare is to employ cyber tools to preserve and protect
the regime and maintain its power and control in the country, it appears that its intention is also
to influence outside forces that affect Iran, whether they are cyber-attacks, or other actions that
Iran deems hostile to its interests.
With the comprehensive control that the Iranian regime extends over all political and military
aspects in Iran, one arm of the ruling religious institution is the IRGC, which is the central and
elite military instrument in charge of protection of the regime and implementation of its most
fundamental strategies and policies. In the framework of this strategic role of the IRGC, it
Matthew McInnis. Iranian Deterrence Strategy and Use of Proxies. Testimony before the Senate Committee on
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assumes the role of leading actor in the control of clandestine cyber activity in the country aimed
against domestic and international enemies of the regime.
N ATURE OF THE T HREAT
The foreign minister of one of Iran’s regional rivals called Iran the “most dangerous nation for
cyberattacks.”357 In order to understand the scope of this threat and the strategic place that
cyber warfare occupies in Iran’s defensive strategic culture, it must be studied in a way that
highlights the tools that could help achieve Iran’s political objectives. Hence, Iran’s politics,
geography, and history influence this dependent variable.
Iranian cyber strategy could be classified into offensive and defensive sides, each of which must
be understood and addressed. As for the offensive strategies, they can be further classified into
espionage activities that aim to collect intelligence information about adversaries, mainly the
West, and sabotage activities which aim to exact revenge for attacks on Iran and to cause harm
to Iran’s adversaries in the region.
In light of the high priority that Iran’s theocratic ruling regime places on securing its own survival
and full control of all sector in the country, Iran’s cyber program was initially bent on defending
the vitality of the political ruling regime as it targeted internal political opposition with
espionage. The focus of the cyber program has then developed -driven by Iran’s other strategic
culture aspects such as enmity to the West and rivalry with its regional foes- to offensive cyber
operations against international and regional adversaries. Thus, cyber capabilities have now
become an important weapon in Iran’s arsenal. The advantages that this weapon offers are
many. For example, it provides less risky means not only to gather information but also to
retaliate against any domestic and foreign threats. Therefore, cyberwarfare has become central
to Iranian statecraft.358
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Iran’s cybersecurity program has improved steadily. It has matured both in espionage and
sabotage aspects. Iran conducts extensive espionage against its neighbors, including Arab
states and Israel, where it uses regular distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks to attack and
disable government websites. 359 As Iran underwent cyber-attacks against its infrastructure,
including the nuclear facilities, the sense that it is a target of cyberattacks has reflected on its
own strategic culture in cyberwarfare. For example, following the Stuxnet cyber-attack, which
was designed to target Iranian nuclear facilities in order to wipe computer systems of data, Iran
responded by conducting precisely the same sort of attack.360 Iran’s attack, strangely, did not
target the originators of the attack against it but rather other states: in specific, the Iranian
attack targeted the back-office computer systems of a Saudi Aramco and the Qatari Ras Gas.
In addition to these threats, Iran has recently taken on further steps in posing a more serious
threat. In august 2017, a petrochemical company in Saudi Arabia was hit by a new kind of cyberassault. The investigators believe that the attack was not designed to destroy data or shut down
the plant, but it was meant to sabotage the firm’s operations and trigger an explosion. 361
Moreover, as part of its assistance to the Assad government in Syria, Tehran has reportedly
exported to Damascus training and technology to intercept communications and monitor the
Internet in order to track down and oppress political opponents.362
In the United States, Iran’s cyber activity has included both espionage and sabotage operations
that aimed, inter alia, to steal information and funds. This is best demonstrated in the following
cases, which were released by the U.S. Justice Department: Seven Iranian nationals were
indicted for hacking American banks. One of these individuals was also indicted for trying to
hack into the computerized controls of upstate New York’s Bowman Avenue Dam on behalf of
the IRGC.363 The Iranian hacker allegedly obtained water-level and temperature information and
would have been able to operate the floodgate remotely if it had been operating at the time.364
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Cybersecurity experts say if the Iranians were able to access its control system, they could also
likely get inside systems for more significant infrastructure, such as pipelines, mass transit
systems, and power grids. 365 In fact, this operation was part of a plot that also breached or
paralyzed 46 of the U.S. largest financial institutions and blocked hundreds of thousands of
customers from accessing their bank accounts online. 366
In assessing Iran’s capabilities in the field of cyberwarfare and the methods it uses, it is worth
noting that Iran’s ICT sector is not among the most advanced and that is why it is not considered
a top threat from a cybersecurity standpoint, especially when compared to the capabilities of
nations like China, Russia, or the United States. Iran is considered by many as a “Second-tier”
cyber power. However, given the importance with which Iran sees its cyber capabilities as a
weapon to inflict damage to its adversaries, it choses its targets in a way to maximize the
damage and achieve great political and economic effects. Therefore, the incidents involving Iran
have been among the most sophisticated, costly, and consequential, invasive and destructive
cyber operations in the history of the internet.367 This is true whether Iran is the target, such as
the Stuxnet attack, or the perpetrator, such as the Shamoon virus attack.
E FFICACY OF THE U SE OF F ORCE
Cyber-attacks usually carry a risk of collateral damage and risk political blowback if the attack
ends up causing damages to legitimate sectors, such as the private sector, and if the attacking
parties are identified. Nevertheless, Iran does not seem to be deterred by this potential risk. In
addition, Iran does not appear to be deterred by the potential for escalatory responses by the
nations it targets with cyberattacks.
As a result of the attacks that were traced to Iranian actors, analysts were able to assess that
they have the ability to develop cyber-attack tools such as installation of malicious code in
counterfeit computer software, blocking of computer communications networks, development
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of viruses and tools for penetrating computers to gather intelligence, and development of tools
with delayed action mechanisms or mechanisms connected to control servers.368 Iran’s tools
include malware that can disable critical infrastructure, create confusion, distrust, deception,
disruption, support or to drive psychological operations that deter hostile activity or otherwise
achieve strategic or tactical objectives.369
The damage inflicted by cyber-attacks perpetrated by Iranian operatives have been extensive
causing material and economic damage comparable to that made by bombs. This is apparent in
the following three incidents:
1. In the 2012 attack on Saudi Aramco, 35,000 computers were partially wiped or totally
destroyed within a matter of hours. This virus caused huge damage that was described as
“a time bomb”, which “forced one of the most valuable companies on earth back into 1970s
technology, using typewriters and faxes.”370
2. Similarly, Iranian actors have commonly created malicious domains that have emulated
those owned by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and have targeted
employees of both liberal and conservative Jewish organizations in the United States and
elsewhere.371
3. In response to a statement made by its CEO suggesting that the U.S. drop a nuclear bomb
on Iran, the Iranian government was behind a damaging cyberattack on the Sands Las
Vegas Corporation (LVS) in 2014. 372 The attackers seized comprehensive employee
information, brought the company's systems to a standstill and wiped out three quarters of

368 Gabi Siboni,

Sa000mi Kronenfeld. “Iran’s Cyber Warfare”. INSS Insight No, 375, October 15, 2012.
http://www.inss.org.il/publication/irans-cyber-warfare
369 Frank J. Cilluffo, Sharon L. Cardash, Cyber Domain Conflict in the 21 st Century, 14 Seton Hall J. Dipl. &
International Relations 41 (2013).
370 Zahraa Alkhalisi. “Saudi Arabia Warns of New Crippling Cyberattack”. CNN Tech. Jan. 26, 2017.
http://money.cnn.com/2017/01/25/technology/saudi-arabia-cyberattack-warning/index.html
371 Anderson, Collin and Karim Sadjadpour. Iran’s Cyber Threat: Espionage, Sabotage and Revenge. Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace. 2018.
372 Jose Pagliery. “ran hacked an American casino, U.S. says”. CNN Tech. Feb. 27, 2015.
http://money.cnn.com/2015/02/27/technology/security/iran-hack-casino/index.html

111

the company's servers, which insiders estimate cost the company more than $40 million in
equipment costs and data recovery.373
One of the most important influences on this dependent variable is economy. To illustrate, Iran
focuses its targets on its adversaries’ main source of revenues in order to cause the greatest
damage possible. For example, in the case of Saudi Arabia, Iran targeted the oil sector, the main
source of Saudi’s revenues. In addition, by attacking energy sectors, Tehran is trying to influence
the production of its energy rivals to compensate for what it has lost as a result of international
sanctions.
N ON -S TATE A CTORS AND P ROXIES
Tehran’s strong imperialist culture and hegemonic policies lead to sponsor many non-state
actors as proxies, and to rely on these proxies in its cyber operations. Given the role of the IRGC
in the framework of the strong military leadership, it assumes the role of the entity that
supervises such proxies in cyber operations internally and externally. The use of outsourcing
allows Iran to maintain distance and deniability about its involvement. This use of proxies is
highly effective in maintaining plausible deniability. 374 Nevertheless, there remain certain
indications that can link such operations to Iran’s sponsors, especially the security apparatus, the
Ministry of Intelligence and the IRGC.375 One of the main sources of influence on this dependent
variable is religion. Tehran relies on religion in order to recruit individuals and groups to be
among its cyber proxies. Therefore, the main source of Iran’s proxies comes today from its Shiite
client groups. Likewise, Iran uses the guardian of its Shiite revolution, the Islamic Revolutionary
Guard, to supervise the activity of its proxies.
Also local non-state, but state-aligned, actors, mainly local universities and hacking
communities, are an important component of Iran’s cyber capabilities. This strategy relies on
the diversified capabilities and affiliations of those actors. Over the decade that Iranians have
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been engaged in cyber operations, threat actors seemingly arise from nowhere and operate in a
dedicated manner until their campaigns dissipate, often due to their discovery by researchers.376
In recruiting operatives, the IRGC reportedly follows a ruthless process as the targeted recruits
are given a choice between joining these operations or being sent to jail. The IRGC openly seeks
hackers and utilizes criminals willing to serve state interests.377 Regionally, Iran relied on groups
associated with it to undertake cyber operations, including Hezbollah, the Syrian Electronic
Army, and Kata’ib Hezbollah in Iraq, in an attempt to create a “Cyber Shi’ite Crescent.”378
For example, Iran’s support for Hezbollah in the cyber domain is done through the direct training
of Hezbollah cyber operators. Iran also offers other forms of support such as providing a media
platform to use propaganda about Hezbollah’s cyber related influence operations through
Iranian state-run news channels. Also, Since September 2010, Iran has hosted Hezbollah officials
for “Cyber Hezbollah” conferences, which reportedly included the attendance of Hassan Abbasi,
a political strategist and advisor of the IRGC379.
L EGAL F RAMEWORK
To legitimize actions taken by Iran in its cyber warfare against adversaries, Iran has kept much
of its activity secretive. It also tends to highlight non-aligned principles such as state sovereignty
and the right to develop technologies for civilian uses. It also portrays the use of cyber tools in
the framework of self-defense against perceived repeated and sophisticated attacks by foreign
countries.
When faced with the allegations about its use of cyberspace to oppress freedoms, Tehran argues
that these allegations are misleading and have nothing to do with the freedom of expression. It
also argues that its cyber policies are crafted for securing domestic Internet as it relates to
security and sovereignty of states and invokes the fact that it is frequently targeted by vicious
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cyber-attacks to justify that it has the right to strengthen its cyber space security.380 Therefore,
the Iranian politics is the main source of influence on this dependent variable.
M ILITARY -C IVILIAN R ELATIONSHIP
As part of the means that Iran uses to enhance its capabilities in cyberwarfare, it has exploited
civilians to boost its resources. Iran is building capacity through several confluent approaches.
These include developing a trained cyber force, leveraging alliances, and mobilizing the
considerable talent of Iranians in the cyber field.
Iran’s decision-making process is obscured, and its cyber capabilities are not controlled by the
presidency or any civilian component of the government. Iran has embarked upon a $1 billion
cyber program to boost its capabilities: developing new technology, hiring experts, and moving
swiftly towards a centralized filtering system. Iran created an Iranian Cyber Army (ICA)
reportedly to hack into government and business websites to generate international awareness
of its presence.381 The activity of this cyber army is believed to be overseen by the Intelligence
Unit of the IRGC,382 which claims that these cyber operations rank as the second-biggest cyber
army in the world.383 As such, this cyber army can be used as a highly-organized and well-trained
entity to carry complex and dangerous cyber operations against Iran’s adversaries and can
therefore pose a serious threat to the U.S.
The same Iranian actors responsible for espionage against the private sector also conduct
surveillance of human rights defenders, who rely on social media and digital communication
platforms for their activity.384 These attacks on Iranian civil society often foreshadow the tactics
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and tools that will be employed against other targets and better describe the risks posed by
Iranian cyberwarfare.

ASSESSMENT OF IRAN’S POTENTIAL FUTURE DISPOSITION
In order to assess the potential future disposition of Iran in connection with cyber warfare, three
issues must be considered. First, the future of the JCPOA and the impact of this future on the
relationship of Iran with the West, in particular the United States. Experts argue that following
the JCPOA, cyber threats emanating from Iran decreased;385 however, the withdrawal would
precipitate the opposite trend. In fact, the Iranian leadership has indicated that it would consider
all options in the case of the withdrawal of the U.S. from the JCPOA386. One of those available
options is cyber operations. Second, the threats to the survival of the theocratic regime. Third,
Iran’s regional hegemonic ambitions. Based on these factors, the most likely and the most
dangerous trajectories will be as follows.
M OST L IKELY F UTURE T RAJECTORY
In all likelihood, Iran will continue to develop its cyber capabilities and expand the network of
proxies from traditional ones to include newly recruited proxies, such as Iraqi groups being
supported by Iran. Domestically, the IRGC and associated entities will continue espionage
activities against its citizens to ensure a successful oppression of any popular protests that could
make use of cyberspace against the regime. Regionally, Iran’s cyber warfare will follow in the
footsteps of its military and power projection in the region and beyond. Relying on the IRGC and
affiliated proxy Shia client groups, it will continue to focus its sabotage efforts against its
neighboring Arab countries, including targets crucial to U.S. interests such as ARAMCO in an
effort to counter its adversaries and expand its interventionist policies. Globally, it will focus its
efforts on espionage operations aiming to collect data in order to influence public opinion
through propaganda following the Russian experience in 2016 presidential U.S. elections. For
the same reasons, Iran’s cyber espionage operations against the United States may target social
media sites, such as Twitter and Facebook, and Government institutions that holds troves of
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personal data. Further, in retaliation to the recent statements made by President Trump against
Iran’s destabilizing activity in the region, the Iranian regime may target businesses belonging to
the President’s family and relatives. In the trajectories of targeting the West and the U.S., Iran is
expected to rely on domestic and regional proxies.
M OST D ANGEROUS F UTURE T RAJECTORY
The most dangerous scenario includes much more extensive and dangerous damage targeting
U.S. domestic infrastructure and disruption of U.S. military operations. To illustrate, since Iran
relies heavily on the energy sector and often targets this sector, the U.S. energy sector is
expected to be the target of Iranian sabotage and espionage. Although most of Iran’s activities
in the West has been for data mining or financial benefit, and that its most severe attacks were
focused on the region, a cyber-attack on vital infrastructure facilities, such as nuclear facilities
or energy plants, in the United States cannot be ruled out completely. There have already been
prior indicators of such intent when an Iranian hackers linked to IRGC were sanctioned for
conducting denial-of-service attacks against U.S. banks between 2011 and 2013.387Furthermore,
since Iran, its proxies and allies are becoming the target of Westerns military operations such as
the recent military operation conducted by the U.S., the U.K., and France on Syrian military
facilities, Iran may choose to escalate further and target the United States bases in the region
by cyber-attack operation aiming to disrupt the U.S. military operations in Syria, Afghanistan
and Iraq, for example. Such operations are complicated and requires expertise and vast technical
resources. Therefore, Iran may rely mainly on its elite cyber force, the “Passive Defense
Organization.”

INFORMING U.S. CYBER STRATEGY
As stated above, since it is expected that Iran would likely focus its cyber-attacks attention on
the energy sector, it becomes necessary to realize the importance of allowing additional
monitoring of facilities and internet connected equipment to prevent any fall and failure.
Coordination with the relevant government entities, such as the Department of Energy, is
crucial. In addition, the focus of Iran’s cyberspace activity is directed against the West, including
387
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the United States and, therefore, requires appropriate defensive arrangements, beginning with
an up-to-date doctrine of cyberspace defense.
Moreover, and since Iran’s neighbors are a primary target of its cyber warfare, it would be
advisable to highlight the importance of this field to encourage the Arab States to strengthen
their cyber capability in order to face the Iranian threat.

RECOMMENDED AREAS FOR F UTURE RESEARCH
Future policy planning and related research should take into account the possible future
trajectories outlined above and focus on the ways to effectively address the implications to the
United States, including possible means and methods to deter attacks that might pose a threat
to infrastructure, the energy sector or American interests, directly or indirectly. In addition, it is
crucial to encourage civil targets such as universities and the private and media sectors, to
examine ways Iran or its operatives could target personal information as part of any possible
misinformation campaigns to undermine American society and its values.
Further, and since Iran has exported its cyber capabilities and expertise to its allies in the region,
such as the Assad regime or Hezbollah, within the context of political oppression, where this
technology and know-how was used for massive misinformation and propaganda, it is a cause
for concern that it can be used by other actors for both espionage, sabotage, and misinformation
campaigns against the West, and the U.S. in particular. Therefore, it is essential to conduct
research into the possible misuses of Iranian cyber expertise and technology for new threats in
areas such as propaganda and misinformation using social media. Nonetheless, since some of
Iran’s previous attacks, such as the attack on a Saudi petrochemical company, are believed to
have intended to cause deadly cyber-attack , it is recommended that future studies examine
whether such deadly attacks are possible and whether Iran is capable of developing such
capabilities.
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DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA
The respected marshal has told us that if we add an idea to an egg ... we can break the stone with
that egg.
-Om Yun Chol, North Korean weightlifter
2012 Olympic Gold Medalist

INTRODUCTION
North Korea’s broad strategic culture can be characterized as aggressive and offensive oriented
– directed primarily by Kim Jung-Un’s personal deposition buttressed by the Ju-Che ideology388.
Hence, DPRK’s stance towards every state affairs including cyber are ultimately heavily
influenced by how Kim Jung-Un understands the situation and how he perceives as ‘relevant
context’. Because cyber-attacks are most likely directly order by Kim Jung-Un, it is important to
understand the North Korean leadership’s perspective while also taking into consideration the
unique and isolated nature of DPRK in order to comprehensively estimate what North Korea will
do with cyber.

DEFINING DPRK’S STRATEGIC CULTURE
North Korea is a totalitarian regime that has been led by the ‘art of tyranny’ over the course of
the three Kim’s: Kim Il-Sung, Kim Jung-Il, and Kim Jung-Un. Due to the state’s unique birth as a
result of the Korean Peninsula separation at the end of World War II in 1945, DPRK is heavily
influenced by the geopolitical waves that engulfed it after the sudden liberation from culturewiping Japanese rule. While the U.S. administered the southern half of the Korean peninsula,
the Soviet Union administered the Northern region, where Kim Il-Sung spearheaded the
creation of a new state, the DPRK, a stage where he pursed his own personal political agenda
after being the soviet-designated premier.
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Since then, DPRK developed a unique strategic culture which is characterized below by Ph.D.
Hwang Il Do389:
•

Imperialistic threats from the United States or Japan are overwhelming; North Korea is
under constant threat from them; and international institutions like the United Nations are
built for the interest of imperialist countries;

•

Diplomatic measures can’t buy any object and only armed conflict is absolutely important;

•

The power of optimistic will or solid ideology is more important than physical capability;

•

Asymmetric strategy, tactics, and weapon systems to attack the enemy’s rear or core are
preferred; and

•

When the objective situation is unfavorable, showing off the offensive attitude pays off.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
H ISTORY
The overarching perception shared by every North Korean resident is the perception of ‘us’390
and ‘them’. This perception has been shaped by carefully executed political initiatives over
decades, and also a product enabled due to the DPRK’s unique Chosun history.391 ‘Us’, to North
Koreans, refers to the decedents of the Chosun dynasty who suffered invasions by ‘them’.
Chosun is also the spelling of the first two characters (조선) of the DPRK’s Korean name: 조선
민주주의 인민 공화국– next four letters represent ‘Democratic (민주주의), the next two
represent ‘People (인민)’, and the last three letters represent ‘Republic (공화국)’. Although not
included into their English country name, the historic sense of Chosun remains in the official
state title, showing the state’s great ties to the past.
South Koreans associate themselves significantly less with ‘Chosun’ and merely remember it as
a historic past when “Kings and Queens ruled the lands with swords being the main weaponry
Hwang Il-Do, “Framing North Korea's Strategic Culture From With the Century”, May 29, 2013
‘Uri’ from ‘Uriminzokkiri’, state-controlled website that provides news from North Korea's Central
News Agency. ‘Uri’ translates into ‘us’ in English.
391 Chosun Dynasty (1392 – 1910) consolidated Korea’s national boundaries and distinctive cultural practices.
389

390 Derived from
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of war”. While the North still associates itself with ‘Chosun’, South Koreans have a widely used
phrase that goes “Are you from Chosun Dynasty?”- similar to an English equivalent of “where
did you dig up that old fossil?” implying that to whomever the phrase refers to is an old, outdated
person. This comparison shows how North Korea’s sense of historic identity remained relatively
uninfluenced since Japanese occupation, compared to other open economies and nations more
culturally connected with the West. The significance behind North Korea’s association with the
historic past is that it allows for an easier embedding of the ‘us’ and ‘them’ mentality, a
perception that also buttresses the ‘Ju-che’ ideology.

Figure 1. (Left) Traditional ‘Chosun’ clothing worn as the main attire for daily news anchor in North Korea, (Right)
More Westernized South Korean daily news anchor.

Before the birth of the current regime and the conceptual ‘us’ and ‘them’ divide amongst North
Koreans was the sudden historic event of the Korean Peninsula becoming independent from the
Japanese colonization in August 1945. Historically, the Korean peninsula has suffered from
invasion from empires of the north (China) and from the South (Japan). Just before the division
of the Korean peninsula, independence was fought for against the Japanese by multiple
liberation armies, but it was ultimately heavily influenced and brought about by defeat of Japan
to the U.S. Previous Japanese occupational operations in the region played a key role in the
formation of the DPRK as a state as Japanese ruling in the region resulted in a ‘vulnerable
society’392 that gave birth to the Kim family and Kim Il-Sung establishing a unified military to
safeguard the Kim family and the North Korean elite society.

392 Vulnerable

society in essence means Northern region of the Korean peninsula was deprived of intellectuals,
institutions, and economy. Explained further in the politics section.s
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The conceptual spectrum that characterizes ‘them’ encompasses i) the United States of
America, ii) capitalist societies, and iii) South Korea, with its embracing of what North Korea
perceives as ‘western cultural invasion’. In the end, all entities characterized as ‘them’ share the
underlying sentiment of being a ‘threat’ – clear intent and capability to harm members of North
Korean just as they experienced in the past ‘invasion’ by the U.S. and by the Japanese. In
addition, because North Korean residents have a long history of daily interactions with the
military has led them to share the same perception and mindset that they are under constant
threat.
The aforementioned perception has been embedded into every resident’s mind in North Korea
throughout the past three Kims’ political initiatives and have resulted in a state wide shared view
towards the ‘outsiders’ as being characterized as adversarial and a threat - down to the individual
level. Such perception and view of ‘us’ and ‘them’ has led to the current indoctrination of the
idea that maintaining a powerful military is the most important function of the state as server to
the people. Although being relevant in the international stage is important for DPRK’s political
elites, detachment to external threat actors and their advocates such as the UN is therefore
conceived essential to ensuring the safety of the North Korean society by residents. This reality
allows the leadership a relatively easy society to control.
G EOGRAPHY
Geographically, after Japan declared surrender in August 15, 1945, the Koreans were divided
into ‘North Koreans’ and ‘South Koreans’ where the 38th parallel acted as the dividing line. The
division was enforced by the U.S. Army that governed the southern part of the peninsula from
September 9th 1945 to August 15th of 1948, and by the Soviet Army that ruled the Northern part
of the Korean peninsula from September 9th 1948 until the establishment of the DPRK
government.
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Figure 3 –Map of North Korea showing 80% being highlands and mountainous (unfit for agriculture)

The northern part of the Korean peninsula is composed of 80% mountainous ranges rendering
the nation highly incapable in achieving the state’s agricultural self-sufficiency objective. Most
of the population lives in the plains and low lands. North Korea’s agricultural environment can
be described as “catastrophic” 393 due to soil erosion, depletion, and increased flooding, in turn
caused by over-farming and accelerated deforestation. Based on satellite imagery, it has been
estimated that 40% of forest cover has been lost since 1985.394
P OLITICS
DPRK’s politics are dominantly about the Kim family. The Kim family always needed to
dominate domestic politics395 and their biggest threats were regime-cleavage by either outside
force or coerced abdication by internal politics.
For North Korean political elites, war exists to provide the level of tension required to sustain the
current domestic power structure. War plays an important role in ensuring political stability over
the three Kim generations and social systems have been convoluted to a degree where show of
force by the leadership is necessary in order for that leader to retain power. As so, the DPRK has
David J. Tenenbaum, “International Health: North Korean Catastrophe.”, January 2005, US National Library of
Medicine, National Institutes of Health, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1253723/
394 Raven, Peter (2013-09-09). "Engaging North Korea through Biodiversity Protection". Science &
Diplomacy. 2 (3). Archived from the original on 2013-10-29.
395 Kongdan Oh, Ralph C. Hassig, “North Korea’s Nuclear Politics.”, September 1, 2004, Brookings Article.
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/north-koreas-nuclear-politics/
393
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been pursing hostile foreign policies which ultimately led to the creation of nuclear arsenals.
Although continued investment toward nuclear capabilities forced the DPRK to be placed into a
gridlock situation where further external display of force is needed, despite its real intentions
being internal show of force, rendering it incapable of maneuvering without attracting further
international sanctions.396
An in-depth overview of how each Kim retained power not only helps understand how the
DPRK’s political structure has been constructed around the Kim family’s power sustainability,
but it also helps to understand how each Kim perceived different situations they faced while
succeeding power as well as during their reigns as ‘Great Leader’, ‘Dear Leader’, and ‘Young
General.’
Table 1. Comparison of the Three Kim Systems and Performances397

David E. Sanger, David D. Kirkpatrick, Nicole Perlroth, “The World Once Laughed at North Korean
Cyberpower. No More.”, The New York Times, October 15, 2017, April 13, 2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/15/world/asia/north-korea-hacking-cyber-sony.html
397 Hyung-Seog Lee, Kwang-Jin Kim, Thomas Fingar, Yong Suk Lee. “Analyzing the Structure and Performance of
Kim Jong-un’s Regime”. Research Brief of the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University
and the Institute for National Security Strategy. June 2017
396
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K IM I L-S UNG

As shown in the last row of Table 1, ‘Kim Il-Sung (first Kim)’, gained power at the onset from the
anti-Japanese sentiment of the people. Before the time of Kim’s campaigning to rise to the top
was Japan’s colonization operations. They utilized the Northern Korean Peninsula region as an
industrial zone focused on supporting the Japanese Emperor’s Military against their adversaries,
including the current Chinese. Such power background allowed Kim’s political campaign to be
centered around the idea that building socialism and communism can bring recovery to the
economically, socially, and morally deprived colonial status quo.
The Japanese education policy of carving out traditional language, culture, and other
endogenous heritage with the end goal of ‘cultural take over’ rendered Kim Il-Sung to confront
a 90% illiteracy rate among adults in 1947, when he embarked on his ‘People’s Economic
Development Plan’ initiative. Kim Il-Sung obtained sufficient political power to pursue such
initiatives after he, with the support from the Soviet Union, managed to out compete other
regional political parties and dispersed existing armed groups scattered across the northern
peninsula.
Kim Il-Sung’s ‘Establish the Party, Establish the Military, Establish the Nation’ political agenda
initiated with the residency of Soviet Army in Northern Korean Peninsula, followed by the
establishment of the ‘People’s Military’ in August 1945. During the period, the military served
the party and party’s objectives, and hence the two were not as ideologically assimilated as they
are now. During the execution of his education policy, Kim Il-Sung geared towards fighting the
90% illiteracy rate to start instilling to the people the greatness of his accomplishments. Kim IlSung’s propaganda buttressed with educational policies designed around empowering him has
placed the formal general as a legendary figure and enabled Kim Jong-Il to work with the military
to dominate the party.

124

Figure 3 – (Left) North Korea Propaganda Designed to re-incite hatred toward Japanese and their killing of Koreans.
Historic pictures of civilians and women being victim is used as a background. (Right) General Kim Il-Sung depicted
as liberator from the Japanese occupation.

K IM J ONG -I L

Along with the fall of the Soviet Union was the rise of the military elites in the North Korean
political scenes. Kim Jong-Il, the son of Kim Il-Sung rose to power by pursuing the ‘Military First
Policy,’ which enabled a reduced role of the party cabinet and steep status rise of military
generals in the power structure. This was necessary as Kim Jong-Il lacked the political capital his
predecessor derived from the wide spread anti-Japanese warrior brand.
Kim Jong-Il rose to the top with the support from the military and allowed them deeper
involvement in political affairs and the governing of the state. This has also contributed to the
current stark perception among the North Koreans of ‘us’ and ‘them’ amongst the North
Koreans, where you are either a friend or a foe.
The fall of the Soviet Union also led to North Korea reinforcing their ‘Ju-Che’ ideology, where
the centerpiece is the Party and Military leader – Kim Il-Sung and his ‘ryeongdoja’398 status. The
concept of ‘ryeongdoja’ was formed as North Korea had to survive the devastating outcomes of
the Cold War and also to consolidate power around Kim Il-Sung. Throughout his rule, Kim Jongil emphasized that the “military is the centerpiece in accomplishing the self-sufficiency
revolution and is the pillar of the state,” all the while emphasizing that the lack of “ideological

398 ‘ryeongdoja’

is defined as the ‘supreme leader’ but is also used widely in all occasion where North Korea has
performed better than other nations in order to attribute the success to the ‘great leadership’ of Kim Jung-un
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mental arming” and the “military’s separation from national politics” were the two reasons for
the Soviet Union’s downfall.
Kim Il-Sung and his efforts to lead by military might and military-minded civil society has
ultimately resulted in the current grid-lock situation due to South Korea’s economic
development along with the presence of the U.S. military rendering the North Korean military
efforts to take over the peninsula unfruitful. The domestic sociopolitical outcome of Kim Il-Sung
efforts was the continuation of the Kim family’s rule and escalated threat perception shared
across the North Korean military and civilian society.
K IM J UNG -U N

Kim Jong-Un, faced with the job to rule a state built around military mindset, assumed power by
maximizing his capabilities of exerting physical power and instilling fear. Broadcasting the arrest
of his uncle Jang Song-taek, the right-hand man of deceased Kim Jung-Il, and the machinegunning execution that followed is a representation of efforts by Kim Jong-Un to be perceived
as a ‘strong man’ and a person to not be meddled with. The main audience was no doubt
domestic political power elites and military generals. The event was significant as it led to
diplomatic backlash from China where Jang Song-taek was trusted as a key man between the
two states. 399 Kim Jong-Un’s pursuit to assassinate his brothers residing under foreign
protection also represents his deliberate and continued efforts to gain and retain power in a
state where his predecessors left as extremely ‘aggressive’ by having pursed a ‘military-first’
policy.
Such political need to focus adversarial sentiment across the society and the military has led to
a characterization of ‘them’ in line to past Japanese colonization era. Not only that, as described
previously, the pressure to address changing international circumstances such as the collapse of
the Soviet Union and South Korea surpassing North Korea in the economic and military domains
has forced not only the North Korean Kim leaders but also the policymaking elite class to

This has also been demonstrated when China refused to engage in talks with North Korea shortly after the
execution of Jang Song-taek. Series of event followed that led to the most recent Kim Jung-un’s remarks that
Japan is a ten-year enemy but China is a hundred-year adversary.
399
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continue policies that constantly invoked the international society to isolate the state. The policy
failures of the leading class have been continually masked from the mass population in North
Korea and propaganda that emphasizes the adversarial nature of the constructed ‘enemy’,
‘them’, persists to be carried out across the nation.

Figure 4- North Korean propaganda designed to incite hatred towards US military. Victims drawn are the helpless
woman and children while the oppressor is the US military.

E CONOMY

The North Korean economy is a centrally planned economy where role of market was
suppressed in full by the government.400 The fall of the Soviet Union negatively impacted North
Korea’s economic status, 401 as national production was concentrated towards waging war

400 This
401

has been changing over the last few years after numerous reporting on market activities across DPRK.
Bluth, Christoph (2008). Korea. Cambridge: Polity Press. p. 34.
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against South Korea for unification, a long-lasting mission of the Kim family. Having to realign
foreign relations in respect to strengthening economic ties after the failure suffered from the
dependency on the Soviet Union, the DPRK’s economy has been sustained with assistance from
Russia and China. As the two nations have the incentive to use North Korea as a buffer to avoid
further expansion of ‘Western influence’ represented by Japan and South Korea. Although North
Korea had a similar GDP per capita to South Korea until the mid-1970s, it is now one of the
poorest nations in the world due to continued economic sanctions and lack of technologies to
exploit its natural resources. Conditions being so, the second most important concern of
policymaking elites has always been economic development.402
Former U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson stated on January 2018 that international sanctions
towards North Korea are “really starting to hurt”

403

despite a number of nations not

implementing full measures toward the combined efforts. Failure to sustain economically sound
conditions of the state is pressing for the North Korean elites as they have been on the issue for
decades and they are addressing the issue by all means possible: the DPRK even sends civilians
as cheap laborers to foreign nations in exchange for internationally banned weapons.
R ELIGION
Religion is strictly banned in North Korea, where members of the Kim family are de facto ‘gods’.
It was imperative that the government establish the Ju-Che ideology as the only belief system
in order to maximize its ability to influence the people. As the Japanese had already acted on
similar course of action during the colonization era, Kim Il-Sung had little difficulty in eradicating
what was very little religious activities in North Korea. Kim Jung-Il and Kim Jung-Un followed
the continued efforts to intensify the belief that portrayed the Kim family as de facto ‘gods’ while
suppressing other belief systems.

402 First

key concern of the policy making elite and the Kim family would be the continuation of the power
structure.
403 Reuters World News, “Tillerson: Evidence sanctions 'really starting to hurt' North Korea”, David Brunnstrom,
January 17, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-tillerson/tillerson-evidence-sanctionsreally-starting-to-hurt-north-korea-idUSKBN1F62UV
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“There’s a five-decade history here (DPRK RGB) and a lot of institutional and operational
memory… These people learned under tough, hardened spymaster and operations chiefs”
-Michel Madden, Founder and Director of NK Leadership Watch and Visiting Scholar to US-Korea
Institute at SAIS, Johns Hopkins
P HILOSOPHY
Ju-Che ideology is a philosophical thought that is a centerpiece to every social facet in North
Korea. ‘Ju-Che’ translates as ‘self-reliance’ and asserts that North Korean’s must act as "masters
of the revolution and construction" which will enable a stronger nation that can achieve true
socialism.404 Historic failure of the Soviet Union left the North Korean government to stand on
its own in respect to D.I.M.E405. There was a great need to motivate the mass public to achieve
such goals of the state and Ju-Che ideology justified the government’s extraction of labor under
Kim’s directives. In relation to Kim Jung-Un, the Ju-che ideology also acts as a shackle to ‘prove
his worth’: Kim Jung-Un, being the third Kim to succeed an isolated state, has a strong need to
prove or at least convey to the public that the old idea of ‘self-reliance’ is still relevant and that
he is the only one able to lead the nation towards it.

DPRK’S CYBERWARFARE STRATEGIES AND CAPABILITIES
Continued pursuit of an aggressive set of military policies placed the North Korean elites at a
grid-lock situation against South Korea, the U.S., and the international society, which meant
that they could not take any more military action without escalating the situation. The
perception of the sharply divided ‘us’ from ‘them’ and the DPRK’s pursuit of offensive-oriented
policies have forced the international community to purse multi-disciplinary policies that most
recently led Kim Jung-Un to engage with the U.S. via South Korean intelligence and diplomat
ministers. The Chinese declaration that they would not respect their past agreement to support
North Korea in time of war against the U.S. has left Kim Jung-Un with little room to maneuver
in addressing domestic power retention issues, which were mainly challenged by the failing of
the state to provide food and economic stability.

404 Juche

Idea: Answers to Hundred Questions. Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House. 2014.
Information, Military, Economic – the four instruments of national power.

405Diplomacy,
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Historically, the pursuit of aggressive military policies not only consolidated power, but also
overwhelmed South Korea. However, because of the existence of the US military base in South
Korea and the economic surpassing of South Korea, it is now a clear fact that North Korea has
no rational hopes of achieving their party’s grand mission to unite the Korean peninsula by
military might. As so, efficacy of conventional use of force have been undermined to the
maximum extent without risking engaging in full-fledged war. Continued investment in nuclear
capabilities, which the Kim family and the North Korean elites perceive as the only means to be
secure from U.S. regime cleavage, has rendered the ever more agitated international
community spearheaded by the U.S.
Because exercising conventional capabilities would escalate the situation out of control for the
North Korean leadership, it was necessary that the party and the military find a solution to
enhance the efficacy of use of force in a method that does not escalate the current status quo.
Such perception and need of the ruling class has resulted in unexpectedly sophisticated cyber
capabilities to be developed, which surprised the western cyber security experts during the
SWIFT and WannaCry hacking incidents.

DEPENDENT VARIABLES
R OLE OF F ORCE IN S TATE A FFAIRS
To this day, showing force has played a significant role in the continuation of the power structure
in North Korea -as regular citizens and the majority of the military have been, for the past six
decades, brought up to believe that war is always around the corner and that the state leadership
is protecting the nation from the constant threat from ‘them’. The history that the North Korean
government has been recognizing and teaching is one that is riddled with an endless fight for
survival -where Korean ancestors fought for survival from ‘barbarians’ invading from the north
(China) and pirates from the south (Japan). This distinct perspective does not hold true for cyber
in the case of North Korea.
As aforementioned, war in conventional sense is no longer a viable option from the perception
of North Korean policymaking elites as any further escalation of tensions may lead to the end of
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Kim’s regime. Hence, a shift to a realm where that is possible has been pursed whether by
showing force to the outside or to the inside of the nation. Show of force is important
domestically for the DPRK elites, but the current economic and diplomatic difficulty experienced
by the DPRK is also making the show of force to the outside world more and more important for
the elites. In this respect, the cyber domain offers the North Korean leadership a new warcapable-zone which not only allows it to be effective in respect to meeting the regime’s
economic needs via cyber means like industrial espionage, but also in the aspect of diplomacy
where through cyber, the DPRK can place itself in a more relevant position to the Western
countries.
North Korean cyber offensive capabilities have recently been considered by the international
community to be far more superior than previously perceived. According to the U.S. Federal
Bureau of Investigations (FBI), Sony suffered from cyberattacks that sabotaged its digital assets
because the company planned to release an American film that undermined the North Korean
leader. 406 The SWIFT system suffered from cyber intrusions that led to fraudulent transactions
which ultimately helped alleviate the DPRK’s economic difficulties. Such successful campaign
instances provide the North Korean Reconnaissance General Bureau, the internationally
attributed entity behind the cyberattacks, the necessary justification to continue their cyber
activities as well as further invest in enhancing their capabilities.
N ATURE OF THE T HREAT
North Korea’s leader Kim Jung-Il and Kim Jung-Un is referred to as ‘spiritual father’ and the state
is referred to as the ‘father land’ by the government propaganda. However, the last decade has
revealed that the ‘father’ being incapable of bringing food home will have to result in violence to
retain power –such which systematically forces the policy to be more aggressive. For Kim JungUn, who was facing such realities, the cyber domain has proven to be an excellent tool to address
the issue at hand.

Some private firms and non-governmental cyber security assert that FBI’s claims are based on dead end
connections, it is assumed that FBI’s attribution is accurate as they may posses’ information undisclosed to the
public.
406
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For example, Sony, tried to release a movie title ‘The Interview’ which was themed around
mocking the North Korean regime – such a film was an existential threat and would have
damaged the Kim family’s domestic reputation when the movie eventually flows in through the
black market to North Korea. Former President Barack Obama stated in the December 19, 2014
end-of-the-year press speech that Sony made a mistake in pulling the film after experiencing
damages from cyber sabotage which ultimately led to pulling the plug to premier the movie.
President Obama said that producers should “not get into a pattern where you are intimidated
by these acts.” To North Korea, such remarks by the President of the United States and
behaviors from the private sector companies would have been clear signals that their
cyberattacks pressed where it hurt for their archenemies.
According to a former head of South Korean National Intelligence Service, Kim Jung-Un has
proclaimed that “cyber, along with missiles and nuclear weapons, is a one-size-fits all weaponry
that ensures our army the ruthless damaging capabilities”. If the former head of South Korean
National Intelligence Service was speaking the truth, it would be hard to doubt that expansion
of cyber activities and investment in TTP capacity building would have been required of the
DPRK government agencies as the Kim family’s words are the de facto law and basis for policy
formulation. Currently, cyber capabilities are deemed nurtured to meet Kim Jung-Un’s
expressed vocal expectation via structured education plans by the state:
1. Computer education at ‘Middle School for Scientifically Talented: GeumSung 1 and
GeumSung 2 in Pyeongyang’ (평양의 과학영재학교인 금성 1,2 중학교)
2. 3-5 year higher education to be trained as ‘cyber warriors’ at ‘Command Automation
University: Mirim University’ or ‘223CP: Moranbong University’ (미림대학이라 불리는
지휘자동화대학 or 223 연락소라 불리는 모란봉대학)
3. Some ‘cyber warriors’ are trained at Kim Il-Sung University
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Given such backgrounds, when Kim Jung-Un commanded to expand Bureau 6: Technology and
Cyberterrorists in August 2012, an organization under Reconnaissance General Bureau 407
(RGB), 408 into the Strategic Cyber Command, it was swiftly implemented by the head of the
RGB, Kim Young-Chol.409

Figure 5- RGB organizational chart, compiled with information from The Korea Herald, 38 North, and CSIS. 410

The RGB, also known as Unit 586, has been attributed to be the epicenter of the DPRK’s cyber
operations and has a long unique organizational culture. Subordinate to the DPRK’s Korean
People’s Army, the RGB was formed in 2009 after a large restructure of several state, military,
and party intelligence elements.411
The RGB inherited its predecessor organizations’ culture of being resourceful, clandestine, and
extreme. It can be said to have been the principal organization responsible for assassination
attempts,412 hijackings, plane bombings,413 and kidnapping since the 1950s. The organization

The general bureau is an integration of the reconnaissance department of the North Korean defense ministry,
the “operations department” which developed infiltration routes for secret agents and “Room 35” in charge of
international intelligence under the Workers’ Party –“Reconnaissance General Bureau is heart of N.K. terrorism”,
Kim So-Hyun, May 26, 2010, The Korea Herald.
408 Unit 586 is another name for RBG used on official occasions by DPRK
409 Kim Yong-chol is head of national intelligence of DPRK and was appointed by Kim Jung-Un after the death of
his predecessor Kim Yang-gon’s questionable car accident. He was attributed to be the mastermind behind the
attacking and sinking of South Korean navel ship in 2010.
410 “North Korea Is Not Crazy,” Insikt Group, June 15, 2017. https://www.recordedfuture.com/north-korea-cyberactivity/
411 Recorded Future Insikt Group, “Report: North Korea Cyber Activity”, July 25, 2017.
412 Blue House Raid in January 20, 1968 against South Korean President Park Chung Hee
413 Korean Air Flight 858 bombing in November 29, 1987
407
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has also been considered as the advance guard for drug smuggling, counterfeiting, and such
criminal activities.
Cyber operations being carried out by an institution with such organizational history will with
high confidence maintain a similar mindset towards cyber and its utility as a means to an end.
Historically, the RGB’s unique sub-culture prioritizes the accomplishment of state goals over all
else: this will continue to hold true for cyber activities as well, where the RGB is the primary
implementor of North Korean cyber operations.
The cyber domain has proven to Kim Jung-Un and to the policymaking elites to be a realm which
can be exploited without attracting uncontrollable tension or escalation. Kim Jung-Un and the
elites serving the Kim family cannot stop taking advantage of the opportunities in the cyber
domain due to internal politics and because cyber activities bring hard cash home. Because
unspoken opinions of the DPRK’s elite ruling class are more important than that of mass public,
the elites’ and Kim’s reliance on cyber will intensify unless Kim Jung-Un finds the cyber realm no
longer beneficial in respect to justifying his ‘right to rule’.
E FFICACY OF THE U SE OF F ORCE
The cyber domain has proved to be the most efficient realm for the DPRK’s military to carry out
state sponsored operations that delivered to the needs of the regime in terms of economics and
not escalating the tensions. According to Chris Inglis, the former deputy director of the U.S.
National Security Agency (NSA), cyber is a tailor-made instrument of power for North Korea.414
Most representatively, ‘Lazarus’, a group of hackers recognized across the cyber industry to be
behind the Sony Pictures hack and WannaCry ransomware attack, has also been attributed by
numerous private cyber shops with multiple campaigns against cryptocurrency exchanges in
South Korea (exchange name: Coinlink).

414 David E.

Sanger, David D. Kirkpatrick, Nicole Perlroth, “The World Once Laughed at North Korean
Cyberpower. No More.”, The New York Times, October 15, 2017, April 13, 2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/15/world/asia/north-korea-hacking-cyber-sony.html
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Such campaigns directly benefit the financial state of the North Korean government while
suppressing the potential for escalation of financial sanctions. In the end, advanced persistent
threat capabilities of DPRK allowed industrial espionage, global cryptocurrency ransomware,
and sabotage of specific companies lessened the pain of the regime having to provide to the
mass public which shows that cyber domain offensive is directly aligned to the interest of North
Korea.
N ON -S TATE A CTORS AND P ROXIES
North Korea has been known to utilize a proxy in the assassination of Kim Jung-Un’s brother at
Macau. The poisoning of such an important individual, which would surely attract international
attention, showed that North Korea will utilize proxies even in utmost important. However, the
current gridlock has rendered the use of conventional force to result in significant retaliation
including economic sanctions which greatly damage the North Korean leadership’s domestic
position.
In the cyber domain, cyber security experts only place four nations above North Korea’s cyber
capabilities (Russia, China, Iran, and the U.S.) and so North Korea would seem likely to have the
least amount of incentive to utilize proxies or non-state actors in the cyber realm –as proxies’
lack of skill in masking network intrusion or similar amateur failings would not serve even the
most basic clandestine requirements from cyber campaigns and operations of the DPRK.
On the other hand, if the non-state actors or proxies can provide higher level of sophistication in
achieving cyber offensive objective, North Korea would not hesitate to utilize such opportunities
as they have been known to leverage proxies before. Although cyber activities or use of proxies
have never been actually admitted by the DPRK, there seems to be confidence amongst the
cyber domain experts that the DPRK has been utilizing proxies and non-state actors to maximize
its benefitting from the cyber domain:
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“North Koreans earn foreign money by developing software in China and performing hacking
activities to collect national industrial secrets at the same time.”415
-Seo Sang-ki - Chairman of Intelligence Committee, National Assembly, South Korea
“Chinese and North Korean soldiers exchange malicious codes and attack techniques created by
Pyongyang.”416
- Kim Hung-kwang, President of the North Korea Intellectuals Solidarity
In case that the above statements are true, they indicate that the DPRK is not just capable of
working with non-state actors and proxies, but also indicates that it will almost certainly
leverage non-state actors and utilize proxies to the maximum capacity in order to continue
denying their involvement in cybercrime.
Although it is widely known that the DPRK carries out cyber operations in China, India, Malaysia,
New Zealand, Nepal, Kenya, Mozambique, and Indonesia,417 their presence is known to be very
complicated to track as members of North Korean cyber operations mask themselves as
software outsourcing companies, game developers, as well as disguise as employees of local
companies. Obfuscation technologies including wide adoption of virtual private networks (VPN)
and virtual private servers (VPS) to accomplish tasks such as large data transfer seems to already
have been set as best practices for overseas North Korean hackers.
North Korea’s use of proxies is further incentivized by the increasing rate of defection by the
population who interacts with the outside ‘them’ world. Laborers dispatched to foreign nations
by governmental efforts to bring home foreign currency has led to the realization of the
discrepancy in reality by the civil individuals with foreign engagement. Individuals belonging to
such population, despite extreme care of the North Korean government to keep things under
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416 Tim Maurer, “Cyber Mercenaries: The State, Hackers, and Power,” Camrbidge University Press (December 21st,
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control, either choose to defect or end up spreading the sense of discrepancy once they are back
in North Korea. In the cyber-warrior’s case, they have more incentives to defect as they know
they will be treated better elsewhere. The DPRK recognizing this has been known to send their
hackers aboard under strict supervision and watch from other non-cyber operators.
L EGAL F RAMEWORK
Rule of law or legal egalitarianism does not exist in North Korea. Approximately 40% of legal
statutes have been edited since Kim Jung-Un’s reign started. 418 Due to the government’s
carefully curated social acceptance to power hierarchy, the notion of equality that is central to
all socialist ideology is in reality completely disregarded.
Members of the civil society accept the discrimination between unofficial social rank as natural
-a characteristic that has been passed onto the society due to the closeness with the military.
Although North Korea asserts the idea of equality amongst all ‘comrades’, it goes no further than
empty rhetoric that serves to justify concentration of power to a single individual –the three
Kims.
Kim Jung-Un has prioritized cyber capabilities at par with missiles and nuclear warheads and
that has generated more than sufficient legal grounds for North Korea to further invest in cyber
capabilities. Investment towards gaming up North Korea’s cyber capabilities began with Kim IlSung; after watching the American “shock and awe”, it is reported that Kim Jong-Il warned his
military that “if warfare was about bullets and oil until now, warfare in the 21st century is about
information.” 419 Kim Jung-Un took it more strategic when he declared that “Cyberwarfare,
along with nuclear weapons and missiles, is an ‘all-purpose sword’ that guarantees our military’s
capability to strike relentlessly.” Such ‘supreme teachings’420 of the de facto gods have led to
not only to the justification for the state to further invest in cyber capabilities, but also to
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approach cyber as a key offensive tool of the DPRK government against their enemies. Cyber,
for North Korea, was given birth by the father for the son to wield with the exclusive purpose of
serving the state’s interest. The lack of a legal framework that checks and balances the Kim
family’s power domination does not exist -on the contrary, because the legal framework
revolves around hardening Kim’s power, as long as Kim Jung-Un sees utility in cyber, the DPRK’s
cyber activities will not stop.

M ILITARY -C IVILIAN R ELATIONSHIP
In the DPRK, advance information communication technologies (ICT) is a distinct tool available
only to select individuals in the state. Nationwide adoption of ICTs that fosters exchange of
information amongst civilians has been systematically discouraged by the state to preserve their
propaganda. The two aspects come together and enable the government to have an exclusive
use of ICT mainly to achieve broad state objectives through the cyber domain.
Also, the DPRK’s cyber capabilities and manifestation of those capabilities are exclusively
administered by the RGB, which is one of the most heavily guarded and isolated facilities in
North Korea –widening the divide between civilian and military’s access to ICTs and cyber.
Hence, it is highly improbable that civil hacktivism exists in North Korea. The ‘cyber warriors’
were originally trained overseas –mainly in China- and are well separated421 from the rest of the
society in order to perform to their maximum as well as to limit their identities being exposed to
the outside world –even the domestic world. The reality that most residents in North Korea do
not have access to open internet as well as sophisticated computing machines supports such
realities. Although events of North and South Korean hackers collaborating with facilitation by
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ethnic Korean hackers in China have been reported to exist behind data breach ATM malware
attack in March 2017422 –there doesn’t seem to be any trend in activities similar to that nature.
The aforementioned characteristics of the state with military and civil societies that are very
coupled together have undoubtedly necessitated from the leadership a socially perceived
‘adversaries’ to focus public attention on. To the civil society and to the military, the clear
adversaries are ‘them’: the imperialist U.S. and its partner South Korea.
International Organizations established by ‘them’ according to ‘their rules’ are no different in
adversarial nature and are conveyed equally threatening to the overall wellbeing of the North
Korean society. However, regardless of the military and civil society’s perception of the
adversary, the leadership’s and elites’ real threat can be said to lay in their own making.
Because they have been masking their policy and ideology failures for far too long, the
discrepancies between the reality of the world and how it is depicted by the North Korean
government to the people now exposes the ruling class to the risk of the ‘general population
doubting claims and statements by the government’. Here lies the DPRK’s vulnerability towards
free flow of outside information. If open internet propagates and there is free flow of
information, especially information which objectively represents the poor performance of the
DPRK relative to the global economy, materializes in North Korea –the leadership of the
government would crumble from the inside.
Because North Korea’s self-sufficing, and hostile military-minded policies set by leaders who
refused to relinquish power attracted international isolation, the North Korean society and its
culture have been closed off from developments the world has faced. Such phenomenon,
alongside the continued misinformation fed to the public to consolidate the Kim family’s power
have given birth to rising disbelief in the leadership at provinces where central government lacks
strong reach and oversight. The North Korean government’s ability to deliver provisions is the
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key factor in remote provinces and the failure of the state and the policymaking class has forced
informal market activities to spread despite extreme suppression by authorities.
Such increasing internal damage to the credibility and sustainability of power structure is a real
threat to the North Korean elites and international sanctions against the state intensifies the
problem.

ASSESSMENT OF DPRK’S POTENTIAL F UTURE DISPOSITION
M OST L IKELY F UTURE T RAJECTORY
Encompassing previous detailing of North Korea’s inclination to cyber offensive, beyond the
obvious continuation of current activities, one of the top three most likely future trajectories of
Pyongyang elites would consider installing malware that can lay dormant in U.S. critical
infrastructure systems,423 but that can effectively take down the system from its building-block
level and up when invoked. Critical infrastructure, such as the three core U.S. electricity grids,
are clear high value targets to cyber intrusion.
Although electricity market experts assert that due to the distributed control system nature of
the grid a complete shut down of power grid may seem unrealistic, it must be taken into
consideration that the RGB learns from foreign actors and the Ukrainian case serves as a great
example for North Korean strategists to concept out a new APT.424
Cyber-Kinetic attacks can pose advanced capability to render critical damage in the ‘Industrial
Control System Network (ICSN)’ 425 which encompasses the electricity system. Malware that
penetrates into the ICSN can allow the human behind the keyboard to figure out how the
infiltrated electricity grid system is engineered and cause direct physical harm to key

President Barack Obama - in his executive order 13636 which calls for buttressing of the current critical
infrastructure cyber security- defined critical infrastructure as ‘systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so
vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating
impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those
matters.’
424 Richard Clarke, Robert M. Lee, Kevin Mandia, Liam O’Murchu. “What is the Extent of the Problem?”, The 2017
Conference Energy Grid Cybersecurity Threats & Solutions, March 3-5, 2017, http://gridcybersecurity.org/
425 “Types of Industrial Control System”, Definition, Trend Micro,
https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/definition/industrial-control-system
423
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components that make up the electricity distribution network. Cyber land mines, which can also
be planted into ICSN, can bring down a power grid with a stroke of a key from the attacker.
In the United States, which has three major girds, if an attacker knocks out the ICSN network of
any one of those three or even a major portion of those three, it is estimated that the power
could be out for weeks, months, and up to a number of years for civilians and government alike.
A single grid power out would lead to tens of millions of Americans being deprived from all kinds
of other communications, medical supplies, and availability of just about everything we need to
sustain ‘normal’ life and culture.
Because actual trigger of dormant malware would be a clear act of war, the DPRK would most
likely only plant the malware as a fallback for the regime and, with high confidence, never pull
the trigger unless Kim Jung-Un’s life is directly threatened.
Second most likely is, with rise of the cloud computing industry, hijacking of computing
infrastructure, including hacking of Amazon Web Services accounts of poorly secured
programmers can become a lucrative exploit for North Korean hackers who are very cost
sensitive. 426 Individual developers with inappropriately loose cyber security policy allocation by
Identity Access Management (IAM) or self-imposed can expose themselves to a watering-hole
attack regarding educational materials on operating PaaS or IaaS which have risen in population
over the years amongst developers. Account credential theft can benefit the DPRK in multiple
ways including, utilizing the computing resources to mine cryptocurrencies, leverage for
botnets, and mask malicious deployment. It is highly probable that individual server operators
across the world whose main expertise are not on the servers are all potential targets for North
Korean hacker groups in this regard.
Last of the three most likely future trajectories is Kim Jung-Un and the RGB’s investment toward
long term (15~30 years) cyber-content capacity building. Content is key as it is central to the
media industry and the public’s consumption of information. The RGB has a long history of
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https://readwrite.com/2014/04/15/amazon-web-services-hack-bitcoin-miners-github/
426

141

experimenting their cyber capabilities in South Korea in terms of manipulating the public
sentiment. Currently, due to what deems to be intelligence failure, former directors of National
Intelligence Service of South Korea were arrested alongside charges of bribery. The two have
been working to counter what they claim is North Korean influence by operating South Korean
counter action team.
North Koreans and South Koreans have been fighting for the public’s attention on numerous
platforms, including Facebook, Twitter, Naver, and Daum 427 on political sentiments and
controversial issues via pre-worded commenting, identifying suspicious ids, and directly
communicating with the public. Although controversial, the undeniable fact is that the DPRK is
aware of platforms and their utility for social manipulation in democratic states.
In this respect, the Russian interference in the American election would also have been a
benchmark learning experience for RGB strategists. Considering the above along with the
longevity nature of totalitarian regime policies, it is possible to hypothesize that North Korean
strategists would seek to influence a democratic state’s public opinion by indirectly affecting
one of the five blocks in the digital media value chain.428
The digital media value chain segments are creation → management → distribution →
awareness → activation, and North Korea can concentrate their cyber capabilities in influencing
either the creation segment of the value chain or the management. For example, the RGB can
work to create original content that is designed around mockery of existing elected
policymakers -it would not only significantly undermine the RGB’s target individual, but it would
also act to discourage policy makers to ‘meddle’ with North Korea.
M OST D ANGEROUS F UTURE T RAJECTORY
The most dangerous future scenario would be North Korea wrongly being accused of a cyber
offensive and being cornered into a kinetic act of war resolution. Most recently, North Korea had
been attributed to Olympic Destroyer malware outbreak which aimed to sabotage the Winter
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Olympics held at Pyeongchang, South Korea. However, this has been proven false by Kaspersky
Lab engineers, who strongly assert that Lazarus (North Korean cyber warriors) didn’t write the
code despite their appearance to look so.
“We can say with 100 percent confidence that the attribution to Lazarus is false...It is not
possible to completely understand the motives of this action, but we know for sure that the
creators of Olympic Destroyer intentionally modified their product to resemble the Bluenoroff
samples produced by the Lazarus group.”
- Kaspersky's technical report

Such false accusation caused by the difficult nature of the cyber domain could systematically
force the North Korean leadership into activating the first scenario of the aforementioned ‘Most
Likely Trajectory’ – an execution of attack on critical infrastructure would directly lead to
escalation of tension rapidly and uncontrollably for either states. North Korean elites have
structured their society in a way that leaves them with limited response decision choices in
exchange for continuation of power stability –such dynamics can be extended to the cyber
domain and should be considered as the most dangerous trajectory possible.
Undermining Kim Jung-Un’s leadership within North Korea would also be a personal red line for
Kim Jung-Un. Although seemingly unassociated with cyber, impossible cases such as the U.S.
pressuring Kim Jung-Un via enabling free flow of information for the mass population would be
detrimental to sustainability and safety of the regime. According to Kim Heung Kwang, who
defected after majoring in computer science at Kimceck Industrial College in North Korea, the
DPRK’s intranet is fully compatible with the worldwide internet. Kim Jung-Un, however, does
not allow landlines to be connected.429 If in any highly improbable case where North Korea is
enabled access to the current Western internet, the free flow of information would render Kim
Jung-Un to retaliate via triggering the aforementioned malware in U.S. critical infrastructure.
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INFORMING U.S. CYBER STRATEGY
Cyber has been proven to be an efficient tool to clandestinely reach out and accomplish
financially motivated state campaigns while at the same time not escalating the tensions
uncontrollably. Past reactions by WannaCry victim Sony, successful hacking of SWIFT system,
and the hacking of Japanese cryptocurrency exchanges have directly benefited North Korea
financially and incentivized the regime to continue the activities.
North Korea’s key decision makers have anticipated and confirmed that cyber offers high utility
in pursuing larger policy goals430 and further even more aggressive cyber activities seem highly
probable. More hackers having been assigned to money raising operations rather than
intelligence collection, signals that North Korean policy makers are concentrating cyber
capabilities to counter geopolitical pressure including economic sanctions from US, Japan, and
South Korea.431
For U.S. Cyber Command, drawing a clear online red line seems imperative as the nature of the
DPRK’s cyber operations render it nearly impractical to tackle via counter cyberattack. Because
most cyber campaigns are either political or economically driven with the end goal being
meeting objectives of the state, a potential solution to dampening cyber activities can be
directly negotiating with key policymaking elites of North Korea.
The DPRK will continue to be far less vulnerable to cyber-retaliation while their cyber offensive
capabilities have been tailor-made under ‘supreme teachings’ of Kim Jung-Il and Kim Jung-Un.
That, coupled with the reality that North Korean cyber operations are carried out clandestinely
in third-party nations makes the situation seem as if fighting against a ‘ghost’: the ghost can’t
be hunted or hurt but it can hurt you.
Such operational characteristics originate from North Korean cyber being founded by the RGB,
where extreme and critical campaigns, such as presidential assassination or airplane bombings,
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are masterminded and executed. As much as the DPRK’s brinkmanship regarding nuclear
threats seems crazy but actually are rational and highly calculated, RGB’s cyber offensive will be
as extreme and well-thought out with the end goal being undermining, misinforming, and
disadvantaging the ‘American imperialists.’ This implies that the U.S. must also be as
comprehensive in their approach to cyber defense as DPRK’s cyber offensive is. Undermining,
misinforming, and disadvantaging the U.S. involves targeting not only mass population and
private companies, but also targeting specific individuals that may be advantageous to leverage
against the U.S. government entities such as Cyber Command or high rank officials of private
financial firms. Such comprehensive and combined (kinetic and cyber) offensives by DPRK will
require more private-public collaboration, as well as higher awareness from those in leadership
positions to address effectively.
Personal disposition of the dictator will be manifested in cyber as his ‘expressed will’ would be
directly reflected into cyber offensive policies with minimum filter from the policymaking elites.
Not only that, due to distinct power structure of the totalitarian regime, Kim Jung-Un’s order to
execute a full scale cyberattack to critical infrastructure can materialize into executed code in a
matter of minutes.

RECOMMENDED AREAS FOR F UTURE RESEARCH
Kim Il-Sung, Kim Jung-Il, and Kim Jung-Un’s speeches and texts are considered as ‘supreme
teaching’ and serve as the legal basis of policy making. Their words are carefully curated, and
content of the Kim’s voices are buttressed by systematic idolization via symbols and portraits
that are installed in every town, and every home. Intentional eradication of religion by the Party
played a great role in idolization of the Kim family and carefully chosen vocabularies for
propagandas allowed not only consolidation of power, but also the words of Kim Jung-Un to
effectively serve as the law within North Korea. Authoritative ‘teachings’ and speeches by the
North Korean leaders, carries skewed weight of importance in understanding the legal affairs of
North Korea.
Taking into consideration the skewed weight of importance of the DPRK leadership’s public
statements, it is recommended that U.S. Cyber Command set up an automated process that
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allows comprehensive understanding of what the DPRK leadership states. For instance,
according to a natural language processing analysis paper by members of the Seoul National
University using advancement in machine learning, 69 of the DPRK’s new year statements
consist of only 18 topics and the specific topics’ importance rises and falls according to the North
Korean government’s policymaking environment, which takes into consideration domestic and
foreign affairs of the state.432

Fig. 6- New Year Address clustering structure diagram via correlation coefficient analysis: Cluster analysis diagram
shows significance in DPRK regime-level political changes.

•

Left to the center of the diagram represents low level of changes (during the Kim Il-Sung
regime);

•

The spike in the middle of the diagram in 1951 to 1953 represents the Korean War;

•

The right side of the diagram from 2013 to 2002 represents Kim Jung-Il to Kim Jung-Un
regime; and

•

Far right cluster from 1946 to 1950 represents immediately before the outbreak of the
Korean war.

According to the authors, specific key word appearance in the ‘New Year Address’ had high
correlation with changes in the DPRK state level, such as the outbreak of the Korea war, rise of
Kim Il-Sung regime, the USS Pueblo incident, and nuclear development and atomic audit issues,
432 Jong Hee
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rise of Kim Jung-Il, and rise of Kim Jung-Un. These show that New Year Addresses reflect
political changes in respect to DPRK.
Caveat acknowledged by the researchers is that the New Year Address is more about informing
on how the DPRK leadership ‘feels’ about the past and present –and that users of such analysis
must take caution in futures analysis. It is recommended that in order to accurately predict the
DPRK leadership’s intents imbedded in the New Year Address documents, the analysts must
take into consideration 1) the DPRK’s official stances; 2) Chosun central news; and 3) Labor
News, and place the New Year Address as the centerpiece of the comprehensive analysis.

Fig. 7- Pearson correlation amongst North Korean Leadership’s New Year Addresses from 1946 to 2015: Text
analysis using Pearson correlation in 69 New Year Address Statements and 6,415 morpheme words (Smallest
grammatical unit of a language meaning it is the smallest meaningful unit of a language.) mentioned in the
addresses by DPRK’s Leaders.

According to key terminology frequency and meanings attribution analysis to three key
vocabularies mentioned in the DPRK leadership’s New Year Addresses: 1) American (미제), 2)
Southern Chosun (남조선 Republic of Korea), and 3) Nuclear (핵) contents of New Year Address
documents are closely correlated to the DPRK foreign policies towards the U.S. and South Korea
as well as towards the nuclear affair. This allows inference of how the DPRK leadership ‘feels’
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towards the issues. In relation to cyber, automated analysis like this can reveal how the DPRK
leadership ‘feels’ towards state affairs that are seemingly unrelated to cyber but acts reciprocally
in the cyber domain.
Extending upon the emphasis on importance of understanding the leader of North Korea -in
order to decompose the cyber issue, future research can be structured around parsing Kim JungUn’s public speeches, publication and track changes in the dictators thought over time, and in
association with cyber incidents. Along with further research on domestic cyber defense
capabilities, especially on electricity grid and implementation of smart cities, such research
efforts can allow decision makers to concentrate limited cyber assets to actionable programs
against potential North Korean cyber intrusion if the most dangerous scenario occurs.
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COMMON THEMES AND GENERAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S.
This report conducted deep analysis on China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea delving into their
strategic culture, how they understand the cyber domain, and projecting what their most likely
and most dangerous futures will look like. Each case study produced distinct findings, but
common elements within each were present. Imbedded within all four state’s strategic culture
is the dominating influence of an authoritative leader, animosity towards the West, and a strong
patriotic/nationalistic response to perceived slights. Throughout the course of this project, the
paramount element that manifested amongst each is the use of the cyber domain as an
equalizer in the following four areas.
1. All four states analyzed in this report desire prestige or relevance on the international
stage, and have developed Cyberwarfare strategies around achieving this objective;
2. For each of the cases, the understanding of the cyber domain is coupled with the state’s
understanding of Information Warfare (IW);
3. All four cases share the desire for sustaining their regimes; and
4. For each of the cases in this report, cyber capabilities have become an extension of their
asymmetric warfare capability. Of particular importance is their use of proxies and the
civil sector for achieving this means.
Within this mindset of equalization, the control over information is an integral part of all four
state’s cyberwarfare strategies, both domestically (defense) and internationally (offense). The
cyber domain is being used to further drive animosity for the West amongst its citizens and has
enhanced all four nation’s ability to conduct military operations as a means to project power for
coercion, while still remaining just short of the threshold for military response. These states see
the cyber domain as a vail of deniability for actions that might evoke negative repercussions
against them.
Capitalizing on cyber’s plausible deniability, China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are able to
employ non-state actors and proxies as legitimate conductors of operations that would normally
evoke a response from the United States, while still claiming to adhere to international laws and
norms. So far, offensive cyber operations have coincided with perceived national slights.
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By obfuscating the motivations behind these cyberattacks, each state has been able to claim
that patriotic hackers conducted these operations without any government or military
coordination. Stemming from each state’s authoritative regime is the concept of cyber war
being integrated into their concept of total war. This integration is most clearly seen when
looking at Russia’s hybrid warfare operations, where cyber was used as a precursor to kinetic
operations. By centering their cyberwarfare strategies around the idea of total war, these states
have created a consistently effective asymmetric mechanism to undermine the U.S. and its
Western allies. Weaponizing the cyber domain has created a means for all four states to gain
information advantages over adversaries, while still maintaining plausible deniability.
By developing their cyber capabilities along with advanced technologies, each state has been
able to lessen its dependence on the West and establish itself as a model for states wishing to
do the same. Their use of the cyber domain as a means to gain advantages over countries with
superior military capabilities is evident from their attempts to achieve information dominance
in industrial sectors, critical infrastructure, and intelligence agencies. Offensive cyber operations
attributed to these states have been geared towards intelligence gathering, disruption, and
industrial intellectual property theft. As these operations have traditionally fallen under
accepted espionage behavior, the response options to these incidents remains limited. By
employing the cyber domain in such an asymmetric manner China, Russia, Iran, and North
Korea, have avoided military pressure, accelerated their economic advancement, and enhanced
their ability to develop and deploy new military capabilities, both conventional and in cyber.
Based on these common themes we recommend three areas for which U.S. Cyber Command
needs to be aware:
1. When predicting the future cyber behavior of these four states, accounting for their
acute sensitivity to regime stability is paramount. Any activity conducted by the U.S. that
might be perceived as disruptive to these regimes, such as the U.S. continuing to pull
economic levers as a means to influence these four nations, there is a high likelihood they
will respond via the cyber domain. This response may present itself as an offensive
operation or in a defensive information control operation. As there are already questions
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around whether the 2015 cyber agreement between the U.S. and China has actually had
any impact on Chinese economic cyberattacks, the current trade war could easily push
China to resume these industrial espionage operations. If the recent comments around
the Iran nuclear deal are perceived by the Iranian regime as legitimate threats that will
lead to newly imposed sanctions, Iran may retaliate with cyberattacks against economic
targets associated with the U.S. Our earlier analysis of Iran has illustrated this vindictive
behavior is well within the realm of possibility for Iran. North Korea has been able to
offset some of the financial effects of economic sanctions imposed on them through
cyber operations. Economic cyber activity will continue and potentially expand for North
Korea especially as tensions with the U.S. rise. Over the past ten years, Russia has
ramped up its use of offensive cyberattacks and has become embolden in its targets, as
seen in the recent Democratic National Convention (DNC) hack and election meddling.
As relations between the U.S. and Russia continue to deteriorate and the effects of newly
imposed sanctions are felt by Russia, the likelihood of them resorting to a cyber response
is extremely high.
2. Defending against operations conducted by these states will continue to be a challenge
for Cyber Command because of their willingness to employ the civil sector and proxies in
the cyber domain. As illustrated in our analysis, these four states have integrated cyber
into all aspects of the state. Because of this asymmetric behavior the U.S. is faced with
enemies that are drastically different than itself. These non-state actors provide the
adversaries with greater control and flexibility in the domain. Proxies also adhere to their
own ideals and motivations, meaning they operate according to different rules.
Traditional or excepted norms for state behavior do not apply to these actors. This should
be the greatest area of concern for United States Cyber Command. This plays an
important role in assessing threats to America’s critical infrastructure because of the
pervasive Russian presence. China also seems to have started shifting focus from
intellectual property theft to a more highly precise offensive targeting of critical
infrastructure. In addition to the threat posed by Russia and China, Cyber Command
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must be on the look out for Iranian and North Korean threats to critical infrastructure as
well. Due to the lack of ICT infrastructure, threats posed from these two states is of
particular importance. Since both states are relatively insulated from a U.S. cyber
response, they perceive themselves as having a low level of vulnerability in this domain.
3. Preparation for continued contention over the cyber domain must take into account the
potential second and third order effects of peripheral diplomatic and military incidents
spilling over into the cyber domain. The recent kinetic action against the Assad regime
by the United States and its allies has real potential to cause cyber actors sympathetic to
the regime to retaliate against the United States, Israel, or Western interests. We cannot
rule out the possibility that Russia or Iran would use their cyber capabilities to attack the
United States in retaliation for the recent missile deployment in Syria. The cyber domain
offers opportunity for any of the four states evaluated in this report to capitalize on this
or some future incident to once again hide behind a proxy to attack the United States
with little blowback on itself. As spill over incidents continue to rise, the cyber
repercussions to future operations will have to be a considered before they are
conducted.
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